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Abstract
Simo Mannila, Vera Messing, Hans-Peter van den Broek, Zsuzsanna Vidra. 
Immigrants and Ethnic Minorities. European Country Cases and Debates. National 
Institute for Health and Welfare (THL), Report 41/2010. 105 pages. Helsinki, 
Finland 2010. ISBN 978-952-245-392-1 (printed), ISBN 978-952-245-393-8 (pdf)
The immigrants in the old EU Member States and ethnic minorities, in particular 
the Roma in the new EU Member States, face various risks of labour market and 
social exclusion many of which are of the same kind for the two groups. Coping 
with them presents rather important challenges to national governments. We look 
at labour market and social exclusion risks of immigrants and Roma, who are a key 
ethnic minority in the European Union, present an overview of latest immigration 
or minority policies, and describe and comment on some ongoing debates on 
the topic. Old emigration countries such as Spain and Finland have lately turned 
into immigration countries. However, the historical backgrounds and political 
responses in these countries are rather different, the main background factor 
bearing an influence on the responses is the volume of the phenomenon: today 
Spain is the leading immigration country in the European Union and the main 
entry into the EU for third country nationals, while in Finland the shift is much less 
dramatic. Hungary, Slovakia and Romania have all major Roma minorities, whose 
volume is somewhat controversial and who are disadvantaged in education and 
on the labour market; they show a strong benefit dependency, still, many of them 
live in extreme destitution in these countries. The Roma policies in these countries 
have varied during the transition and EU accession periods, but few have reached 
genuine results, thus, much remains to be done in order to develop effective socially 
inclusive policies for the Roma. 
The articles have been written in the context of Network of Excellence 
Reconciling Work and Welfare in Europe (RECWOWE), funded by the 6th 
Framework Programme (FP6) by Simo Mannila (National Institute for Health and 
Welfare, Finland), Hans-Peter van der Broek (University of Oviedo, Spain) and 
Vera Messing and Zsuzsanna Vidra (Hungarian Academy of Sciences). 
Keywords: immigration, ethnic minorities, Roma, social exclusion, European 
Union
4 Immigrants and Ethnic MinoritiesTHL – Report 41/2010
Tiivistelmä
Simo Mannila, Vera Messing, Hans-Peter van den Broek, Zsuzsanna Vidra. 
Immigrants and Ethnic Minorities. European Country Cases and Debates 
[Maahanmuuttajat ja etniset vähemmistöt. Kuvauksia muutamista Euroopan 
unionin maista ja niissä käydystä keskustelusta]. Terveyden ja hyvinvoinnin laitos 
(THL), Raportti 41/2010. 105 sivua. Helsinki, 2010. 
ISBN 978-952-245-392-1 (painettu), ISBN 978-952-245-393-8 (pdf)
Artikkelikokoelma pohtii maahanmuuttajien ja etnisten vähemmistöjen tilannet-
ta Euroopan unionissa muutamien maakuvausten avulla, jotka käsittelevät Es-
panjaa, Suomea (muutamin Ruotsia ja Norjaa koskevin vertailutiedoin), Unka-
ria, Slovakiaa ja Romaniaa. Maahanmuuttajat ja etniset vähemmistöt, erityisesti 
romanit Euroopan unionin uusissa jäsenmaissa, kokevat samankaltaisia sosiaali-
sen ja työstä syrjäytymisen uhkia, ja tämä tilanne on samalla tavalla haasteelli-
nen kansallisella tasolla eri maissa. Artikkeleissa kuvataan maahanmuuttajien ja 
etnisten vähemmistöjen, erityisesti romanien sosiaalisen ja työstä syrjäytymisen 
uhkia, luonnehditaan maahanmuuttopolitiikan ja etnisiä vähemmistöjä koskevan 
politiikan kehitystä ja kuvataan muutamia ajankohtaisia keskustelunaiheita, jotka 
eri maissa liittyvät maahanmuuttoon tai etnisiin vähemmistöihin. Maat, joista pe-
rinteisesti on muutettu pois, kuten Espanja tai Suomi, ovat nykyään maahanmuut-
tomaita. Niiden historia ja politiikan ratkaisut ovat kuitenkin melko erilaisia, ja 
tärkeimpiin erottaviin tekijöihin kuuluu ilmiön laajuus: tätä nykyä Espanja on Eu-
roopan unionin volyymiltaan tärkein maahanmuuttomaa ja myös Euroopan ul-
kopuolelta tulevien pääasiallinen tuloväylä, kun taas Suomessa muutos on ollut 
vähemmän dramaattinen. Unkarissa, Slovakiassa ja Romaniassa on suuria roma-
nivähemmistöjä, joiden koosta on erilaisia käsityksiä ja jotka ovat muita heikom-
massa asemassa koulutuksessa ja työmarkkinoilla; heidän toimeentulonsa riippuu 
myös paljolti erilaisista etuuksista ja he elävät silti syvässä köyhyydessä. Näiden 
maiden romanipolitiikat ovat vaihdelleet transition ja Euroopan unionin lähenty-
misprosessin aikana harvat niistä ovat saavuttaneet merkittäviä tuloksia ja tehok-
kaan sosiaalipolitiikan kehittäminen vaatii vielä työtä. 
Artikkelit ovat syntyneet Euroopan unionin 6 puiteohjelmahankkeen (FP6) 
Reconciling Work and Welfare in Europe (RECWOWE) työnä. Kirjoittajat ovat Si-
mo Mannila (Terveyden ja hyvinvoinnin laitos), Hans-Peter van der Broek (Ovie-
don yliopisto, Espanja) ja Vera Messing ja Zsuzsanna Vidra (Unkarin tiedeakate-
mia). 
Avainsanat: maahanmuutto/maahanmuuttajat, etniset vähemmistöt, Roma, 
sosiaalinen syrjäytyminen, Euroopan unioni
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1	 Foreword
Simo Mannila, Hans-Peter van den Broek, Vera Messing
This publication is a result of cooperation in a research task of Network of Excellence 
Reconciling Work and Welfare in Europe (RECWOWE, see http://www.recwowe.
eu), funded by the 6th Framework Programme (FP6). This project focuses on a 
number of actual themes, related on existing social and policy tensions in Europe, 
and pools and develops further scientific knowledge relevant to European social 
policy. These tensions are related to the interaction of employment and social 
security, which is often discussed as the problem of ’flexicurity’; to the interaction 
of work and family life, two key spheres of human life, but sometimes difficult to 
reconcile; to job creation in the context of global competition and maintaining 
high quality of working life; and to synthetizing these discourses in the existing or 
new paradigms of social policy. The project brings together over 20 partners from 
17 European countries. 
The task on the situation of immigrants and ethnic minorities in the European 
Union as well as policies and debates related to them was carried out in RECWOWE 
during 2007-09 by mainly three persons, Adjunct Professor Simo Mannila of 
National Institute for Health and Welfare (Helsinki, Finland), Dr Vera Messing of 
the Hungarian Academy of Sciences (Budapest) and Dr Hans-Peter van den Broek 
of the University of Oviedo (Spain); in this work and in this anthology participates 
also Ms Zsuzsanna Vidra of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. 
Dennis Bouget of the University of Nantes defined in a RECWOWE workshop 
Tensions between Work and Welfare in Nantes 2009 the following tensions 
important for the situation of immigrants and ethnic minorities: 
• The generational consequences of migrations and growing presence of 
ethnic minorities. Immigration into Western welfare states is changing the 
population structure: immigrants tend to be younger than the basic national 
populations. A main trend in social rights has been increasing irrelevance of 
national citizenship as far as the entitlement to welfare benefits is concerned.
•  Economic protectionism and social protectionism. The current financial crisis 
seems to give ethnicity a new role in social tensions, which may lead into 
social conflicts. 
•  Political risk under the present financial crisis may lead into economic and 
social protectionism which entails also a danger of extremist politics, the 
results of which already seen in some countries. 
•  Discrimination on the labour market at all levels of human capital. The nation 
states seem to be inable to accommodate growing ethnic diversity which makes 
the European Union’s predicament of migration, welfare, and citizenship more 
complex than the American experience (cf. Schierup, Hansen & Castles 2006).
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These tensions show the actuality of immigration, immigration policy and related 
debates. This paper brings together five articles rather different from each other by 
style and topics; it is a report on ’the state of the art’ of research, data sources and 
policies in some European contexts. The anthology highlights socio-political issues 
related to immigrants and ethnic minorities from the perspective of countries 
which are seldom in the key focus of European discourse defined more often by 
countries such as the United Kingdom, France, Germany or Italy. The first two 
articles describe the problems of immigrants and corresponding policies and 
debates in Spain, Finland and to a certain extent also in Sweden and Norway. The 
following articles highlight the situation of Roma in some new Member States of 
the European Union i.e. Hungary, Romania and Slovakia. 
The integration of immigrants and ethnic minorities in society depends in 
no small measure on their participation in the labour market – an integration that 
should be supported by public services (e.g. education, health care, social care) 
as well as anti-discrimination policy. In most old Member States of the European 
Union, social exclusion and discrimination in the labour market, as well as in other 
spheres of life, are risks faced disproportionately often by immigrants and their 
families. In the new EU member States, immigration is of minor social relevance, 
it is mainly domestic ethnic minorities such as, in particular, Roma, who suffer 
from social exclusion and discrimination. The common feature of both immigrants 
and ethnic minorities, however, is their high risk of being ‘othered’ by the ethnic 
majority and excluded from the labour market.
The country cases to be presented illustrate mutually very different situations as 
follows:
•  Spain is a ‘new immigration country’ i.e. immigration is rather new to Spain 
but it has grown dramatically during the past years, and presently Spain is the 
main ‘entrance gate’ to the European Union;
•  Finland, a country with a Nordic welfare model in social policy has changed 
from a long-time emigration into an immigration country but the immigrant 
flows are still rather modest; in the chapter on the Nordic region, Sweden 
and Norway are also described as two different cases of Nordic immigration 
history and policy;
•  Hungary and Slovakia are Central European countries where the presence 
of the Roma is a challenge to developing integrative employment policy and 
welfare state; 
•  Romania hosts a quarter to a third of European Roma population which 
meansw that it faces a similar but even stronger challenge than Hungary and 
Slovakia; additionally, since its entrance into the European Union, it has been 
estimated that up to 3 million people are at least temporarily working abroad 
or search for better paying jobs in other EU countries.
1   Foreword
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For each of these countries, we shall analyze the situation of the immigrants or 
Roma in the national labour market and welfare system. We assess, whether 
it would be possible, on the basis of the existing literature to find tendencies 
towards social integration, assimilation, segregation or exclusion of immigrants 
or ethnic minorities (Roma). Integration vs. segregation may occur at different 
levels: in relation to occupation, salary, participation in trade unions and political 
organizations, factors such as nationality, education, gender, age may bear an 
influence on the outcome of the acculturation process. 
The EU countries historical background as immigration or emigration states 
and the divergent challenges they face at the moment, are reflected in the academic, 
political and public debates on immigration and integration in these nations as 
well as in their immigration policies. Hence, we will also explore the immigration 
and minority policies and discuss the debates in the chapters that follow. Although 
our articles differ from each other, we want to emphasise our joint approach by a 
common list of references.
The contributions of this publication were written before the financial crisis 
we are facing in the European Union. This crisis most certainly bears an impact 
on the life of immigrants and ethnic minorities, and even more so on the national 
policies and debates on immigration and ethnic minorities. The present situation 
may give a possibility of an acid test to the European anti-discrimination policy 
and its national applications.
The authors would like to thank the RECWOWE Network of Excellence, 
and in particular, Professor Denis Bouget (University of Nantes), Dr Bruno Palier 
(Sciences Po Paris) and Professor Ana Guillén (University of Oviedo) for support.
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2	 Immigrants	and	ethnic	minorities			
	 between	work	and	welfare
Hans-Peter van den Broek, Vera Messing, Simo Mannila
This review will focus on tensions between labour and welfare and the labour 
market situation of immigrants in old Member States of the EU, but it also has 
a special focus on Roma in the new Member States of the European Union. We 
see the problems related to Roma integration in new Member States resemble in 
many respects the problems of immigrants; this may be even more true for the 2nd 
+ generation of immigrants in old EU Member States. The problems of integration 
of immigrants in Central and Eastern European countries cannot be compared 
to those of the immigrants in the older Member States for various reasons. The 
immigrant population in the former group of countries is negligible (around 1% of 
the population), while in some of the EU-15 Member States immigrants number 
over 10% of the population.  A large share of immigrants in the new Member 
States are very well trained, whose aim has been to find better paying jobs, and 
they rarely encounter social exclusion. Thus, if we focus on risks of social exclusion 
and discrimination across the EU, the problems typical of immigrants in many old 
Member States are experienced by Roma. This legitimizes our focus on the Roma 
as a special case of ethnic minorities and their vulnerability in our review.
Population numbers: immigrants and immigration 
trends in Europe
Immigration in Europe is a rather heterogeneous phenomenon. There are 
countries with a long history of immigration, countries that have only recently 
begun to attract immigrants, and some others that have changed from emigration 
into immigration countries; there are also countries experiencing both large-scale 
emigration and immigration. In some EU Member States labour immigration is 
very common, while other countries receive more refugees and asylum seekers or 
persons on the basis of family reunification. In crude terms we may distinguish 
three groups of countries in the European Union: (1) North and Central(-Western) 
European countries with an old tradition of immigration; (2) new mass immigration 
countries in Southern Europe, which previously were emigration countries (in 
particular: Spain and Italy) and (3) countries in Central and Eastern Europe, where 
large numbers of people have emigrated to the old Member States of the EU in 
search for work, but which at the same time experience some immigration pressure 
from some countries on the eastern border of the EU-27 (cf. Laparra & Martínez, 
2   Immigrants and ethnic minorities between work and welfare
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2008). And in contrast to the first two groups of countries where immigration is an 
important political issue, interethnic relations are shaped primarily by the presence 
of the Roma in the third group of countries. 
The countries with highest shares of non-native residents are small nations 
or microstates such as the EU-state Luxembourg, where in 2005 the share of non-
native inhabitants was 37 %. In the European Union countries the highest numbers 
of immigrants were in Germany, France, United Kingdom, Spain and Italy. The 
fastest growing immigrant populations are now in Spain and Italy: for instance, 
in 2005 the share of immigrants was 10.8% in Spain but in 2010 it was 12.2% with 
an increase of some 800 000 persons in five years. EU countries with a share of 
immigrants between 10% and 25% were Latvia (19%), Estonia (15%), Austria 
(15%), Cyprus (14%), Ireland (14%), Germany (12%) and Sweden (12%), Spain 
(12% in 2009), France (10%) and the Netherlands (10%). In Norway the share of 
non-native residents was 7%, in Finland 5% (in 2009), while in the new Member 
States the shares were very low, for instance in Romania it was less than 1%. 
However, the European countries with highest numbers of non-native residents 
are not in the European Union, they are Russia and Ukraine (United Nations 2005; 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Immigration_to_Europe). 
The increase of numbers of migrant in the different EU countries is highly 
divergent. Figure 1 (next page) gives a broad picture of the migration influx in the 
first five years of the new 21st century. Immigrant status was defined on the basis of 
the country of  birth.
In Spain, Italy, Ireland and Cyprus the migration inflows have the greatest 
relative impact on the countries’ original population. On the other hand, while 
the absolute numbers of migrants who settled in Ireland and Cyprus seem to be 
relatively low, Spain and Italy have received two to three times as many immigrants 
as Germany, France and the United Kingdom in the first half of the ongoing decade. 
The new EU Member States in Central and Eastern Europe can all be found in the 
left-hand part of the diagram, where the relative and absolute immigration numbers 
are either extremely low or even negative: in Poland, Romania and the three Baltic 
republics emigration surpasses immigration. Finland and the Netherlands, which 
we address in this publication, are two EU-15 member States with quite low net 
immigration according to the indicators used. 
Although Germany, France and the UK are the EU member States with the 
highest numbers of immigrants, the migrant influx to these countries from 2001 
has become relatively modest compared to what is happening in Spain and Italy 
today. Many immigrants who enter the European Union through its ‘Southern 
gates’ may, however, continue to countries in Northern Europe, where salaries tend 
to be higher, unemployment rates lower and the welfare state more developed. 
However, in recent years Southern Europe has also become the final target for a 
great number of migrants from Latin America, Africa and new EU Member States. 
In several Southern EU countries the huge influx of immigrants has engrossed the 
2   Immigrants and ethnic minorities between work and welfare
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national labour markets and contributed to the expansion of the informal economy, 
while, in Northern Europe immigration has in recent years been increasingly often 
based on family reunification and asylum and refugee policy. Few countries have 
developed a policy specifically aimed at attracting highly qualified immigrants but 
some initiatives are found in many countries (Laparra & Martínez, 2008).  
Figure 2 shows that in 2003 Spain and Italy were the countries that most 
contributed to the migration influx in the EU-15. Half of all immigrants who 
entered the European Union settled at least temporarily in the Iberian Peninsula or 
Italy. In comparison to this, the numbers of immigrants in the Northern EU States 
were small.
FIGURE 2. Contribution to net migration in EU-15, per country (2003)
FIGURE 1. Migration in EU-25 + Romania. Average annual growth and net migration per 
1,000 inhabitants (2001–2005)
(Laparra & Martínez, 2008, 3.)
   Annual average    Net migration/1000 
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(Eurostat, Statistics in focus, 3-1/2004, cited in CES, 2004, 16.)
From 2002 to 2006, immigration in the European Union grew by almost 25%. 
The countries where immigration numbers increased most were Spain, Italy and 
Ireland (cf. Herm 2008, 2). In the Netherlands, on the other hand, immigration 
declined during this period: the 2006 influx of newcomers was 11% lower than 
in 2002. In Finland, immigration has been increasing but is still rather low as 
compared to most of EU15. In 2006, all over the European Union about 3 million 
people settled in another country. This includes people who moved from one EU 
country to another. The following Figure 1.3 shows the origin of these immigrants 
according to continents and regions. Non-EU immigrants numbered some 1.8 
million people, whereas immigrants from other EU member States (in the diagram, 
Romania and Bulgaria were already included in the EU) numbered a total around 
1.4 million. In these numbers about half a million former immigrants who in 2006 
returned to their home countries are not included. Note that the percentages given 
here refer to the new immigrants in 2006, not to the total numbers of immigrants 
by 2006.
Figure 3 shows that 40% of immigrants in the EU countries came from another 
EU country i.e. there is a great deal of transnational mobility in the European 
Union. Nevertheless, the share of European immigrants from non-EU countries 
was only 14% i.e. comparable to those coming from Africa, Asia or America/s. 
Translation 
Reino Unido: UK 
Suecia: Sweden 
Alemania:  Germany 
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Figure 3. New immigrants by continents and regions of origin in the EU-27, 2006
(1) The share was less than 0.5% and the category “other” includes stateless and 
unknown citizenship.
(Herm 2008, 3, based on Eurostat and Migration Statistics.)
Among citizens of the EU-27 States, Polish migrants constituted the largest 
group with around 290,000 people; Romanians were the second one with some 
230,000 migrants. Moroccan immigrants constituted the most numerous group 
– 140,000 people – among the newcomers of non-EU origin. The absolute net 
migration figures for 2007 in the EU27 show that it was highest in Spain with 
684,000 and Italy with 454,000 net immigrants, followed by the UK (247,000) and 
France (100,000). The net migration rate was negative in Poland with a rate of – 
138,000 and Romania with a rate of – 100,000; the net immigration balance was 
also negative in Bulgaria, the Baltic States and surprisingly in the Netherlands. In 
all other countries the net immigration rate was positive in 2007 (also in e.g. the 
Czech Republic, Slovakia and Slovenia). (El Mundo 25.5.2008.)
Some EU countries attract immigrants of a wide variety of origins, while 
others have appealed to a reduced number of nationalities. We may also say that 
“[c]itizens of some countries are attracted by several Member States, while others 
have only one main country of destination” (Herm 2008, 4). Something similar 
happens to gender: for instance, in Slovenia four times more immigrant men 
than women entered the country in 2006, whereas Cyprus received twice as many 
women than men (Herm 2008, 5). 
There is also a wide variation in age among immigrant categories. The median 
age of EU migrants was in some countries 4 or 5 years higher than that of non-
EU immigrants. These differences can be explained by, for instance, the historic 
relations between the (receiving) EU Member State and the country of origin, the 
economic progress in the target country and its sectoral differentiation, and cultural 
or linguistic proximity between the target country and the country of origin. 
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Roma population in Europe
Figure 4 (next page) shows the estimated numbers and the relative shares of Roma 
population in various CEE countries. 
In contrast to immigrants, the Roma have settled in Europe centuries ago. 
Despite this fact, some numbers of Roma – especially in countries of South-Eastern 
Europe – still do not have official documents or, consequently, full citizenship rights. 
The exact number of Roma is uncertain, for several interrelated reasons: inaccurate 
data collection on ethnicity, data protection regulations or their misinterpretation, 
and, most importantly, the reluctance of Roma to register their ethnic origin in 
censuses because of – historically motivated – experience of stigma. The vast 
majority of Europe’s estimated 6-8 million Roma resides in the Central and East 
European countries, although there is a significant Roma population also in some 
old EU Member States: in Spain (700,000–800,000), France (280,000–340,000), 
Greece (160,000–200,000), the UK (90,000–120,000 incl. travellers), and Italy 
(90,000–110,000).
FIGURE 4.  Average Roma populations in selected countries and their share in total 
population (2000)
(Source: http://www.migrationinformation.org/Feature/display.cfm?ID=308.)
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EU and national policies on immigration and 
integration
In several treaties and agreements, the European Union has laid down the common 
policies on migration and the competencies of individual member States. The 1992 
Maastricht Treaty expressed an interest in establishing a common policy, but left 
the competencies of individual states in questions of asylum, immigration and 
internal borders as before, whereas the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997) took on a 
compromise to elaborate a common policy on immigration, introducing a special 
chapter (Title IV) on “Visas, Asylum, Immigration and Other Policies Related to 
Free Movement of Persons”, which stipulated the main measures such a policy 
should include. The objectives of a common EU policy on asylum and immigration 
were further agreed upon at the Tampere European Council of October 1999. 
Since Tampere, the common policy on asylum and immigration has consisted of 
the following basic elements: collaboration with countries of origin and transit; 
creation of a common European system of asylum; just treatment of citizens of 
third countries; and adequate management of migration flows. In relation to the 
point on cooperation with countries of origin and transit, it was decided at the 
Seville European Council (June, 2002) that in any future agreements between the 
EU and other countries clauses should be included on common management of 
migration flows and the compulsory readmission in case of illegal immigration. 
In 2003, the European Commission issued a communication on immigration, 
integration and employment “COM (2003) 336 final”, which stressed the need for 
a holistic approach to integration policies, focusing on the importance of social 
inclusion, economic and social cohesion and combating discrimination.
Today, in most countries with a long immigration tradition (e.g. France, the 
UK, the Netherlands), the children and grandchildren of the first immigrants 
participate in the national education system and immigrants are, as a rule included 
in the workforce, although there are cultural differences in immigrant women’s 
participation in paid work. Nevertheless, in several ‘old’ EU Member States, labour 
market and cultural-political integration not only of first-generation migrants but 
also of the second or even third generation has proven to be a rather difficult process. 
In a reaction to this, some of these countries have started to adopt coercive policies 
to promote the (‘civic’) integration of newcomers, such as the so-called ‘citizenship 
diplomas’ for immigrants in the Netherlands. In some other countries other forms 
have been adopted in order to promote the immigrants’ integration, e.g. in Finland 
there is a specific set of integration measures available for immigrants that will be 
described in the following chapter. 
Challenges of integrating immigrants largely resemble to some of those 
posed by the integration of Roma in CEE countries. Their situation is similar in 
various aspects: low labour market participation, higher welfare dependency, 
low educational levels and consequently lower chances of employment, higher 
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participation in the semi-legal or illegal segment of the labour market. In the 
EU countries there are active labour market policies as well as education policies 
targeted to groups at risk of social exclusion with  a special focus on Roma.
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3	 Nordic	immigration	policy	and	the		
	 new	emphasis	on	labour	immigration		
	 –	the	case	of	Finland	as	compared	to		
	 Sweden	and	Norway
Simo Mannila
This article describes immigrants and their integration in Finland, and to a 
certain extent in Sweden and Norway; some Finnish debates on immigrants and 
immigrant policy; and the latest policy development based mainly on Finland 
with some all-Nordic perspectives. The article does not address but in passim the 
traditional ethnic minorities in Finland, Sweden or Norway (e.g. Roma and Sami in 
all three countries, Finns in Sweden and Norway). I start by a concise description 
of immigration research in all three countries. 
Immigration research in Finland, Sweden and 
Norway – some key scientific bodies
Lately immigration and ethnic relations have become a very popular research 
topic in Finland. This has been supported by rather extensive research funded by 
the (previous) Finnish Ministry of Labour, a research programme funded by the 
Finnish Academy of Sciences focusing on ethnic relations, and there is also the 
Finnish Society for Ethnic and Migration Studies bringing together a large number 
of scientists on a multidisciplinary basis; the society also publishes a scientific 
journal in English. As of 2008 the immigration policy was transferred to the powers 
of the Finnish Ministry of Interior, and it remains to be seen what kind of impact 
this will have on Finnish research on immigration. 
 Some of the most interesting research centres in Finland working with 
immigration are the Institute of Migration in Turku (www.siirtolaisuusinstituutti.
fi) and the Centre of Ethnic Research CEREN at the Swedish School of Social Work 
at the University of Helsinki (www.helsinki.fi/). The former institute has earlier 
focussed exclusively on Finnish emigration, but it makes an effort to develop 
also research into immigration; the latter body is e.g. a member of the IMISCOE 
Network of Excellence. Extensive studies into discrimination on the basis of ethnic 
origin have been carried out at the Institute of Social Psychology of the University 
of Helsinki (e.g. Jasinskaja-Lahti & al. 2003), and the Finnish League of Human 
Rights has a long time composed a yearly report on discrimination in Finland 
(e.g. Lepola & Villa 2007). As a new scheme of monitoring discrimination, this 
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reporting will in the future be tendered out by the Finnish Ministry of Interior. 
Some of the themes studied more thoroughly are the Russian-speaking, ethnically 
Finnish and Estonian immigrants in Finland, their risks of social exclusion and 
discrimination (Liebkind & al. 2004) and female immigrants between work and 
welfare (Martikainen & Tiilikainen 2007). The National Institute for Health and 
Welfare is presently starting a major study on immigrant health and well-being, 
focusing on Russian-speaking, Kurdish and Somali immigrants by the model of 
Finnish Health 2000 survey implemented earlier (cf. Aromaa & Koskinen 2003; 
http://www.thl.fi/fi_FI/web/fi/hankesivu?id=22131).
During the first years of the 2000s, Statistics Finland implemented a living 
conditions survey of four immigrant groups, Russian-speakers, Estonians, 
Vietnamese and Somalis (Pohjanpää & al. 2003; Paananen 2004), but there is 
no ongoing living conditions survey covering all immigrants in Finland. The 
yearly publication Immigrants and Foreigners in Finland, compiled by Statistics 
Finland on the basis of various register data contains some interesting data such as 
unemployment rates per immigrant groups (e.g. Nieminen 2006). 
Nevertheless, Finnish research into immigrants and immigration policy is of 
later origin if compared to that in Sweden or Norway. This is due to the fact that 
immigration to Finland is also rather new as compared to that to Sweden or Norway, 
and the shares of immigrants in these three countries differ widely. In Finland, the 
foreign-born population numbered around 188,000 in 2006 (Maahanmuuttajat 
Suomessa 2009), in Norway (2008) 460,000 (Innvandrere i Norge 2009) and in 
Sweden (Statistiska centralbyrån 2007) 1,900,000. The Finnish population is 
around 5.2 million; the population of Sweden is 9.2 million and that of Norway 
approximately 4.8 million. This means that the share of foreign-born population is 
by far the smallest in Finland (according to the latest data grown to 5%), and the 
highest in Sweden (over 17%); in Norway the share is over 8%. 
Nordic countries have very different shares of immigrants in the whole 
population; nevertheless, it is to be expected that in the future the direction is 
towards some convergence; for instance, the pace of growth in immigration in 
Finland is now comparable to or higher than that in other Nordic countries, and 
in particular the number of refugees and asylum-seekers has risen during the past 
few years in Finland. Also, the development of immigrant policies points towards 
some convergence in the future.
In Sweden and Norway the interest in immigration and immigration policy 
is very long-standing, partly since immigration has been an important means to 
increase labour supply. There has also been a standard practice to implement living 
conditions surveys of various types on immigrant population (e.g. Tema invandrare 
1991; Social och ekonomisk förankring 1999 & Olika villkor - olika hälsa 2000; 
Blom 1998; for Denmark, cf. e.g. Mikkelsen 2001). In Sweden the Central Bureau 
of Statistics SCB publishes a great deal of statistics and research on its web-page 
www.scb.se, similarly to the migration administration Migrationsverket (www.
3   Nordic immigration policy and the new emphasis on labour 
immigration – the case of Finland as compared to Sweden and Norway
20 Immigrants and Ethnic MinoritiesTHL – Report 41/2010
migrationsverket.se). Another key administrative organ was Integrationsverket 
(integration administration), closed for administrative reorganization: it has 
produced a high number of interesting research and statistics during its existence 
(available now on www.mkc.botkyrka.se). 
One of the key research institutes in migration studies in Sweden is the Centre 
for Research in International Migration CEIFO with the University of Stockholm 
(www.ceifo.su.se), and another one is Stockholm University Linnaeus Center for 
Integration Studies (www.su.se/sulcis). There is also the Immigrant Institutet, 
with less emphasis on research and more on documentation and information 
dissemination (www.immi.se). Additionally, there is, among other things, a long-
standing tradition in research on discrimination and racism by Integrationsverket 
(with a number of barometers published) and academically by Anders Lange 
et al. (e.g. 1995; 1996; 1997 & 1999). At Karolinska Institutet a great number of 
dissertations focusing on immigrant health have been produced (many listed in 
Mannila 2008; Gadd 2006; Hjern & al. 2001; Klinthäll 2007; Bask 2005; Österberg 
& Gustafsson 2006; from Norway e.g. Syed & al. 2006). 
In Norway, some of the key research centres in the field include International 
Migration and Ethnic Relations Research Unit at the University of Bergen (http://
imer.uib.no), a key player in the Nordic IMER immigration research network, as 
well as FAFO (www.fafo.no) with a long-standing interest in neighbouring countries 
(incl. the Baltic States and Russian Federation) and, increasingly, on immigration, 
immigrants in the labour market and their social protection. A special focus of 
FAFO has lately been on Polish immigrants in Norway, their labour market status 
and living conditions. 
These are merely some key information sources in Swedish and Norwegian 
immigration research - in some form or at some level immigration is a topic of 
interest in all Nordic universities, and in all countries there are also administrative 
reports giving useful information on immigrants’ life and policies designed for them 
nationally and locally. Worth mentioning is also the Nordic Migration Research 
network maintained by the University of Copenhagen and bringing together some 
researchers and projects from all Nordic countries (http://nordicmigration.saxo.
ku.dk). In the Network of Excellence Reassessing the Nordic Welfare State, funded 
by all Nordic Academies of Science (www.reassess.no) there is also a research 
strand on immigration.
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Immigrants and their social situation in Finland, 
Sweden and Norway
Ethnic background of immigrants
In Finland the largest group of immigrants by the country of origin consisted in 
2004 of people born in Russia or in the Soviet Union (26%), and the second largest 
group of those born in Sweden (18%). To a very large extent these two groups 
contain persons of Finnish origin, either from the Finnish minority in Russia or 
returning Finnish emigrants to Sweden in the 1960s or 1970s plus their children 
(see more in detail later in this article). The next ethnic groups by the country of 
origin were Estonians (7%), countries that were part of the former Yugoslavia (3%), 
Somalia (3%), Iraq (3%) and Germany (3%). 
By language, we get a somewhat different picture: after Russian-speakers 
and Estonians there is a considerable minority speaking Albanian (mainly from 
Kosovo) or Arabic (from a number of Arabic-speaking countries from Morocco to 
Iraq). Besides Russian-speakers and those coming from Sweden, also a high share 
of persons coming from Estonia have been of Finnish origin. Presently, the share of 
Estonians is growing very fast in Finland, and there is also a large number of those 
who commute to work in Finland having the basic domicile in Estonia: the size of 
this group is not known but it is estimated to be tens of thousands. The profile of 
immigrants to Finland during 1994-2006 has been rather stable: the three most 
common countries of origin have been Sweden, Estonia and Russia. The relatively 
large Somali, Kosovan, and Iraqi minorities reflect the national policy focusing on 
refugees or asylum-seekers (Heikkilä & Pikkarainen 2008). 
In Sweden by far the largest minority consists of Finns, who belong to two 
groups: approximately 50,000 persons who belong to the traditional Finnish 
minority in Northern Sweden and are not immigrants, and 450,000 persons, 
who emigrated from Finland mainly in the 1960s and 1970 (including the second 
generation). Other major minorities consist of persons born in the countries 
of the previous Yugoslavia and many other groups, for instance, Assyrians or 
Syrians (approximately 100,000). Presently, there is a major gender difference in 
immigration to Sweden: for men, the most common countries of origin are Iraq, 
Turkey, USA, United Kingdom and Poland, for women Iraq, Thailand, Poland, 
China and Russia. The largest group of those who came as refugees or asylum-
seekers consists of people from Iraq (35%), followed by persons from the countries 
of the former Yugoslavia (Kosovo, Bosnia-Herzegovina), Somalia, Iran and 
Afghanistan. 
We see that the profile of Swedish immigrants is characterized by labour 
immigration previously from Finland and nowadays e.g. from Poland and the 
Baltic States - and a humanitarian emphasis as reflected in the very high figures 
of refugees and asylum-seekers (e.g. Invandrare i Sverige 2009). The latter is even 
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more true for Norway, where the largest groups have come from Pakistan (28,000), 
Sweden, Iraq, Somalia, Denmark, Poland, Vietnam, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Iran and 
Turkey (Malmberg 2008; Blom 2008a). In Norway, the immigrants’ ethnic profile 
is more multi-faceted than in Finland (dominated by ethnic Finns and Russian-
speakers) or in Sweden (dominated by Finns); it has consisted largely of refugees 
or asylum-seekers plus persons from other Nordic countries who often may have 
come for work or as a result of marriages. Nevertheless, the Norwegian high salary 
and wage levels increasingly attract today labour immigrants from the new - and 
some old - EU Member States (e.g. Poland).
Besides labour immigration and humanitarian policies towards refugees and 
asylum-seekers, the third very important reason for immigration to the Nordic 
countries is intermarriage. We can see this very clearly among Russian-speaking 
immigrants to Finland (Liebkind & al. 2004), and the importance of certain 
countries among the countries of origin of immigrants also reflects this: e.g. Thai and 
Russian women coming to Sweden. According to Finnish research intermarriages 
contribute to good integration (Jääskeläinen 2003); but this must be contrasted 
with the vulnerability of immigrant families (see below) – this vulnerability may, 
however, relate both to intra- as well as intermarriages. At present there is also 
a discourse in Nordic countries concerning immigrants’ role in ‘opening doors’ 
to new immigrants (e.g. children first, then their parents; men first, then their 
families). According to recent Swedish research, altogether 16% of immigration to 
Sweden could be explained by this phenomenon, i.e. by the immigration that has 
taken place earlier (Anhöriginvandrare och deras familjer 2008). 
Some comments on two traditional ethnic minorities in Finland, Sweden 
and Norway. The Sami people are the only indigenous people living in all three 
countries (plus Russia): they speak a Finno-Ugric language (with some dialects) 
but the largest number of Sami lives in Norway (60,000–100,000, depending on the 
definition). Altogether there are fewer than 140,000 Sami, with 15,000–25,000 in 
Sweden, 6,000–10,000 in Finland and 2,000 in Russia. Another traditional ethnic 
minority consists of Roma with approximately 40,000 in Sweden, 10,000 in Finland 
and 500 in Norway. Similarly to Sami, the Roma group is internally heterogeneous, 
in particular in Sweden, consisting of immigrants from very many countries. The 
Sami and Roma languages have obtained the official status of a minority or regional 
language in all three countries; the same goes recently for Finnish in Sweden, while 
Swedish is one of the two national languages in Finland. 
The status of the Sami and the Roma is fairly stable in Nordic countries, and 
it is to be feared that the Roma and the Sami, to a certain extent, are presently 
neglected in the discourse on immigrants and ethnic minorities, which focuses on 
new issues that are seen more challenging (e.g the role of Islam). 
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Immigrants, labour market status and subsistence
In Finland, a larger share of immigrants than that of the native population is of 
the standard working age between 15–64 years (79% vs. 66%). However, only 60% 
of the immigrants belong to the labour force, as contrasted to 75% of the basic 
population. In particular, labour market participation is lower than that of the 
native population and also lower among women (55%) than among men, due to 
cultural traditions of some immigrant groups. 
A key characteristic of Finnish immigrants’ life is a marginal labour market 
status including higher risk of unemployment. According to statistical data, we 
could state that the unemployment rate of immigrants varies by economic cycles 
in parallel to that of the general demand for labour but in general it has been 
manifold as compared to that of the native population. The general unemployment 
rate for Finland was 7% in 2008, but for immigrants the rate was around 20%, 
with considerable variation by ethnic group. EU citizens and people from other 
‘Western’ countries, like the USA and Australia, manage just as well as the basic 
population, followed by the Estonians and Russians or other Eastern European 
immigrants; those immigrants who came to Finland as asylum seekers or refugees 
manage much worse (in particular, those from Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, Somalia, 
Sudan, according to the Finnish Government Report… 2008). These differences 
may be related to cultural factors, education, health status and life course (e.g. 
Mannila 2008) as well as to discrimination (Jasinskaja-Lahti & al. 2003). 
In Sweden we see very much a similar phenomenon to that in Finland. While 
the share of persons in the labour force for those born in Sweden is close to 80%, the 
share of those of Nordic (usually Finnish) origin is already more than 10% lower. 
The lowest shares are among African- and Asian-born immigrants, somewhat 
over 40% (Integration 2008), and as far as the gender difference is concerned, we 
see a similar profile to that in Finland. Swedish data also show that for immigrant 
women, in particular for those from African, Asian, South American and non-
EU-European countries it is more difficult than for the native population to turn 
the education into occupational success. Altogether, the shares of workforce for 
foreign-born men were 12% and for women 18% less than for native-borns in 
Sweden (Statistikrapport 2007; Integration 2008). 
For Norway, we see that the share of persons in workforce among Sri Lankan 
immigrant men is as high as or higher than among the native population. Among 
female immigrants, only Bosnia-Herzegovinian women matched Sri Lankan 
women in this respect. The ethnic groups with the lowest employment rate in 
Norway are Somali, Iraqi, Iranian and Pakistani (Mathisen 2008) – i.e. some of 
the largest immigrant groups in Norway. Thus, on average, immigrants in Norway 
seem to have a different, more vulnerable, profile than immigrants in Finland or 
Sweden since until lately the share of labour immigrants has been less in Norway. 
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Liebkind & al (2004) found for Finland that immigration usually meant going 
down occupationally: among Estonians, Russian-speakers, and ethnic Finns, only 
Estonians were mainly able to maintain their previous occupational level. We find 
similar recent results in Sweden for immigrants of Nordic origin, who constitute 
the only group of immigrants who maintain pre-immigration occupational status. 
This may partly be explained by the “salmon” hypothesis: unsuccessful migrants 
tend to return to the country of origin, which is very easy between Nordic countries 
and Estonia that is, it may not be so easy for these groups either, but we do not 
find the unsuccessful immigrants since they have returned. For Norway, the results 
show a mismatch between immigrants’ education and occupation level with an 
occupational traiectory going down (Mathisen 2008).
In general, immigrants’ education as well as their qualification in general are 
very difficult to measure in a way comparable to that of the native population, and 
usually comprehensive ethnic samples consist of persons who have acquired the 
education and training in the country of origin as well as of persons who have 
received their education and training in the target country – but these groups may 
be received in a completely different way in the labour market. The key Norwegian 
report points out the inadequacy of the national official register data and a need 
to carry out survey research: in reality the education is often higher than what the 
registers show (Henriksen 2008).
Looking at education levels we see a rather direct link to successful 
employment. Thus, 38% of Russian-speakers and 21% of Estonians in Finland 
have an upper high-level education, while the corresponding share among Somali 
is only 10% and among the Vietnamese 8%. The figure for the whole population 
in 2001 was 32%. Altogether, 27% of Somali and 34% of Vietnamese immigrants, 
but only 2% of Russian-speakers, lacked basic education (Pohjanpää & al. 2003); 
we have similar information concerning Vietnamese immigrants to Norway (25%; 
Henriksen 2008).
A similar differentiation is found also in Sweden, with Nordic immigrants more 
or less at the Swedish level, and Asian, African and non-EU European immigrants 
at the bottom of the scale (Integration 2008). Norway shows a somewhat different 
pattern, with over 40% of Iranian immigrants having higher education; also 
Chilean and Iraqi immigrants often have very high education. The results are largely 
explained by the high share of persons in these groups who came to Norway at a 
very young age. This, however, indicates that there is a variation among groups of 
refugees and asylum-seekers, among whom there are some groups with a very large 
share of intelligentsia and other groups with a large share of persons lacking basic 
education. The high education does not always turn into labour market success, at 
least not for men and women alike. 
The ratio of unemployment rates between the foreign-born and native-born 
population by OECD data (2007) is almost the same in Finland and Norway and 
only slightly less in Sweden (Johansson 2008). In spite of the differences in the 
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composition of the immigrant population in the three countries, the vulnerability to 
unemployment is by the OECD data twice as high for immigrants as for the native-
born population in all three countries. We may hypothesize that the unemployment 
rate of immigrants in Finland is higher than that in Sweden or Norway due to 
the rather small share of labour immigrants to Finland. This potential influence 
is probably counterweighed on the aggregate level by much larger numbers of 
refugees and ex-asylum seekers in Sweden and Norway, amounting to higher levels 
of labour market vulnerability and poverty. The large share of ethnic Finns coming 
from Sweden or Russia among immigrants to Finland means, in practice, that 
these persons are also, in fact, labour immigrants in the case they are not retired, 
although their official motive of immigrating is ethnic. 
A key characteristic of immigrants’ employment seems also to be that 
employment does not always buffer against poverty. For instance, in a study on 
Russian-speaking, ethnically Finnish and Estonian immigrants to Finland, self-
assessed poverty was more typical of the immigrants than long-term unemployment 
(Liebkind & al. 2004). Norwegian data show that in 2005/06 altogether 11% of 
immigrants – as compared to 5% of the whole population – often had a problem 
of meeting basic needs such as paying for food, transport or accommodation, but 
there is, again, considerable variation by ethnic groups: the subsistence problems 
were most common among Iraqi and Somali immigrants and least common among 
the Vietnamese and Bosnia-Herzegovinian immigrants. 
The poverty is related to the fact that finding employment in the new country 
often means low-pay jobs and downgrading professionally, which, again, may 
have several reasons. The skills “baggage” acquired in the country of origin is not 
well recognized, and measuring skills as it happens now may not be adequate to 
assess the real contents of the “baggage”. There is also evidence for discrimination 
in employment from all three Nordic countries (e.g. Jasinskaja-Lahti & al. 2003; 
cf. Lange 1999; Tronstad 2008; Integration och etnisk disriminering i arbetslivet 
2006). In Norway the ethnic group facing strongest discrimination in the labour 
market is Pakistani immigrants; Somali immigrants both in Norway and in Finland 
also often experience labour market discrimination (Jasinskaja-Lahti & al. 2003; 
see also the MEDIS research of the Fundamental Rights Agency). Nevertheless, 
there are exceptions to the rule: Norway-born children of Vietnamese immigrants 
who received inadequate education experienced little differential treatment at job 
centres, and they also fared relatively well in the labour market according to the 
abovementioned sources. The labour market outcomes of immigrants are caused 
by a complex set of factors such as education, culture and discrimination and their 
impact varies by e.g. host country and ethnic group.
The registered earnings of Finnish immigrants have been so low (Forsander 
2002) that supplementary income must be somehow available. There are two major 
ways to find this supplement, and they are not mutually exclusive. On the one hand, 
supplementary income or other resources can be earned in informal employment 
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or barter relations which may take place also inside the family or network of 
relatives, on the other hand, some families may rely on the social benefits such as 
child benefits, housing benefits etc. A great deal of formally unpaid work is done by 
women, and family networks are important for finding any work – as an extension 
of this thinking we must bear in mind the importance of ethnic market niches in 
all European countries. For Finland, Sweden and Norway, information concerning 
informal employment is surprisingly scarce and mostly based on estimations (e.g. 
Baldwin-Edwards & Kraler 2009). 
Information about immigrants’ use of services in Finland points to a higher-
than-average use of child care and child benefits, due to a higher number of 
children, while the elderly care is underutilized since most immigrants are not old 
enough; this underutilization may also be due to cultural reasons (Gissler & al. 
2005). Evidence shows that immigrants’ chances to find work in the Finnish open 
competitive labour market are shockingly low, the services of job centres do not 
seem to open any new chances, and in this case ethnic networks offer a way out 
(Akhlaq 2005). 
Family vulnerability, geographical segregation and health
Immigrant families show a rather high degree of vulnerability in Finland in the 
sense that 21% of immigrants to Finland during 1991–2004 lived in single parent 
families. The share was particularly high among those coming from Somalia, 
Uzbekistan, Vietnam and some African countries, which may be related to the 
refugee or asylum-seeker background and in some cases the situation may be 
temporary. The share of immigrant clients in family shelters in Greater Helsinki 
Area is also very high: it has increased from 9% at the beginning of the 1990s to 
30%. Rather than improved accessibility to shelters, this indicates a dysfunctional 
family life and would deserve more attention. A similar share of single parent 
immigrant families is in Norway (Blom 2008b). Violence in immigrant families 
has been a major focus of attention in Sweden and Norway due to reported cases 
and discourse on murders related to ‘family honour’. In Finland this discourse has 
been less significant and more of a theoretical character.
Here we may out point also that the statistics show a disadvantage of immigrant 
youth as compared to the native youth. For instance, approximately 50% of Finnish-
speakers and 59% of Swedish-speakers of the 1980 cohort started college studies 
until 2005, while the share of those speaking other languages was only 23%. The 
corresponding shares in Sweden were for Sweden-born population 45% and for 
foreign-born population 35%; for those born in Sweden with foreign-born parents 
the share was 37% (Integration 2008); both education outcomes and the labour 
market status after accomplished education are somewhat better for native than for 
foreign-born population (Statistikrapport 2007). Nevertheless, we must remember 
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the very high variation between ethnic groups. The risk of dropping out of school 
at all levels is in Finland higher among immigrants than in the native population. 
However, on average Finnish immigrants do considerably better in education than 
those of other OECD countries (Finnish Government Report… 2008). 
As far as geographical segregation is concerned, Finland shows a rather low 
degree of segregation by ethnic origin. Concerning spatial development of urban 
areas, there are studies by Vaattovaara & Kortteinen (e.g. 2003) indicating that 
there are no slums in Finland, largely thanks to very successful housing policy 
which attempts to mix various types of housing. As far as geographical distribution 
of immigrants across the country is concerned, approximately 50% of immigrants 
concentrate in a rather narrow strip of Southern Finland, and approximately 75% 
live south of the Turku-Tampere-Lappeenranta line (Heikkilä & Pikkarainen 2008). 
The attempts to place refugees and asylum-seekers all over the country in order to 
balance the financial burden of local governments has not been very successful: 
people tend to move from northern and eastern parts of the country to the south, 
which is the common tendency also among the native population. However, the 
key immigrant groups in Finland, ethnic Finns and Russian-speakers are not very 
strongly concentrated in any part of the country (e.g. Liebkind & al. 2004). 
In the 2000s there has been a stronger concentration of immigrants in 
urban centres as well as in the south - this corresponds to the general tendency 
in Finland (Heikkilä & Pikkarainen 2008). The concentration of immigrants is 
rather strong also in Sweden, in spite of the high share of immigrants in the whole 
population. In particular, immigrants from Africa (46%), South America (47%), 
North America & Oceania (38%) and Asia (33%) are concentrated in Stockholm 
province. Interestingly, the two other key provinces in Sweden, Västra Götaland 
(with Göteborg) and Skåne (with Malmö), do not seem to attract immigrants 
coming from outside Europe (Integration – en beskrivning av läget i Sverige 2008; 
Invandrares flyttmönster 2008; cf. this with widely reported problems between 
immigrants and native population in some parts of Malmö). 
The geographic and urban concentration of immigrants in Norway is of a 
similar type to in Sweden: approximately 25 % of all Oslo inhabitants i.e. 131,000 
persons were of immigrant background (Daugstad 2007). Some 20% of all 
inhabitants in Oslo are of non-Western background, and in Oslo there is a strong 
differentiation between suburbs and other parts of the city, the share of immigrants 
varying from 11% to 43% by urban districts. Similar differences can also be found 
in Sweden (e.g. the famous immigrant centre Rinkeby near Stockholm, sometimes 
shown also as a positive example of local immigrant policy).
A key indicator of social disadvantage may be life expectancy, and here we find 
a wide differentiation among immigrant groups. The key factor influencing health 
status is ethnic background, with persons immigrating as refugees or asylum-
seekers having a very strong burden in their life experience, be it in the country 
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of origin or in a refugee camp, and most often coming also from countries with a 
relatively low life expectancy. 
Labour immigrants tend to be in relatively good health, at least compared 
to their compatriots who do not emigrate. For instance, the good health of the 
Canadian and Australian populations is partly attributed to the good health of 
immigrants. Research findings show that the “healthy migrant” hypothesis is valid 
for Estonian and Russian male immigrants in Finland; “salmon hypothesis” may 
also hold good as stated earlier for Estonians (Liebkind & al. 2004); other Finnish 
research points in the same direction (Pohjanpää & al. 2003). The refugees and 
asylum seekers, and labour immigrants are the two extremes in health, between 
which the health of other types of immigrants may be placed: e.g. those who get 
married, those who come for family reunification or those whose arrival has been 
the result of an ethnic policy. 
Living conditions of immigrants, such as occupational risks, the life style 
that is the outcome of the interaction of the old-country “baggage” and new social 
environment, and acculturation stress also bear an impact on the morbidity and 
mortality of immigrants. There is also a wide variation by types of ill-health and 
causes of mortality, although international results show that, with time passing, the 
profiles of immigrants tend to become closer to those of the native population for 
good and bad. 
Swedish results show that women from Iran, Iraq and India live 10-15 year 
longer than the compatriots who did not emigrate; for Russian men, the difference 
in life expectancy was 17 year in the advantage of those, who immigrated to Sweden. 
Results from Norway (Östby 2002) showed that children born to two immigrant 
parents had higher mortality than their parents. In conclusion, immigrant health 
is a complex issue with a number of constituting and potentially contradictory 
factors which must be studied.
Attitudes and discrimination
There is evidence that citizen’s attitudes towards immigrants fluctuate by 
economic ups and downs: during a recession the attitude is more negative, and the 
attitudes towards various ethnic groups clearly show the impact of labour market 
considerations: according to a recent study on the booming year of 2007, Finnish 
attitudes were more positive than ever during the decades of 1987–2007 (Jaakkola 
2009). Finnish attitudes were most critical against Somali immigrants, and this 
is also reflected in the research findings concerning discrimination in Finland 
(Jasinskaja-Lahti & al. 2003; MEDIS 2009). Jaakkola explains her results on the 
basis of a conflict theory stating that increased contacts – of any character, at work, 
in the street, when travelling – between population groups reduce prejudice; this 
result is also linked with immigrants’ language skills that increase a possibility 
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of communication, and they can be supported by adequate policies. The hostile 
attitudes tend to concentrate among those with less education; thus, education 
supporting diversity and transnational understanding will be productive (see also 
Integration och etnisk diskriminering i arbetslivet 2006). 
There is a strong link between attitudes, discrimination and racism, although 
these phenomena are conceptually far from being simple and they are difficult to 
measure. A report from Sweden (Integrationsbarometer 2007) shows that racism 
and xenophobia are increasing, although they are very uncommon, and the 
overwhelming majority sees Sweden as a non-racist society. So far, we have only 
addressed labour market discrimination; however, various forms of discrimination 
are interrelated and they must be studied together: e.g. discrimination of children 
at school most certainly has consequences for the whole family with an inter-
generational impact. 
National backgrounds of immigration policy – the 
case of Finland
In this section, we focus on the Finnish immigration policy solely with no references 
to Sweden or Norway. As we have seen above, there are important differences – 
in particular in the share and constitution of immigrant population – between 
Finland, Sweden and Norway. The historical differences are partly produced by 
immigration policy and they also bear an impact on the immigration policy of 
today and tomorrow. 
Background and change
Finland has a long-standing tradition of emigration, and there is an estimate 
that approximately 1 million persons with Finnish roots live abroad, mainly in 
Sweden, Canada and the USA. This bears still an influence on Finnish attitudes 
towards emigration vs. immigration: it is easier to imagine Finns living in distant 
countries and “making it” than to imagine immigrants settling and making a living 
in Finland. Another factor bearing an impact on Finnish immigration policy is 
the fact that there have always been Finnish minorities living outside the Finnish 
national borders. Besides the Finnish minority in Northern Sweden, and there has 
always been a large number of Finns living in the Republic of Karelia in the Russian 
Federation, as well as around Saint Petersburg; in Norway the traditional Finnish 
minority is limited to some municipalities in Northern Norway, called Finnmarken 
in Norwegian. There has been a strong sentiment in Finland that Finns must offer 
ethnic Finns a home country, which has amounted to certain ethnocentrism in 
immigration policy. This approach, still legislatively valid although weaker today, 
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has been supported by the fact that, in the course of history, Finns living outside 
Finland have been repressed to various degrees. 
Due to this ethnocentric approach in the Finnish immigration policy and 
established by legislation in the 1980s, there has been an inflow of Finns from 
the Russian Federation and Estonia to Finland which has continued, with some 
fluctuations, until today (e.g. Liebkind & al. 2004). This has amounted to a group 
of approximately 30,000 ethnic Finns moving to Finland, and there is a queue of 
several thousand families at the Finnish consulate in Saint Petersburg still waiting 
for the permission to come. The interest of Finns living in Estonia in moving to 
Finland was strongly reduced in the course of 1990s, and since Estonia became 
a Member State of the European Union, population movements between Estonia 
and Finland changed the character. Due to this approach, mixed composition of 
families and some historical factors, there are now approximately 50,000 Russian 
speakers in Finland; if we classify immigrants by language this is presently the 
largest minority group in Finland, followed by Estonians who number around 
15,000 (excluding those who only commute between two countries). 
Counting by citizenship, Swedish citizens are the second largest group of 
foreigners in Finland amounting to almost 30 000 persons: many of these persons 
are also of Finnish origin (Korkiasaari & Söderling 2007). The Finnish ethnocentric 
immigration policy has similarities to that in Germany (“Aussiedler” from Eastern 
Europe and the Russian Federation), Greece (“Pontic Greeks” from the Black Sea 
Region), Israel (defined as the home country for Jews from various parts of the 
world) and also Hungary giving special entitlements on the basis of historical 
reasons to certain groups considered “us” (cf. Dietz 2000; Halkos & Salamouris 
2003; Haberfeld & al. 2000). 
Another key strand of the Finnish immigration policy has been the focus on 
refugees and asylum seekers. Finland is one of few countries officially receiving 
people belonging to these two groups, and its asylum policy is comparable to that 
of Sweden or Norway. The Finnish quotas have, however, been much smaller than 
in other Scandinavian countries. In the course of the past 20 years, some of the 
major immigrant groups in Finland have come into existence as a result of this 
policy: Albanian-speakers from Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kurds from 
various countries (mainly Iraq and Turkey), Somalis, and Vietnamese are some 
of the best-known ethnic minorities in Finland: their size is small, but they have 
attracted a great deal of attention in the Finnish discourse. 
A third key factor bearing a strong impact on immigration to Finland is related 
to family ties: surprisingly high numbers of – in particular female – immigrants in 
Finland have come to the country as a result of a marriage or family reunification 
(e.g. Liebkind & al. 2004; Heikkilä & Pikkarainen 2008; Jääskeläinen 2003). The 
prominence of intermarriages and people with Finnish ethnic origin among 
immigrants give a very special profile to Finland as a country of immigration. 
Finland is considered still by many a very homogeneous country.
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In Finland, labour immigration has not been a topic of interest until recently: 
this means that the issue of work vs. welfare has been a potential problem to the 
vast majority of Finnish immigrants, since they have not come directly to work. 
Presently, immigration is increasing rapidly in Finland, and the small share of 
immigrants in Finland is growing fast. In 2007 almost 17,000 foreign citizens i.e. 
22% more than in 2006, moved to Finland, and applications for a work permit 
since 2006 grew by 21%. This may be contrasted to the fact that in Finland in 2007 
there were only 132,708 foreign citizens; counting by the country of origin the 
figure was higher 202 528, which points out that a very large share of immigrants 
become Finnish citizens as soon as possible: a similar trend exists also in Sweden 
and Norway. It is estimated that before the financial crisis there were approximately 
90,000 foreigners working in Finland, out of this figure 40,000 persons work only 
temporarily (Finnish Government Report… 2008). A large share of these was, 
according to unofficial estimate, from Estonia and Poland. 
Labour immigration is historically the least common form of population 
movements to Finland, although all migrants consider their perspectives in 
the labour market when making the decision on moving. For the first time, the 
Finnish Government Programme for Immigration (2006) lays a strong emphasis 
on labour immigration – besides refugee and asylum policies, which retain their 
previous significance, while the ethnocentric approach is phasing out. Also the 
new European Social Fund Programme for Finland 2009–2010 has a strand which 
aims at increasing the attractiveness of Finland for labour immigration, and there 
are tens of projects focusing on this goal during 2008–2010 (cf. also Finnish 
Ministry of the Interior 2008). The present government has continued to develop 
the immigration programme of 2006 further and has, for instance, composed 
an implementation programme (2008) for it. Due to the unification of the EU 
labour markets an increasing number of recruiting companies are operating in 
Finland. In this respect, the development in Finland is delayed as compared to 
that in other Nordic countries, which traditionally have been countries of labour 
immigration and presently are experiencing a certain backlash in their openness 
and introducing more restrictive immigration policies. In Finland, on the level of 
government programmes and projects, we see increased openness, although on 
the level of debates the situation in Finland may be rather similar to that in other 
Nordic countries. 
There are several ethical considerations concerning population movements 
between countries, as reflected in the discussion whether international mobility 
is a zero-sum or a win-win game. Due to the aging of population and other social 
factors developed countries will in the future face a major demand of professional 
workforce. There are calculations that in 2050 the European Union needs 63 
million immigrants for the present labour performance, if the employment rate 
of the population will stay as today (Münz 2008). This prognosis is valid also for 
Finland, the population of which is according to the official EU estimates one of 
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the most vulnerable to aging in the European Union in 2030, although after that the 
situation will improve (European Commission 2008).
Administrative reorganization and what it may mean
A recent key reform in the Finnish immigration policy is related to the new division 
of labour between Finnish ministries as of 2008. In this reform, the Ministry of 
Labour and Ministry of Trade and Commerce were joined together to become 
the Ministry of Labour and Economy. Immigration policy and the related issues 
belonging to the (previous) Ministry of Labour were transferred to the Ministry of 
the Interior. The Ministry of the Interior had already previously been responsible 
for immigration policy namely border controls, visa, residence permits and related 
issues; such issues as e.g. various integration measures were earlier planned and 
administered by the Ministry of Labour, but now only one ministry is responsible 
for all immigration policy. However, it is clear that many practical aspects of 
immigration policy need cross-administrative cooperation.
The new reform is in compliance with the standard organization of immigration 
authorities in the EU Member States. In Finland, the immigration administration 
in the Ministry of the Interior is split into three main branches, one responsible for 
labour market policies for immigrants; another responsible for social integration 
policies and the third one responsible for issues related to refugees and asylum-
seekers. The Foreigners’ Office under the Ministry of Interior has also received a 
new profile, and its name has been changed into Finnish Immigration Service. 
This reform indicates a major change in the Finnish and European immigration 
policy: population movements inside the European Union will in the future be 
classified as professional mobility in the intra-EU common labour market, and 
they will be addressed in the future more in the context of general labour and 
economic policy and individual mobility than in the context of immigration. Thus, 
immigration is increasingly seen as the inflow of non-EU/ EEA citizens from “the 
third countries” – a new term coined – and its regulation. For Finland, this may 
be a more considerable change than, for instance, for Norwegians, because of a 
very large share of Russian-speakers (and ethnic Finns from Russia), and it will 
in the long run also emphasize the policies for refugees and asylum-seekers in the 
context of any immigration policy. We already see this shift in the ongoing debates 
concerning immigration, not only in Finland. 
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Integration and other relevant policies
Since 1997 there has been a comprehensive system of integration services in 
Finland targeted to immigrants and administered by employment authorities. This 
means, in practice, training including language skills, plus various employment 
schemes mainly based on wage-subsidies for the employer and supplemented by 
rehabilitation services as needed. Besides Finnish courses, this system does not, 
however, substantially differ from the services available to any hard-to-employ 
client of the employment services. The key idea is that for every immigrant client 
of employment services or social protection offices, an integration plan listing the 
measures needed for a successful integration will be made. The idea is that the 
jointly prepared plan is a commitment done by public administration as well as by 
the jobseeker. 
There is no strong evidence for a hypothesis that the immigrants who came to 
Finland before this system of services for immigrants was set up would presently 
be worse off in Finnish society. This, rather than pointing to a weakness of the 
system of integration services in place since 1997, may indicate that there are 
different cohorts among immigrants, and the labour markets they face change also 
by economic cycles. 
Additionally, Finnish local governments, responsible for administering 
education as well as social and health care must prepare an integration programme 
covering all immigrants in the municipality and report on its implementation. 
Nevertheless, these plans are of very variable character, since the local governments 
have a very high degree of autonomy and there are no sanctions if the plan does not 
exist. All major public and private employers are also by law required to prepare an 
equality plan to address ethnic groups; very often this plan is done in the context 
of making a similar plan to promote gender equality, which is historically a much 
better established policy focus in Finland. 
These are some key administrative instruments which aim to promote the 
successful integration of immigrants. Ethnic issues are the key focus of Finnish 
equality policy, which legally stipulates that a mandatory equality plan should be 
made by Finnish public and private employers; for other groups at risk and usually 
addressed by equality policy (e.g. persons with disabilities, elderly people, sexual 
minorities, religious groups), equality planning is not mandatory. A reform of the 
national Equality Act is in progress, with at present unknown results. Ethnic issues 
are also a key focus of the Finnish Ombudsman of Minority Issues. Presently there 
is also ongoing work in order to widen the focus of equality planning as well as the 
ombudsman’s work in compliance with the wider scope of the European equality 
policy: this new focus will introduce also other potential grounds of discrimination. 
This does not mean that the focus on ethnicity will go down; when focusing also 
on other and more traditional groups at risk this work may gain new impetus in 
society. 
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The first Government Report to the Parliament on the implementation of 
the Finnish comprehensive system of integration services was given in 2002 and 
discussed in Parliament in 2003. The second Government Report to the Parliament 
was given in 2008 (Finnish Government Report… 2008). The latter document 
emphasizes very adequately the fact that integration is a two-way process: the 
immigrants must adapt to the receiving society, and the society must adapt to 
the immigrants. This is well in compliance with the modern understanding 
of acculturation defining integration in this way as the optimal outcome of 
the acculturation process: if it is not a two-way process we should not speak of 
integration (Berry 1997; Liebkind 2001). In 2010 the system of integration services 
was reformed by new legislation. The idea was to streamline the services so that 
all immigrants would have similar rights, and the legislation introduces a uniform 
assessment scheme on the basis of which the services can be better tailored. 
The Finnish Government Report (2008) to the Parliament indicated very 
interestingly that the key buffer against social exclusion of immigrants is housing 
and urban planning, which must prevent the concentration of social exclusion risks 
as well as the immigrant population in certain districts or regions. Finnish research 
from the 2000s shows that this policy, in practice mixing various types of housing 
in the same urban district, has succeeded well until now. However, regional and in 
particular urban planning must in the future find stronger instruments, potentially 
including a reform of local taxation, to fight the risk (Vaattovaara & Kortteinen 
2003). Research shows in general good cost-effectiveness of the Finnish integration 
legislation for immigrants: inputs turn into outputs as expected according to the 
assessment model developed (Accenture 2007). This does not seem to be true to 
the same degree for all Nordic countries, although we must bear in mind that their 
historical context and the scale of the issue are different from what we have in 
Finland (Thompson 2006).
On the basis of the attitude research referred to above, we may conclude that 
the present financial crisis, which will probably last for several years, will make the 
introduction of labour immigration into practice in Finland much more difficult 
and, in general, worsen the mental climate immigrants in Finland will face. This 
means that it will take a longer time to implement the policy change taken place 
on the level of programmes and projects in Finnish practice, and the protagonists 
of the new policy will face similar debates that have been going on in other Nordic 
countries already for a while. 
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Some debates
This chapter does not contain references and it is based on a rather subjective 
selection of topics addressed in Finnish politics at various levels, newspaper 
articles and television programmes. We review some key issues brought up today 
in Finland, but the very same issues are relevant also in other Nordic countries. 
Today, we see an opening of a European Union – wide labour market (incl. EEA 
countries such as Norway) and its repercussions in debates. This may be such a 
major step in many countries including Finland that it will bring previously almost 
unknown critical and xenophobic reactions to the fore.
For Sweden, labour immigration as such is not new: since the constitution of 
the common Nordic labour market and free movement of workers in the 1960s the 
country has benefitted from it. The boom of the Norwegian economy and labour 
market thanks to the oil and gas industry put Norway into a similar situation as 
Sweden already in the 1980s. This means that in these countries there should hardly 
be any need to discuss labour immigration as something new, as an opportunity or 
a threat – nevertheless, there are debates, based on the idea of “how large numbers 
of immigrants a country can adapt”. Labour immigration is new only in Finland, 
and there have lately been some lively debates on the topic in Finland, and we 
illustrate the present social climate by some of them. 
There is extensive discourse concerning the mobility of health care professionals 
globally. There are several WHO publications relevant to the topic e.g. the World 
Health Report 2006, and, for instance, there is the WHO Code of practice on 
the international recruitment of health personnel approved internationally. The 
European Commission has prepared a Green Paper (2008) on the issue and the 
OECD Migration Outlook has a special chapter on the international mobility of 
health workforce (Dayton-Johnson & al. 2007; OECD 2008a; 2008b). The point 
here is, on the one hand, whether it will be just to attract health professionals from 
poorer countries facing similar or more serious deficit of health care staff; is this 
not just another example of promoting brain drain? (cf. Katseli & al. 2006); on the 
other hand, there is always some degree of professional mobility, why not utilize it? 
This is the background of an administrative debate: Finland supports the general 
WHO and EU policies, but certain reservations are brought to the fore both by the 
government as well as the trade unions. 
At a practical level, the Finnish debate on the issue has largely concentrated 
on some projects to import nurses from the Philippines. A private sector project 
of this kind was started in 2008 and there has been a great deal of public debate 
on it: the newspaper Helsingin Sanomat published several articles – one, several 
pages long (20 Jan 2008) – a television programme was made on the topic and 
various opinions still come up occasionally. The debate and the interest in the 
issue has been quite disproportionate taking into account that the project brought 
fewer than 10 nurses; now there is another project of partly similar kind ongoing 
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in the public sector and it has brought over 20 nurses from the Philippines with 
less public debate. The public debates concerning the international recruitment in 
health care may have been caused by the status of public health care as a ideological 
ornerstone of the Nordic welfare model, as well as by the high interest in health 
care of Finland. At the same time, labour immigration from the Baltic States and 
some other new member States in the field of construction seems to have increased 
without generating a major public debate, which is very interesting since this might 
have a major impact on wages, trade unions as well as on the contracting system.
Secondly, a most interesting debate came to the fore when the Finnish 
legislation addressing foreigners’ status was reformed in February 2009. The idea 
was to reform the legislation, in particular with respect to the status of refugees 
and asylum-seekers, their right to family reunification and conditions of their 
repatriation. The role of family reunification is widely discussed in all Nordic 
countries. Its significance depends on e.g. the share of refugees, asylum-seekers 
and their family composition as well as the share of intermarriages. Extensive 
debate was carried out on this topic, with an outburst of new hostility towards 
refugees and asylum-seekers; there have been television programmes addressing 
the topic, increased activity on the Internet, and harsh criticism against the 
Minister responsible for immigration. Many leading politicians have felt the need 
to comment on the situation, some of them in a rather evasive way. It seems that 
the amendments to the law were not well prepared by the Ministry of the Interior 
– they were too vague and allowed for too much discretion – and the proposed 
amendments were changed in the Parliament. As a result of the debate the 
Finnish legislation concerning family reunification has not been loosened and it 
is considered to comply with the European Union standards. The main points of 
discussion are the definition of family i.e. who is entitled to family reunification, 
and how the travel costs of family members coming to Finland for reunification 
will be paid Nevertheless, President of Finland as well as Finnish national churches 
have supported immigrants’ cases where grandmothers of Finnish foreign-born 
citizens have been refused the permit to stay. 
In general the debates tend to highlight only some individual points of major 
reforms. An increasing hostility towards immigration seems to become to the fore 
for the first time in Finland. The technical reason for this is the higher number 
of asylum-seekers in Finland during 2008. The number of asylum-seekers peaked 
earlier in 2004 with 3861 applicants, and then decreased considerably until 2008 
when it peaked again, with 4035 applicants. Since then, the numbers seem to 
remain at the – for Finland – higher level. Only a minority of asylum-seekers yearly 
get a either the asylum or otherwise any entitlement to stay in Finland, but the 
process with the applications can take years – this seems to be no different from 
that in many other countries – which has been criticised from many viewpoints. 
Refugees come to Finland in small yearly quotas, they are carefully selected and 
usually show a number of social exclusion risks (e.g. disability). Lately, the number 
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of refugees to Finland has been around 700 a year and there are proposals that is 
should be somewhat higher (e.g. 1 000). In total, Finland is lagging behind Sweden 
and Norway, but we also have a discourse concerning “how many immigrants the 
country can adapt” pointing out that the limit has been reached.
A great deal of debate in Finland takes place by a rather small group of activists 
who seem to ge a great deal of public attention. The main forum is the Internet where, 
for instance, Finns who detest Somalis were invited to sign a hate list: over 10,000 
persons signed the list with their names. There was also a hate list threatening to kill 
the Minister of Immigration, over 100 persons signed that list: there is an ongoing 
police investigation on the matter leading into prosecution. Until now, xenophobia 
has been absent in Finnish politics (unlike some other Nordic countries), but the 
last elections for local government point towards an increase of racist tendencies. 
In the latest elections a new party Perussuomalaiset (“Basic Finns”) gained 4 seats, 
out of 200 (2 %), and in particular some local supporters of this party are highly 
critical of the present immigration policy: the opinion polls show that the support 
of the party is growing and may well reach 15%, and there seem to be spin-offs of 
their populism to other political parties.
Similar debates and political approach are found in Norway with the 
Fremskrittspartiet (“Party of Progress”), which already has 38 representatives out of 
169 (22%) in the Norwegian Parliament Stortinget. In Sweden Sverigedemokraterna 
(“Swedish Democrats”) just entered the Swedish Parliament with a considerable 
number of seats and, due to the lacking majority in the government, may well play 
a key role in the issues of their interest, even if no party does seem to have any open 
interest in cooperation with them; most of the racist and xenophobic activities in 
Sweden occur outside the political establishment. These include, for instance, riots 
in Southern Sweden, a recent scandal in the training of police force revealing racist 
tendencies, some crimes which have had obvious elements of hate and also various 
Internet activities.
In the Finnish discourse, the arguments in the debate on immigration are most 
interesting. In the – hopefully small – wave of xenophobia that has arisen now, 
few seem to oppose labour immigration openly, although there have traditionally 
been strong protectionist feelings in favour of domestic labour and against foreign 
competition, and campaigns to promote domestic products have been traditional 
in Finland. In the public discourse the blame seems to be on refugees and asylum-
seekers, with two kinds of arguments. Firstly, it is not believed that these people 
are in real trouble, claiming a faster investigation procedure of “unfounded 
applications” (quoted by a parliamentary candidate of “Basic Finns”) i.e. person in 
question knows that the application is unfounded before investigating it. Secondly, 
when their situation is recognised, the argument is that their number is already too 
high for the adaptive capacity of Finnish society. 
There is a strong irrational element in this ‘blaming-the-victim’ debate. 
First, low success of refugee groups in the Finnish labour market is partly due to 
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the system of asylum-seeking, which in practice has isolated these groups from 
Finnish everyday life, in particular from the labour market. In the second place, 
when refugees are being selected, there has been a special emphasis on identifying 
the most vulnerable people and families (e.g. persons with disabilities or people 
who suffered serious torture). It is obvious that these kinds of people need to go 
through a process of support and rehabilitation before labour market success can 
be expected. These background factors are, however, rarely brought up in the 
debates, and various groups of immigrants are often discussed simultaneously, 
without an understanding or a will to make distinctions badly needed for successful 
immigration policy.
Finally, allowing for a subjective view on the neighbouring countries, from a 
Finnish perspective, there are two interesting characteristics in the Swedish and 
Norwegian approaches to immigration, which are different from what we have in 
Finland. In Sweden, the stock data concerning the immigrants’ country of origin 
seem of minor importance for statisticians and decision-makers, judging from the 
fact that breakdowns by that variable are not very common; flow data are much 
easier to find. This may reflect the integrative ideal of Sweden as a “folkhem” 
where all should be equal citizens independently of their background. In Norway, 
a distinction between European and non-European immigrants is often found in 
research, and rather often the European immigrants are excluded from the research 
focus. In practice this largely reflects the policy divide between persons from the 
“third countries”, in particular refugees and asylum-seekers vs. others. As we found 
earlier, the share of refugees and (ex) asylum-seekers of all immigrants to Norway 
is high; the share of labour immigrants from EU countries is today not so small 
either, but labour immigrants are considered unproblematic.
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4	 Immigration	in	Spain:	data,	debates			
	 and	policies
Hans-Peter van den Broek
Data on immigration
From the 1960s till the 1980s, Spain had been an emigration country, but halfway 
the 1990s the situation changed and immigration flows began to increase 
spectacularly. Today, Spain is considered to be the principal country of entry into 
the European Union. In 2003, the three Mediterranean countries Spain, Italy and 
Portugal received half of the net immigration into the EU-15 (CES 2004, 16), and in 
2007, Spain and Italy alone received 69% of the migration inflows into the enlarged 
EU-27 (Laparra & Martínez 2008). 
While in 1998, there were officially only 637,085 immigrants in Spain (1.6 % 
of the total population), in 2006 their numbers had increased to over 4 million, 
which amounted to 9.3% of the total population (Observatorio de Demografía y 
Mercado Laboral 2007, 2). By the end of 2008, immigrants in Spain numbered 5.2 
million that is 11.3% of a total population of over 46 million inhabitants (Prieto 
2009, see Table 1). This implies that, from 1998 to 2006, the population of foreign 
residents increased at an average rate of 26% every year (Observatorio DML 2007, 
5). Only 20% of this growth can be accounted for by natural increase (i.e. births 
minus deaths), which means that the main part of the increase in the number of 
foreign citizens has been due to new arrivals (Izquierdo 2008, 619).
TABLE 1. Foreign population (citizens) in Spain
Year Population % total
1981
1986
1991
1996
1998
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
198,042
241,971
360,655
542,314
637,085
923,879
1,370,657
1,977,946
2,664,168
3,034,326
3,730,610
4,144,166
4,519,554
5,220,600
0.52
0.63
0.91
1.37
1.60
2.28
3.33
3.73
6.24
7.02
8.46
9.27
9.99
11.30
(Source: http://es.wikipedia.org/ wiki/Inmigración_en_España.)
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Figure 4.1 shows that not only have net immigration figures in Spain been 
higher than the average figures for the EU-15, but the gap between Spanish and EU 
figures has been growing incessantly for over a decade.
FIGURE 1. Net immigration into Spain and the European Union (per 1000 inhabitants)
(Eurostat figures, by Serra 2005, 1.)
From the mid 1990s till 2000, immigration increased principally from Latin 
America, Africa, and non-EU countries. From 2000 to 2003, it was especially the 
influx of people from Central and South America that soared (CES 2004, 21), while 
the immigration from other European countries (especially Romania) has grown 
spectacularly since 2004. Table 2 shows the inflows of the main nationalities of 
immigrants between 1998 and 2007. The key countries of origin are Romania, 
Morocco, several South American countries, the neighbouring Portugal and also 
the United Kingdom. The UK immigrants to Spain are probably mainly retired 
people.
To understand the sudden changes in Table 2 of sometimes tens of thousands 
of new immigrants, one has to be aware of some key data. In 2000 and 2001, 
the Spanish Government regularized 160,000 and 230,000 illegal immigrants, 
respectively. In February 2005 the Spanish Government promulgated the most 
important regularization of the six ones that had been carried out since 1986: 
almost 600,000 irregular immigrants obtained a legal status. On 1 January 2007, the 
European Union incorporated Romania and Bulgaria as Member States, which not 
only implied a new influx of migrants from these countries, but also an automatic 
regularization of tens of thousands of Romanian and Bulgarian residents who had 
thus far been living in Spain illegally. 
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TABLE 2. Influx of immigrants to Spain per year, by country of origin in 2000-2007
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Romania 17,435 23,276 48,292 54,998 49,487 93,976 111,920 174,149 
Morocco 38,178 39,256 39,930 40,865 58,839 69,288 60,830 71,397 
Bolivia 3,318 4,835 10,562 18,119 35,339 38,349 69,467 46,055 
United 
Kingdom 11,007 16,233 25,632 32,148 44,315 41,633 39,497 35,930 
Colombia 45,868 71,014 34,042 10,888 16,610 20,541 27,864 35,690 
Brasil 4,113 4,283 4,582 7,349 13,017 20,771 28,249 31,838 
Bulgaria 6,493 11,761 15,842 13,648 17,898 15,453 17,664 26,889 
Portugal 2,968 3,080 3,634 5,050 8,000 11,966 18,742 25,186 
Ecuador 91,120 82,571 88,732 72,581 11,936 11,588 14,292 24,647 
(Elaboration by the author, based on data from EVR – Estadística de Variaciones 
Residenciales, i.e. Statistics on Residential Variations; INE.)
After the 2005 regularization of illegal immigrants and the change of status 
of Romanians and Bulgarians in January 2007, the cohort of irregular immigrants 
decreased spectacularly. Izquierdo and León (2008) claim that, between 2003 and 
2005, for every legal Romanian resident in Spain there were three illegal immigrants. 
In these years, about 50% of all foreign residents in Spain were believed to be illegal, 
while in 2007 their share was only one out of four immigrants (Izquierdo & León 
2008, 29). 
Different nationalities have gone through quite different immigration 
processes. The influx of immigrants from Ecuador was particularly high in the 
first years of the decade, but it has diminished in recent years, while the number 
of Romanian newcomers has been increasing year after year. The number of 
Moroccan immigrants has been high since the beginning of the century and at 
present this nationality constitutes the second-largest immigrant community, after 
the Romanians. The number of Bolivian immigrants began to grow when arrivals 
of Ecuadorians were declining. 
Table 3 (next page) shows the total size of the main immigrant communities in 
Spain in 2008; the numbers only refer to registered immigrants. 
What profile do immigrants in Spain have? 37% of them, some 1.5 million, 
had been living in Spain for more than 5 years and could thus be considered as 
settled, stable immigrant population (Izquierdo 2008, 627). According to the Active 
Population Survey, some 3.47 million immigrants came from non-EU countries. 
About 3 million immigrants were employed, 2 million of whom were non-EU 
citizens (Izquierdo 2008, 619). The gender distribution among immigrants varies 
widely, depending on their nationality. Figure 2 (next page) shows that among 
Latin-American migrants the number of women is generally higher than that of 
men. Among almost all other nationalities, male immigrants outnumber female 
newcomers (also CES 2004, 25). 
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FIGURE 2. Number of registered foreigners according to age and sex (1 January 2006)
(Observatorio DML 2007, 6; INE.)
TABLE 3. Nationalities with the highest numbers of registered immigrants in Spain in 2008
Nationality Total Men Women 
Romania 702,916 378,390 324,526
Morocco 575,242 372,577 202,665
Ecuador 414,188 203,313 210,875
United Kingdom 343,016 174,449 168,567
Colombia 279,064 123,717 155,347
Bolivia 235,507 103,314 132,193
Germany 173,247 87,464 85,783
Italy 150,358 89,250 61,108
Bulgaria 149,004 81,579 67,425
Argentina 144,905 72,689 72,216
Portugal 121,403 77,833 43,570
Perú 119,704 59,060 60,644
Brasil 114,519 45,978 68,541
China 111,984 62,196 49,788
(Municipal Census - INE, ‘Padrón Municipal de Habitantes’ 2008.)
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An indication of the fact that the foreign population in Spain consists mainly of 
labour immigrants is their youth: 51.4% of them are under 35 years (cf. 27% among 
Spanish nationals) and only 8% are older than 50 (35% for Spaniards) (Izquierdo 
2008, 626). The population pyramid of registered foreigners in Spain (see Figure 2; 
also CES, 2004, 26) demonstrates the predominance of the age group 25-39 among 
immigrants, an image that contrasts with the relatively low percentage of young 
nationals in the same age-group.
However, we should not forget that a relatively large number of newcomers 
in Spain have not settled here for economic reasons, but because of the country’s 
climate and its beaches. According to the Observatory of Demography and Labour 
Market, about 75% of foreign residents in 2006 (slightly over 3 millions) were labour 
migrants; the other 25% were resident immigrants, most of them pensioners from 
the UK, Germany and other European countries (Observatorio de Demografía y 
Mercado Laboral 2007, 5).
Most immigrants enter the country by plane (e.g. from Latin American 
countries) or by bus (from Central and Eastern Europe); nevertheless, the images 
that best illustrate the human tragedy behind much of the immigration are those 
of African migrants who land on the shores of the Canary Islands or Spain’s 
Mediterranean coast in their rickety boats, often after having crossed the ocean 
for many days without any food or water. In the last 20 years, about 18,000 people 
have died while attempting to reach the Spanish shores. All in all, we should keep 
in mind that the inflow of sub-Saharan immigrants in the last few years has not 
exceeded 4% of the total immigration per year. 
The principal reasons why immigrants prefer to come to Spain instead of 
entering the European Union through other member States are: (1) the country 
belongs to the European Union; (2) access is relatively easy (at least compared 
to other EU countries); (3) for immigrants coming from Africa, Spain is one of 
the nearest Southern access gates to the EU; (4) cultural or linguistic proximity 
(important for Latin-American immigrants as well as for Romanians); (5) internal 
control of immigrants is less effective than in other EU countries; (6) the informal 
economy absorbs or at least has absorbed ‘irregular’ immigrants without major 
obstacles (cf. CES 2004, 6; Izquierdo 2008, 620).
The dominant strategy of integration in the receiving society is through 
participation in the labour market in Spain, while alternative paths of integration, 
such as asylum or naturalization, are relatively much less common. Family 
reunification has become a major issue in recent years. The numbers of permits 
for family reunification increased from some 33,000 in 2003 to 128,000 in 2007 
(Izquierdo 2008, 621) and in the coming years they will probably rise more. 
Altogether, more than 300,000 permits were issued in those four years. 
Immigrants in Spain have not settled homogeneously across the national 
territory. As we observe in Figure 3, about two-thirds of the immigrant community 
concentrated in only 4 of the 17 autonomous communities in Spain: Catalonia, 
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the Community of Madrid, the Community Valencia and Andalusia, i.e. in those 
regions that by and large are characterized by a dynamic building sector, an extensive 
service sector (especially domestic service), or labour intensive agriculture.
FIGURE 3. Number of registered foreigners by Autonomous Communities (1 January, 2006)
(Observatorio DML 2006, 8; INE)
By studying the migration inflows into each of the 17 autonomous 
communities of Spain (plus the enclaves Ceuta and Melilla) in the course of the 
decade 1998–2007 we note that immigrants do not settle mainly in the richest 
communities or those with the highest economic growth and the best jobs. Rather, 
as Laparra and Martínez affirm (2008, 12–15), they move to those regions where 
it is easier to find irregular jobs or where there is demand for workers, who are 
willing to accept unstable, precarious, working conditions. A similar conclusion 
may also be derived from the fact that labour migrants are mainly found in the 
building sector, agriculture, domestic services, and bars and restaurants – sectors 
with relatively high percentages of irregular jobs. The authors claim that irregular 
immigration in Spain should not be understood as the result of failing border 
controls, but as a consequence of the irregular labour market. Thus, it is not so 
much the possibility of future regularization measures that constitutes a pull effect 
on potential immigrants, but rather the existence of a vast informal sector in the 
Spanish economy.
Immigration and the Spanish labour market
The Spanish labour market, expected to absorb both native and immigrant workers 
alike, has the following characteristics:
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• a relatively high unemployment rate, especially among women and youth;
• a high rate of temporary jobs and rotation between employment and 
joblessness;
• a relatively extensive informal sector of the economy;
• little growth of labour productivity, due to a high incidence of small enterprises 
with labour intensive activities;
• substantial regional differences by labour market indicators, together with low 
mobility among the active population.
From 1997 to 2008, the Spanish GNP grew at a rate of about 4% a year, almost 2% 
higher than the average growth in the Euro-zone. This economic growth fostered 
the creation of new jobs – jobs that could not be occupied by native workers alone. 
Thus, the favourable economic situation of the last decade boosted the demand 
for foreign labour power. The social characteristics of the national population that 
gave incentives to immigration are: the extremely low birth rate and the aging of 
the national labour force (i.e. in certain sectors – agriculture, building sector – 
there is lack of young, strong, workers), higher educational levels of the younger 
generations (thus, fewer young people are willing to do low-skilled jobs), and higher 
participation of women in the labour market (i.e. more and more families where 
both partners work outside hire – mainly female – immigrant workers to take care 
of the house, the children or elderly parents) (cf. Domingo & Houle, 2005). 
Between 1995 and 2005, the active population in Spain increased by about 4.7 
million people, 2.4 of whom (i.e. over 50%) were immigrants (Pimentel 2006). In 
2007, the immigrant labour force occupied 16% of the total number of workforce 
in Spain (Manpower, 2008). As we see in Table 4, 66% of the registered foreign 
workforce (1.3 million) in 2007 consisted of immigrants from non-EU countries.
TABLE 4. Number of foreign workers registered with social security, by geographical area of 
origin, (end of) 2007
Continent / region N %
European Union
– Romania 
Rest of Europe
672,894
69,754
34
    12
   3.5
Africa 
– Morocco
360,785   18.2
    13
America
– Ecuador
– Colombia
744,432 37.6
   13
    7
Asia 128,419   6.5
Oceania 776    0.04
Stateless / Unknown 4,046   0.2
Total 1,981,106    100 
(Own elaboration, based on Izquierdo 2008, 639–640.)
4   Immigration in Spain: data, debates and policies
46 Immigrants and Ethnic MinoritiesTHL – Report 41/2010
As Pérez Infante observes (2007), despite the increasing participation in the 
workforce among Spanish women, the total rate for Spanish nationals is only 
56%, far below the 77% corresponding rate among immigrants. The immigrants’ 
participation in the workforce, which is especially high among Latin-American 
and non-EU, European immigrants – 85%, is due to the relatively young age of 
most immigrants and the fact that most of them came to Europe precisely with 
the aim to find work. According to Pérez Infante, this tendency is opposite to what 
occurs in most other developed ‘immigration’ countries, where the participation in 
the workforce in the basic population tends to be higher than among immigrants 
(cf. e.g. in Nordic countries). 
Table 5 shows that, for the period 2003–2007, the participation in the 
workforce among immigrants was about 25% higher than that of Spanish citizens 
(Izquierdo 2008, 644). At the same time, as Izquierdo observes, the unemployment 
rate among immigrants was only slightly higher than among Spanish nationals, 
whereas in countries with a longer immigration history, unemployment rates 
among immigrants are often twice or three times as high as among natives. 
TABLE 5. Activity, occupation and unemployment rates of immigrants and Spanish national 
population (2003–2007)
Rates Immigrants National Spanish
Participation in workforce
Employment rate
Unemployment rate 
79.7
69.1
13.3
55.4
50.3 
 9.2
(Izquierdo 2008, 644.)
The Spanish Census data of 2001, i.e. still three years before ten new countries, 
mainly from Central and Eastern Europe, entered the European Union, reflect that 
the participation in the workforce for non-EU immigrants was much higher than 
among Spaniards; especially male and female immigrants from Eastern Europe 
and Africa, and also Latin-American and Asian women, had a rate 30–50% higher 
than Spanish citizens. Only the participation of Maghreb women in the workforce 
was lower than the corresponding percentage for Spanish females (CES 2004, 35; 
also Domingo & Houle 2005). 
Spanish male and female workers had higher levels of labour market 
participation than immigrants from other EU15 countries. The unemployment 
rate in Spanish male workforce is lower than that among both EU and non-EU 
immigrant men. For national and immigrant women, the situation has been more 
complex: unemployment rates were lower for Asian, Latin American and Eastern 
European female immigrants than for Spanish women, but for African women 
they were much higher (26%). 
Table 6 relates unemployment to gender and age, comparing immigrants and 
the native population.
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TABLE 6. Gender and age of unemployed immigrants and national Spanish population 
(2003–2007)
Immigrants National Spanish
Sex
– Man
– Woman
47.4
52.6
43.4
56.6
Age
– 16–24
– 25–34
– 35–49
– Over 50
21.2
38.5
29.3
 7.0
25.1
28.9
30.5
13.6
(Izquierdo 2008, 649.)
If we compare the distribution of immigrant workforce according to economic 
sectors with that of native one, we note that the participation of foreigners is 
especially high in the building sector, the service sector, bars and restaurants, and 
in agriculture (Izquierdo 2008, 647; cf. CES 2004, 51); Izquierdo refers to these 
sectors as the “four legs of low-productivity economy”. It is worth highlighting 
that among female immigrants, the overwhelming majority (96%) has found work 
in the service sector, especially in domestic service and home care of dependent 
(sick and elderly) people (Observatorio DML 2007, 11). According to the Spanish 
census of 2001, almost one of every two male immigrants worked in the building 
sector or in agriculture, 47%, against only 24% of native Spanish male workforce. 
Among female immigrants, 52 % worked either in the household or the restaurant 
sector (as against 11 % of native Spanish women by CES 2004, 52).
According to another study (Manpower 2008), however, it is incorrect to 
assume that immigrant workers have mainly occupied low-quality jobs, and the 
weight of low-quality jobs in the national economy has not grown significantly due 
to a higher influx of immigrants. The study claims that between 1995 and 2007, 
the number of qualified workforce grew by 3.3 million, against 1.3 million growth 
of the total number of non-qualified workers. Of these 1.3 million non-qualified 
workforce 1 million were immigrants, but 1.6 million immigrants belonged to 
the category of 3.3 million qualified workforce. The numbers of immigrants who 
entered the highest employment categories in these 12 years are relatively modest: 
they constitute about 0.2 million of the 2.6 million professionals and technicians, 
and some 80,000 of the almost 400,000 new managers. Other data, referring to 
the total numbers of immigrant and Spanish workers (2001), confirm also the 
under-representation of (non-Western) immigrants in the categories professionals 
or technicians and managers or self-employed. However, Asian citizens are 
represented in higher percentages in the latter category than native Spaniards and 
Western immigrants (cf. Domingo & Houle, 2005). 
The latter study also suggests that, if immigrants tend to be overrepresented in 
some categories of workforce, this is because these categories are principal ‘sectors 
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of entry’ for many recently arrived immigrants: for men (excluding Asians), this is 
agriculture, and for women, domestic work. Izquierdo, on the other hand, states 
that the unequal distribution of immigrants along the occupational pyramid is 
an indication of their vulnerability and lack of integration (Izquierdo 2008, 647). 
The vulnerability is shown by the incidence of temporary jobs among immigrants, 
which is twice as high as among Spanish workers (Table 7; Izquierdo 2008, 648; 
also CES 2004, 54–59). 
TABLE 7. Distribution of temporary contracts among wage-earning immigrants and nationals 
(2003–2007)
Immigrants Nationals
Indefinite contract 39.6 % 71.8 %
Temporary contract 60.4 % 29.2 %
(Izquierdo 2008, 648; based on INE, Encuesta de Población Activa.)
According to Izquierdo (2008, 650), the labour market for immigrants has 
become dualized: there is a top layer for immigrants who entered the country legally, 
and a bottom layer of irregular immigrants working in the informal economy. In 
this case, the author asserts, it would not be appropriate to speak of segmentation, 
considering that ‘illegal’ immigrants have the opportunity to ascend to the upper 
layer as a result of the regularization measures that have been implemented in recent 
years. However, we should note that a great number of ‘irregular’ immigrants do 
not fulfil the necessary conditions to become legalized; moreover, it is not clear 
whether new regularization measures will be taken in the near future. 
It seems to be a fact that the irregular segment of the labour market is going 
through a process of feminization. Nevertheless, Izquierdo (2008, 653) suggests 
there are several factors which may temper or prevent the social exclusion of 
female immigrants. Firstly, many of them are from Latin-American origin, which 
implies they are fluent in Spanish and culturally close to Spanish society; secondly, 
they tend to have higher levels of education than male immigrants; and thirdly, 
many of them have their families in Spain, a factor that stabilizes their situation and 
motivates them to settle down permanently. 
There are three main mechanisms for non-EU immigrants who attempt to get 
access to the Spanish labour market in a legal way: (1) through yearly contingents 
called ‘contingentes’, responding to the labour demands in different sectors of the 
economy, (2) following the a system of ‘general regime’ (Régimen General), whereby 
employers arrange temporary residence and work permits for their labourers, 
and (3) via regularization of workers who lack the necessary permits. Izquierdo 
(2008, 652) provides the following figure, which reflects the relative importance 
of these three paths (see Figure 4). We observe that a (small) majority of non-EU 
foreign workforce in Spain acquired legal status in the labour market as a result of 
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regularization, while only one out of eight responded to demands by the system of 
contingents. The explanation of the low effectiveness of the policy of contingents, 
forwarded by Arango & Sandell (2004), is that it is a slow, long-term process, with 
the public administration interfering directly in the labour contracts between the 
Spanish employer and its staff, something companies are normally only willing to 
accept if they have no alternatives.
FIGURE 4. Legal mechanisms for immigrant workers to enter the Spanish labour market 
(2003–2006) 
(Izquierdo 2008, 652.)
Arago & Sandell (2004) claim that a government which aims at curbing 
irregular immigration should not only – or even principally – focus on the 
immigrants, but rather on the logic behind the existence of an informal economy 
and the arguments employers use to explain why they ‘need’ to hire immigrant 
workers illegally. It implies, among other things, adopting a firmer stance in a more 
comprehensive fight against violation of labour laws. 
 
Labour market and educational levels – is the labour market 
segmented
While educational levels of the Spanish active population grew during the past 
25 years considerably with almost 80% having a secondary education in 2005, 
against only 43% in 1987, more persons started to refuse low-quality jobs and 
move into jobs that offered them higher wages, better conditions and more stability 
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(cf. Castelló 2005). Figure 5 (next page) shows that the percentages of immigrant 
labourers with primary or secondary education are now higher than those of native 
workforce (although we should note that these percentages do not coincide with 
the figures provided by Castelló). 
FIGURE 5. Education levels of workforce, national Spanish and foreign persons (2006)
(Observatorio DML 2007, 9; INE.)
Moreover, Table 8 demonstrates that the average level of education among 
immigrants has increased in the last decade: percentages of those with no or only 
primary studies declined, while the proportion of immigrants with secondary 
education grew significantly; the percentage of immigrants with higher education 
was stable, but as the total number of immigrants in this period rose spectacularly, 
we may conclude that the number of immigrants with a higher education also has 
increased considerably. 
TABLE 8. Evolution of educational levels of unemployed immigrants (1992–2007)
Educational level 2003–2007 1997–2001 1992–1996
No studies
Primary
Secondary
Higher 
10.0
21.3
50.3
18.4
14.6
21.6
43.7
20.0
16.6
27.0
37.1
19.3
(Izquierdo 2008 649; based on INE, Encuesta de Población Activa.)
Nevertheless, 35% of immigrant workforce can be found in jobs that require 
little or no qualification; this percentage is twice as high as that for native workforce 
in the same labour segment (Observatorio DML 2007, 10). Izquierdo suggests there 
is a differentiation among immigrant groups by education, as follows (2008, 641): 
Africans are at the basic level, Latin-Americans in the middle and immigrants from 
Central and Eastern European countries at the top. 
Analphabetic Primary 
education 
Secondary
education and 
labour insertion 
Higher
education 
PhD
    Spanish basic population  Foreign population 
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Although it may be hypothesized that a great number of immigrant workers 
occupy jobs that Spanish citizens are not willing to fulfil and that many of these 
jobs are below their educational level (cf. Observatorio DML 2007, 10), it may not 
be correct to assume that the Spanish labour market is segmented according to 
ethnic origin. In the first place, mismatches between a worker’s current occupation 
and his/her received education and training do not only occur among immigrants, 
but also among native persons. Izquierdo qualifies this mismatch as “one of the 
endemic evils of the Spanish labour market” (2008, 642; see also García-Espejo & 
Ibáñez 2005). Moreover, many Spanish workers have gradually moved to higher 
echelons of work life, while large numbers of immigrant workforce can be found 
in low-skilled, low-quality jobs, but there are indications that this has to do more 
with the recent arrival of the bulk of immigrant workers in specific ‘sectors of entry’ 
of the Spanish labour market than with dominant tendencies of discrimination 
or the impossibility of upward mobility. Once settled, most immigrants tend to 
be just as motivated as Spaniards to move up in the labour hierarchy and grasp 
every opportunity to do so, which implies that at a later stage they will compete 
with Spanish workers for better-quality jobs. In conclusion, I see that the so-called 
substitution effect meaning that newcomers take the place of native workforce only 
occurs in immigrants’ main sectors of entry into the labour market. 
Segregation and social exclusion
Several authors have explored whether we can find tendencies towards segregation 
between Spanish nationals and immigrants: i.e. can we differentiate immigrant and 
national workers according to occupation and salary, activity and unemployment 
rates, educational levels, age or gender? Segregation on the labour market may exist 
between men and women, among different age groups or ethnic groups. We speak 
of horizontal segregation when certain categories of workforce are concentrated in 
a small number of branches of activity or occupations; vertical segregation refers 
to the fact that some categories can be found mainly on the lower levels of the 
occupational hierarchy, while other groups concentrate on the upper end of the 
hierarchy. 
According to Calderón and Hidalgo (2007), the horizontal (or sectorial) 
segregation between immigrant and national population grew from 1999 to 2006, 
but the level and evolution of this segregation varies by ethnic group. Thus, for 
instance, the segregation index is highest and growing, for European non-EU, 
immigrants, decreasing for citizens of Latin-American origin, and lowest for 
immigrants from other EU countries (2007, 23–24). Introducing gender, they 
noted that the segregation index for both men and women of immigrant origin 
was higher than that for national Spanish male and female workforce. At the same 
time, horizontal segregation among immigrant and national women was higher 
than among immigrant and national men. 
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Vertical segregation between national and immigrant workforce grew steadily 
in the first years of the new millennium. The index of vertical segregation between 
immigrant and native women was higher than the index for native Spanish men 
and immigrant men. Segregation between immigrants and native population with 
higher levels of education is also more pronounced than for those in lower echelons 
by education. 
Categories of immigrants vary by economic and social vulnerability. Being 
a citizen of an EU country and a cultural-linguistic proximity of the immigrant 
to the target country are two main factors that facilitate labour market inclusion 
and make social exclusion more unlikely. The most vulnerable group consist of 
non-EU, irregular, immigrants – people who lack residence permits and often 
have deficient labour contracts if any. Nevertheless, we should note that under the 
Spanish welfare system these people do have access to health care and education for 
their children. Legal immigrants from non-EU countries have practically the same 
rights as EU immigrants and Spanish nationals; but unlike immigrants from EU 
countries, the former ones have the obligation to renew their work permits every 
few years. 
Immigrants from EU Member States have the same rights as Spanish nationals, 
but this does not necessarily lead to their acceptance in society; or in other words, 
integration of immigrants in legal terms does not automatically imply their social 
integration. Izquierdo and León (2008) give a clarifying example: people of Roma 
origin are a minority within the Romanian immigrant community, but nevertheless, 
many Spaniards tend to identify all Romanians with gypsies – and aversion towards 
the gypsy way of life is rather widespread in Spanish society. When on 1 January, 
2007, both regular and irregular Romanian immigrants in Europe became EU-
citizens with all corresponding rights negative attitudes towards Romanians did 
not disappear overnight. 
Table 9 compares levels of social exclusion by a number of important 
dimensions among Spaniards and citizens from EU-15 countries vs. with non-EU-
citizens and immigrants from the new EU-12 member States. 
We observe that percentages of non-EU citizens and immigrants from the 
new EU member States who experience social exclusion by the dimenbsions of 
employment (labour market), housing and consumption are more than twice as 
high as those for Spanish nationals and other EU-15 citizens. Political participation 
of citizens from outside EU-15 countries is virtually non-existent. However, the 
exclusion from education is extremely rare among non-EU citizens and immigrants 
from the new EU countries, even lower than among native Spaniards and EU-15 
citizens. 
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TABLE 9. Households at risk of social exclusion in different dimensions in Spain; Spaniards 
and EU15 citizens vs. others
Dimension of social 
exclusion
Spaniards and EU-15 
citizens
Non-EU citizens and 
citizens from new 
EU-12 member States
Employment 12.5 27.2
Housing 17.8 37.0
Consumption  8.0 17.6
Education  6.0  3.5
Health 10.8 16.6
Politics  4.3 89.1
Social conflict 12.3 16.4
Social isolation  7.5  9.2
(FOESSA 2008; in Laparra & Martínez 2008, 14.)
Immigration and the crisis
Of course, the huge inflow of migrants into Spain of the last decade did not imply 
the end of emigration. The total population in Spain has increased with some 5 
million people in the last decade, but at the same time, since 2006 more than 60,000 
people per year have left the country (Izquierdo 2008, 616–617). Some of these 
emigrants were of Spanish origin, while others – probably the majority – were 
former immigrants who returned to their home countries or moved on to a third 
country. 
In Spain, the ongoing economic crisis has led into a virtual collapse of the 
building sector, affecting especially large categories of immigrants. For instance, the 
number of Romanian construction workers losing their jobs was rapidly increasing: 
in October 2008, some 100,000 Romanian immigrants were unemployed; in a few 
months, hundreds of them had returned to their home country and many more 
were planning to do so. 
Now that native workers seem to be willing again to enter those sectors where 
they could formerly hardly be found, many employers have started to substitute 
their immigrant workers for Spaniards. Other employers, however, employ a 
negative discourse with respect to Spanish workers to justify why they continue 
hiring foreigners: allegedly, immigrant workers are still more willing to do certain 
jobs and to work harder than natives (Izquierdo 2008, 644). 
Izquierdo suggests that in periods of economic progress the majority of 
immigrants are men (and women) who arrive alone; when the boom continues, 
they want or let (at least a part of) their family come over to Spain. In periods 
of recession, when many migrants consider returning to their country of origin, 
4   Immigration in Spain: data, debates and policies
54 Immigrants and Ethnic MinoritiesTHL – Report 41/2010
immigrant families – especially if they have school-going children – tend to stay 
and hold out longer than others (Izquierdo 2008, 625). 
Academic and political debates on immigration
Because immigration is still a relatively recent phenomenon in Spain, debates 
on key issues have hardly matured yet, and the most salient policy interventions 
relevant for immigration seem to have been the outcome of ad hoc decisions rather 
than the result of a thorough design. We may distinguish between political, public 
and academic debates. 
According to opinion surveys carried out in 2008, Spanish citizens expressed 
greater worries about immigrants’ cultural integration than about possible 
competition of foreign newcomers on the labour market (Izquierdo 2008). Labour-
intensive sectors like construction, agriculture, the restaurant sector, and domestic 
services, characterized by cyclical or temporary, low- and medium-skilled jobs, 
had long faced a lack of native labour supply and thus absorbed the greater part of 
immigrants. However, now that the financial crisis has caused higher unemployment 
– to over 3 million in early 2009 – and many Spanish nationals have started to enter 
jobs they would not have accepted earlier, growing intolerance towards immigrant 
workers in certain sector of Spanish society may not be unlikely. 
Thus far, there have been few xenophobic incidents in Spain. In spite of 
its regional – cultural and linguistic – differences, Spain was a culturally very 
homogeneous country until recently. The relatively extensive Roma/Gypsy 
community has mostly lived in the margins of society and has therefore hardly 
interfered with the general idea of cultural homogeneity among Spanish people. 
The high numbers of foreign workforce, and especially those of immigrants from 
Maghreb and Sub-Saharan regions, who differ most – culturally, linguistically and 
religiously – from the native population, may challenge the integration capacity 
of the country. Nevertheless, subjects like the ‘multicultural society’ or the ‘social 
integration of immigrants’ have not yet turned into topics of popular debate. 
Neither is there a well-defined social integration government policy for 
immigrants. Arango and Sandell (2004) suggest that a full-fledged integration 
policy should cover such issues as legal inclusion, linguistic abilities, basic 
knowledge of constitution and constitutional rights etc.; it must be aimed at the 
inclusion of immigrants in the areas of labour market, education and housing. 
By and large, integration is, nevertheless, understood in Spain in a fairly narrow 
sense: as providing irregular immigrants with the necessary documents (papeles) 
which will turn them into legal residents. This was what, for instance, the 2005 
regularization accomplished for over half a million undocumented immigrants 
living in Spain. However, the latest regularization campaign elicited intense 
debates both inside Spain and in other European countries: it was believed that the 
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legalization of such a huge number of foreign residents would have a strong pull 
effect on thousands of other potential immigrants. Other EU countries especially 
criticized that these measures had been taken without consulting other Member 
States. The Spanish Government argued that the regularization would serve to pull 
the majority of illegal migrants out of the informal economy, allow them to ascend 
to registered, better-quality jobs and convert hundreds of thousands of persons 
into new contributors (i.e. tax-payers) to the national welfare system. However, as 
stated earlier, according to Izquierdo (2008), it is not so much the regularization 
measures that have a pull effect on potential immigrants, but rather the existence 
of an extensive informal sector within the national economy. 
Immigration policy in Spain
“Spain now has comparable numbers of immigrants to the old immigration 
countries of the EU, but it is still a long way off possessing the social policies 
required to meet the new challenges immigration presents” (Serra 2005, 5).
Spain launched its first immigration law in 1985, when the country was about to 
enter the European Community – principally as a reaction to the fear of other 
European countries that the incorporation of Spain might open the door to huge 
inflows of people from Latin America and Maghreb. An update of this law came 
into effect in 2000 (Organic Law 4/2000), some five years after the migration influx 
had suddenly accelerated (CES, 2004: 83). Since then, several more updates of the 
latter law have taken place. Immigration policy in Spain has a twin-track approach: 
on the one hand, the policy focuses on the control of admission of immigrants 
and on the other, it is aimed at an integration of newcomers in the Spanish society. 
Since, until recently, immigration was still considered as a transitory phenomenon, 
policies tended to put more stress on the control of inflows than on measures 
enhancing integration (Arango & Sandell 2004, 9); special attention was (and is) 
given to the reduction of irregular immigration. The Spanish Government has 
developed a sophisticated system of border controls in the Strait of Gibraltar and 
the Canary Islands to stop illegal immigration proceeding from the coasts of Africa. 
Since 1993, the Spanish Government has established annual contingents of 
immigrant workers who are hired in their countries of origin and then expected to 
supply the labour force for jobs that cannot be covered by the national labour market. 
The contingent measures are decided upon after consultation with the National 
Council of Immigration Politics, trade unions and employers’ organizations, and 
stipulate the numbers and characteristics of foreign labourers and the sectors 
where they are required. For about a decade, these contingents have oscillated 
between 25,000 to over 30,000 foreign workers each year (CES 2004, 90). Moreover, 
Spain has signed bilateral agreements with over 20 emigration countries stipulating 
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the regulation of immigration flows or the repatriation of irregular immigrants. 
However, considering the gap that exists between the legal influx of migrants and 
the high incidence of irregular immigration, the effectiveness of these measures in 
controlling migration flows may be seriously questioned (see also Figure 4.4).
There are several factors that explain why management of immigration flows 
was not particularly successful at the initial stage of the policy (CES 2004; also 
Serra 2005):
• Huge immigration flows were unforeseen (Serra speaks of an “historical 
surprise”; 2005, 23). 
• Immigrants arrived in very few years and came from a wide variety of countries 
(in most countries in Northern Europe, different nationalities entered the 
country ‘one after the other’, sometimes with many years in between).
• Spain, being a former emigration country, lacked policy experience with 
immigration flows.
• It took a relatively long time before it was publicly admitted that immigration 
was a phenomenon that was ‘here to stay’ and therefore needed thorough 
analysis and a worked-out policy. 
Inexperience and inadequate management has had some very negative consequences 
such as the high percentage of irregular immigrants; lack of cooperation with 
emigration (‘sending’) countries in managing the migrant flows; and deficient 
integration of immigrants in the labour market and society.
With the regularization campaigns, the Government of Spain achieved, in 
the first place, full incorporation of the regularized immigrants into the welfare 
system. As irregular immigrants they already enjoyed similar access to health care 
and education as legal migrants, but once they are ‘legalized’, they also contribute 
to the system as tax-payers. The 2005 regularization implied the incorporation of 
about 600,000 immigrant workers into the national social security system (Laparra 
& Martínez 2008). In the second place, the regularization of the situation of illegal 
immigrants helped to pull them out of the informal economy, often characterized 
by labour exploitation, social isolation, intervention of mafia etc. There is also 
adequate native workforce in the Spanish labour market for jobs that require high-
level education and experience. Hence, unlike some other EU countries (e.g. the 
Netherlands), Spain does not have a specific policy aimed at attracting knowledge 
immigrants (Serra 2005, 20–21).
Since the beginning of the 1980s several other countries such as Italy, France 
or Portugal have also carried out a number of mass regularizations. It is generally 
assumed that one of the consequences of mass regularization is that newly 
‘legalized’ immigrants start looking for jobs with higher payment or better working 
conditions (cf. CES 2004, 79); and since the obs these immigrants leave vacant 
are generally difficult to occupy, employers often tend to turn to irregular labour 
force anew. Although measures of mass regularization are an exception rather than 
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the rule, the Spanish Economic and Social Council recognizes they have been one 
of the principal ways of access to legal work permits in Spain (CES 2004, 87, see 
Figure 4).
Izquierdo (2008, 634-635) criticizes the Spanish immigration policy, which 
in his view has aimed almost exclusively at supplying low-skilled labour force to 
the market. Such policy is highly insufficient and inadequate, for several reasons: 
not all migration flows are for economic reasons; return migration tends to be 
unpredictable; and it is hard to identify what types of employment the national 
labour market will need in the medium-long run. 
Integration policy
Izquierdo and León suggest that, until recently, there was an implicit aim behind 
the policy of allowing a “superfluous immigration” i.e. providing the national 
labour market with ‘handfuls’ of (irregular) workers. The regularizaton of no less 
than 1 million non-EU immigrants between 2000 and 2005 is, in the authors’ view, 
a clear reflection of excessive exploitation of foreign workers. In spite of the huge 
inflows of immigrants, the situation has not led into a collapse of the health or 
educational systems, nor has it given rise to xenophobic sentiments among the 
native population. However, is is expected that the arrival of millions of newcomers 
in less than a decade will not leave the social fabric unaffected. It is therefore 
essential to develop a consistent policy aimed at the integration of these immigrants 
as new citizens of the Spanish society. This implies “legal stability, occupational 
training for the unemployed, participation in local elections and opportunities for 
schooling and housing” (Izquierdo & León 2008, 13–14).
Izquierdo (2008, 604) affirms that the institutional discourse on immigration 
is an understandable consequence of Spain’s own history as an emigration country, 
and it is one of empathy with and acceptance of “those who flee hardships”, and 
suggests that it is this discourse that has hampered the elaboration of a National 
Integration Plan. At the same time, the author states that legal integration of 
immigrants (here: regularizations; also the conversion of both regular and illegal 
Romanian and Bulgarian immigrants into EU citizens as of 2007) has been more 
successful than their integration in the labour market, where temporary contracts 
and low upward mobility still prevail. 
There are no defined rules as to how much time it should cost an immigrant to 
obtain permanent residency: it depends on the economic situation of the country, 
the willingness of the employer to help the immigrant employee, and sheer luck 
(Izquierdo & León 2008, 22). The possession of a permanent residence permit 
is one indication of an immigrant’s motivation to settle down permanently or at 
least for an indefinite time in the country of destination. Another indication is 
the integration of immigrant children into the education system. The number of 
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school-going immigrant youth increased from 108,400 in 2001 to 531,000 six years 
later; 85% of them were of non-EU origin. 
In 2007, 37% of regular immigrants in Spain were in possession of a permanent 
residence permit. But this is an average percentage: the situation differs widely in 
different autonomous communities. For instance, in Extremadura, the percentage 
of immigrants with a permanent permit is 61%, while it is as low as 27% in the 
Community of Madrid.
Immigration policies of the autonomous communities
Spain consists of 17 autonomous communities, whose regional governments have 
extensive competencies on a large number of major political issues. Some maintain 
that the Administration of the Spanish State is more decentralized than the Federal 
Republic of Germany. The Spanish central government has created a € 120 million 
fund to help the autonomous communities and municipalities to implement 
their integration policies. Those with higher numbers of immigrants receive an 
additional sum on top of the average amount for each community. 
Thus, we should differentiate migration policies of national and autonomous 
institutions. Whereas competences of the central government refer to immigration 
and emigration (e.g. contingents, control of in- and outflows of migrants), 
regularization and asylum, the autonomous communities develop policies aimed 
at the integration of newcomers (through employment services, education, health 
care, and social services, cf. Izquierdo 2008, 605). Catalonia, for instance, has its 
own Citizenship and Migration Programme, aimed at integrating foreign workers 
in Catalan (instead of Spanish) language and culture. Izquierdo and León (2008, 
22–23) highlight the lack of coordination of immigration policies among the 
different autonomous communities and the central government. The challenge is 
establishing an immigration policy that includes a coherent system of integration 
valid for all 17 autonomous communities in Spain.
Immigration policy and the crisis
With the collapse of the Spanish building sector and the overall economic crisis, 
national unemployment figures have grown rapidly. Hence, competition for jobs 
between native Spaniards and immigrants has increased in sectors that until 
recently had hardly appealed to native workers, and the Spanish administration 
encourages unemployed immigrants to abandon the country. They will receive 
their unemployment benefit in their home countries, under the condition they sign 
a document promising not to return to Spain in the next three years. 
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However, at the initial stage this policy met with relatively low response among 
immigrants. As Izquierdo and León (2008) observe, inflows of migrants principally 
depend on economic up- and downswings in the country of destination, but return 
migration probably depends more on structural factors, like the level of family 
reunification or other factors which contribute to immigrants’ rooting in the host 
society. Izquierdo (2008) suggests that the main aim of the government’s return 
policy are issuing a symbolic message to Spanish citizens that ‘the government is 
actively tackling the problem’, and discouraging potential new immigrants to come 
to Spain – rather than effectively encouraging unemployed immigrants to return 
home.
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5	 Hungary:	Roma	and	Immigration
Vera Messing
In contrast to the old Member States of the EU, immigration to Hungary is a minor 
phenomenon, with immigrants comprising 1–2% of the population. Their vast 
majority (70%) consists of ethnic Hungarians from neighbouring countries. They 
are culturally and traditionally similar to the native population, of working age, they 
are welcomed by Hungarians and do not face problems that immigrants often have: 
they do not have language problems, do not encounter prejudice, discrimination, 
social segregation or exclusion, they are often highly trained and find work easily. 
In general, they are accepted as Hungarians by Hungarian society and thus do not 
require assistance to integrate. There are immigrants in Hungary whose status can 
be compared to the status of migrants in the old Member States of the EU (Chinese, 
Afghanistan, Pakistani, etc.) but their numbers are negligible. Moreover, most 
migrants of non-Hungarian descent consider their present residence in Hungary 
as one of transit towards Western Europe or the US.
Roma on the other hand, compose a considerable part of the population,their 
number exceeds half a million and they account for 6–7% of the total population. 
Their low education, long-standing discrimination against them and social 
exclusion create a number of unsolved social tensions in the Hungarian society.
Data on the number of Roma
There is substantial uncertainty about the exact numbers of the Roma/Gypsy 
population. Methodological and legal obstacles in gaining such data are 
interrelated: due to data protection legislation, collection and processing data 
related to ethnicity meet a number of limitations. Because of historical fears related 
to expressing Roma identity1 and exclusion of multiple identities, census data – 
based on self-reported single exclusive ethnic identity – underestimate the number 
and ratio of the Roma population to a large extent2. Another data source, yearly 
household surveys also significantly underestimate the proportion of Roma for two 
reasons: many live in segregated, isolated areas where interviewers are reluctant to 
go, and more importantly, Roma are not willing to identify themselves as Roma 
because of troublesome interethnic relations. Thus we have to rely upon various 
estimates based on a combination of census data, survey data and a mixture of 
ethnic self-definition and ethnic definition of the close environment. The same 
problems related to data-collection on Roma/Gypsy communities have also been 
encountered in other EU countries. 
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The most important data sources that may be used when assessing the number of 
Roma in Hungary:
• The National Census, which was conducted in 2001. The National Census 
includes questions with regard to belonging to an ethnic minority. The census 
only allows respondents to choose a single identity, consequently Roma with 
dual or multiple identities are unable to express their true belonging.
• Representative Roma/Gypsy Surveys in Hungary that were run in 1971, 
1993, 1997 and 2003 in the Institute of Sociology, the Hungarian Academy of 
Sciences, led by István Kemény. The surveys applied combined methods based 
on the identification of Roma by the closest environment, self-identity and 
language use. This set of consecutive surveys is regarded as the data that best 
represent the reality of the Roma of Hungary. Still these data can only be used 
on a national scale; at regional and especially local level, they are not reliable. 
• Estimation about the number of Roma in micro-regions and settlements based 
on the combination of school-level data and the census data. These estimations 
were produced by Gábor Kertesi and Gábor Kézdi in 1999 (Kertesi & Kézdi, 
2000).
• UNDP conducted a regional survey on the Roma population in Central and 
Eastern Europe in 2004. In Hungary, the research was lead by TÁRKI. (Bernát 
2006) Due to its limited methodology and scale, which was optimalized for 
purposes of comparative East and South European survey, the data provided 
by this research are less reliable on a national level than those produced by 
Kemény and collegues. 
• Several surveys were conducted specifically about schooling and education 
of Roma children. The most exhaustive of these was conducted by Kertesi, 
Kemény and Liskó in 2000.
According to the census the ratio of Roma population is low in Hungary: 190,000 
Hungarian citizens identified themselves as Roma or Gypsy in the census of 2000. In 
contrast, according to estimates based on a national survey of the Roma population 
(Kemény & Janky 2003), the population is approximately 600 000 i.e. 6–7% of the 
total population. The ratio of the Roma population in Hungary is expected to 
increase due to higher than average birth rates and due to younger than average 
population, although the life expectancy is over 10 years lower than for the rest of 
the population. A third set of statistics on the Roma population, commissioned by 
the UNDP, estimated the Roma population to be between 520,000-650,000 (Bernát 
2006). 
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Employment of Roma
As for the employment of the Roma population there is even more ambivalence in 
data, as it is against data protection regulations for the authorities to collect data 
disaggregated by ethnicity. Public bodies – the State Employment Office, Regional 
Labour Market Centres, and the Ministry of Employment and Social Affairs – that 
collect and record labour market data do not possess information on the ethnicity 
of their clients. The primary sources of data on the labour market situation of the 
Roma are therefore the aforementioned sociological research projects. 
In order to understand the reasons behind the miserable labour market 
situation of the Roma in present Hungary we have to look backwards in history. 
During the state socialist regime (1949–1989) the Roma were formally employed, 
but employment was due to labour intensive industrial technologies and the fact 
that the legitimacy of the state socialist regime depended, among other things, on 
the concept of full employment4. Roma occupied the lowest level, worst paid jobs. 
Consequently, the changes after 1989 had dramatic consequences for the Roma 
people: most of those who had previously been employed – as low skilled workers, 
employed in the labour intensive heavy industry and agriculture – lost their jobs. 
The employment rate within the Roma population decreased from 77% in 1984 
to 29% by 2003 (Kemény & Janky 2003). A massive loss of jobs characterized the 
Roma population in the years between 1989 and 1993, but these tendencies started 
already prior to the system change. In 1984 77% of the working age Roma, in 1989 
67%, in 1993 only 31% and in 2003 29% of them had employment.
Kertesi (2005) presented an excellent comprehensive overview of the reasons 
and consequences of the labour market situation of Roma people after the system 
change. He argued that the low level of employment had stabilized: only 30% of the 
age cohort 15-49 is employed since 1993. The reasons are manifold: similarly to 
the entire Hungarian population some Roma made use of early retirement. Those 
working age Roma, who lost their jobs between 1989 and 1993 were unable to 
return to the labour market due to the lack of qualifications and jobs and became 
long-term unemployed. Young people, who would want to enter the labour market, 
are in equally miserable situation: they do not find employment due to the lack 
of jobs suitable for their qualifications, discrimination and unfavourable regional 
dispersion of the Roma population. 
A very important factor besides the low level of employment is the instability of 
employment of Roma people. There is a very high turnover to and from the labour 
market among Roma (Kertesi 2005). Kertesi estimated that 40% of unemployed 
Roma lost their jobs within 2 years. The yearly rate of job-loss among working age 
Roma is estimated between 25–30%, which is an extremely high ratio. The reason 
behind this is twofold: firstly, Roma are typically employed in jobs where the cost of 
changing workforce is very low (low quality, unskilled work in building industries, 
agriculture) and secondly, the dominance for Roma of publicly financed work 
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programmes, which typically provide short term, low prestige jobs. Kertesi argues 
that the present labour market and welfare policies alone increase employment 
instability and trap low skilled, long-term unemployed in the welfare system and 
secondary (publicly financed) labour market. 
Autonómia Foundation together with the State Employment Office conducted 
a survey on Roma people employed in publicly financed work programmes and 
found that approximately 14,000–16,000 Roma were employed in such programmes, 
which means that approximately 40% of working Roma are employed in this form 
of secondary labour market. 
Data on immigrant population
There are three sources of data on the number of immigrants in Hungary. These 
are the Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS), the Ministry of the Interior, State 
Immigration Office, and the State Employment Office. In sharp contrast to the 
case of Roma, the immigrant population in Hungary is minor, especially when 
compared to old member-states of the EU. The yearly rate of immigration has 
remained below 1% (0.5–0.7%) during the past 15 years (Rédei 2006). According 
to CBS statistics the number of immigrants was only 166,000 in 2007: they account 
for less than 2% of the total population. The vast majority of them – over 60% – 
are of Hungarian descent. They are ethnic Hungarians arriving from neighbouring 
countries (Romania 40%, Slovakia 30%, Ukraine 10%, Serbia 8%). The most 
important reasons for migration are employment (for 46% of immigrants with 
resident permit), family reunification (23%) and education (17%). (Hajduk 2008; 
Hablicsek & Tóth 2000; Gödri & Tóth 2004; Rédei 2005).
Despite the common stereotype of the dominance of Chinese among migrants 
the vast majority (85%) of all migrants arrived from European countries, and only 
12% have Asian origins. Less than 9 000 Chinese reside in Hungary officially, 
although estimations refer to a much larger – double, triple – Chinese community. 
Chinese are visible migrants, who have established over thousand companies in 
Hungary, most of them micro businesses in catering (Chinese restaurants and 
buffets) and commerce (small shops, and market traders). 
The majority of immigrants are of working age, highly motivated to attend 
higher education and to work, due to the better financial circumstances in Hungary 
than in their countries of origin. A new “secondary flow” of immigration has 
included elderly people, in the context of family reunification of ethnic Hungarians 
who arrived from the neighbouring countries. According to CBS data, the majority 
of immigrants come from urban areas and their educational level is higher than 
the Hungarian average in all age brackets: 29% of migrants had a higher education 
diploma and 37% had graduated from a secondary school. The corresponding 
percentages for the Hungarian population were 21% and 32% respectively (this 
data refers to 2002).
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Employment of immigrants
As recent surveys demonstrate, migrants (i.e. incoming Hungarian nationals) 
experience lower rates of unemployment than the respective socio-demographic 
groups of native Hungarians; most of them experience upward occupational 
mobility in comparison to their status in their home country (Hablicsek & Tóth 
2000; Gödri & Tóth 2004). 
Data show (State Employment Office, 2004) that the vast majority of migrants 
with a work permit (85%) arrived from the three neighbouring countries: 
Romania, Slovakia and Ukraine. Since Romania joining to the EU, Romanian 
citizens may work without any special limitations in Hungary. Despite earlier 
worries, this development did not produce a radical increase of the presence of 
Romanian citizens in the Hungarian labour market; conversely, it resulted in 
the decrease of Romanian migration to Hungary. As known from European 
migration data5, following Romania’s EU access, Romanian workforce migrated 
primarily to Spain, Italy and other old member-states of the EU rather than to 
Hungary. As a consequence of these developments, migration from Romania to 
Hungary, especially migration aiming at employment has significantly decreased 
since January 1st, 2007. According to statistics of the State Employment Office the 
applications for work permits of Romanian citizens decreased by 30% in the first 9 
months of 2007 compared to the previous year. 
Similarly to the small number of immigrants in Hungary, the number of 
foreign children in education is not significant. Out of a school population of 
1,880,816 around 12,500 foreign students were registered as attending Hungarian 
public education (Kováts & Medjesi 2006). More than two thirds of foreign students 
(8,546) were of Hungarian ethnicity (mainly children of ethnic Hungarians from 
Romania, Slovakia, the Ukraine and Serbia).
Academic and political debates on Roma and 
immigrants
Debates on the situation of Roma are intense both in the public, political and 
academic arena. The following section will sum up and categorize major topics of 
discourse in the public and academic sphere. Debates on immigrants are much less 
intense in Hungary. 
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Reasons behind low and unstable employment of Roma
In the mid 1990s the employment rate of Roma workers was not only extremely 
low, but also highly unstable (Kertesi 2000). Economic transition caused increasing 
regional differentiation and inequalities that had a disproportionate effect on 
the Roma, forcing them to engage in expensive commuting, participate in the 
illegal labour market or appeal to the social welfare system. Besides, the spread 
of unstable employment led into social disintegration: the lack of permanent 
employment brought about irregular income, lack of a stable lifestyle, continued 
worries of subsistence, little protection from majority institutions, lower level of 
social transfers from the state and the employers – or even the loss of previous 
entitlements (Szalai 2005; Messing 2006; Kertesi 2005). 
Besides the unfavourable geographical distribution and low educational level 
of the Roma population policy measures may contribute to the instability of their 
employment. Public work programmes that aimed at increasing employment of 
the long-term unemployed actually perpetuated the instabile employment: these 
programmes typically offer irregular, short-term (couple of months) employment in 
low prestige jobs, contributing to negative social stereotypes, making dependency 
on the welfare system permanent, and reinforcing the lack of protection from the 
authorities. (Kertesi 2005; Fleck & al. 2006.) 
Racial discrimination on the labour market
Another segment of research and debates in Hungary focuses on labour market 
discrimination. There are three bodies that receive and investigate complaints of 
discrimination: Equal Treatment Authority (ETA), the Legal Defence Bureau for 
National and Ethnic Minorities (NEKI) and the Roma Antidiscrimination Service of 
the Ministry of Justice. According to the experience of these bodies, discrimination 
against Roma is widespread in the labour market. ETA is the authority that 
establishes whether a complaint fulfils the legal prerequisites of discrimination and 
it has the right to fine discriminating employers, or other public actors. NEKI, an 
NGO, investigates racial discrimination regularly by testing companies according 
to incoming complaints. According to NEKI’s experience 8 out of 10 clients’ 
complaints are valid: in these cases repeated testing by Roma and non-Roma job 
applicants confirmed the accusation of racial discrimination: Roma applicants are 
usually told that the position has been filled, while non-Roma applicants later are 
accepted. NEKI published a report on racial discrimination in the labour market 
in 2004 (Bodrogi and Iványi 2004) reviewing practices of racial discrimination 
at different stages: discrimination against job applicants, discrimination during 
selection procedures, discrimination in the workplace, discrimination through 
public work. 
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A survey by Delphoi Consulting Ltd. (Babusik 2006) among Hungarian 
companies (with more than 10 employees) collected data on discriminatory 
practices in employment. The research, which collected data from 1 800 companies 
and 530 regional Employment Office members of staff, provided a new type of 
data: corporative, i.e. company level data on practices leading into discrimination 
against disadvantaged groups, especially the Roma, but also immigrants and asylum 
seekers. Its major conclusion is that the Roma are excluded from the labour market 
not only because of their disadvantaged educational situation but mainly due to 
the negative attitudes of employers: over 80% of employers interviewed stated 
that he/she would not employ Roma even if his/her qualification fit requirements. 
The study also pointed out, that labour market subsidies aimed at the inclusion 
of disadvantaged groups do not influence discriminatory practices: companies 
that exercise racial discrimination are able to obtain such subsidies as much as 
companies that do not discriminate. 
Work in return to welfare allowances
An open letter of a mayor of a small village in North East Hungary provoked 
heated public and policy debate on the functions and consequences of social 
benefits in the summer of 2008. The mayor’s argument, which was supported by 
a great number of local politicians can be summarized as follows “those should 
get benefits who work for it and who comply with the majority standards”. The 
North Eastern region of the country is an economically highly depressed part of 
Hungary where unemployment – especially long-term unemployment – is highest 
and where the proportion of Roma is also decisive. Social problems and tensions 
are soaring: even those who have a job get a modest earning and masses of families 
with a large number of children live solely on social benefits and income from 
informal employment (badly paid day-labourers in agriculture and constructions). 
This tension has often an ethnic bearing. According to the mayor’s proposal the 
long-term unemployed, receiving social benefits should be obliged to work in 
public work programmes.
 Roma activists as well as sociologists argued that the proposal was 
misleading, because it blames the victims: it presupposes that a large number 
of long-term unemployed do not work because they are lazy, are not willing to 
work and are free riders living on the generous social security system. In contrast, 
most long-term unemployed would be happy to work, but there is no opportunity 
for low skilled unemployed in the region. Nevertheless, they take the worse 
paid, dirtiest, physically hard and insecure jobs on the informal labour market. 
Economists argued that a problematic point in this proposal is that it interferes 
with labour market equilibrium: the demands of the labour market are met with 
public work paid by the social welfare system and consequently the balance of 
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demand and supply in the labour market will be distorted. Long-term unemployed 
people would, thus, only replace other workforce for a much lower income. Cheap 
workforce may be desirable for local government, but undesirable at the national 
level, according to this argument. 
Subsistence strategies, communities
Anthropological research provides in-depth knowledge on the living conditions, 
life-style and subsistence strategies of various Roma/Gypsy communities. Despite 
extensive public and political discourse on the Roma population there is relatively 
little knowledge about how in fact Roma communities survive. Fleck, Orsos and 
Virag (2000) provided an in-depth insight into the subsistence strategies of an 
impoverished Boyash community in South East Hungary. They mapped families 
in these communities, their sources of income, employment and other income-
generating activities and showed that only the privileged families have a low paid, 
but stable income. Most families have to rely on various income sources i.e. welfare 
assistance (including family allowances), irregular and badly paid seasonal jobs, 
collecting crops from the forest and wood for heating. 
Another study published by Stewart (1994) presented everyday life, values 
and subsistence of a traditional Vlah Gypsy community. Szuhay’s earlier study 
gathered information on and described traditional Gypsy communities and related 
traditional occupations prevalent in Hungary (Szuhay 1997). Messing (2007) 
analysed data on income sources, subsistence and social networks of Roma and 
non-Roma poor families. She found that most of Roma poor have lost supporting 
social networks and are isolated not only from the majority, but also from Roma 
communities. The public imagines Roma as traditional communities based on 
extended families but this situation rarely exists today; most of the impoverished 
Roma became totally isolated. 
Despite the fact that there is very little research on the identity of Roma/ 
Gypsy people and the impact of this identity on social and labour market inclusion, 
one can say that there is substantial evidence for the assumption that social and 
labour market exclusion is mostly due to low social capital (low level of education, 
disadvantaged family background, lack of social networks) on the one hand, and 
to discrimination based on wide-spread prejudice on the other hand. There is no 
evidence for the hypothesis that social and labour market exclusion are the product 
of some distinct culture or ethnic identity of Roma people. 
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Debates on immigrants
There is very little public and political debate about the role and consequences of 
immigration in Hungary. Public debate is generated periodically, usually due to 
generalizing, populist statements made by political actors. Such a public debate went 
on following the declaration of an MP of the FIDESZ (conservative party) alerting 
that the government plans will lead to the arrival of 1 million Asian immigrants. 
Another public debate was generated by plans of providing “Hungarian passes” to 
ethnic Hungarians being citizens of one of the neighbouring countries. The Socialist 
party opposed these plans and alerted the public with potential immigration of tens 
of millions of migrants. These instances prove that besides the complete absence 
of meaningful discourse on the social and economic effects and consequences of 
immigration in Hungary, rare debates focus on few populist declarations. 
András Kováts, an expert in migration policy, analyzed policy debates on 
migration in 2008. He found that public discourse on migration is dominated 
by arguments on refugee policy. The particularity of the Hungarian migration 
and discourse is the special role and status of migrants of Hungarian decent, the 
role and responsibility of the Hungarian state towards ethnic Hungarians in the 
neighbouring countries. Public policy debates do not refer to the – mostly positive 
– demographic consequences of migration: the Hungarian population, similarly to 
what is happening in industrialized European societies, is ageing; migration could 
ease tensions caused by ageing of the society. 
Roma and immigrant policies in Hungary
Policies towards Roma
The focus of policies aiming at Roma population is on active labour market policy, 
primarily employment programmes and connected trainings. One has to emphasize 
that such policies are extremely turbulent and their focus as well as financial frames 
might change each year, and by each 4 years of parliamentary circles. Despite the 
fact, that the ethnicity of a client can not be recorded, most of such programmes 
aim at “socially disadvantaged, long-term unemployed, with a special focus on 
Roma population”. 
I may repeat also in this context that a study on Roma employment published 
by Kertesi (Kertesi 2005) provides evidence for the hypothesis that public work 
and active labour market programmes aimed at increasing Roma employment 
have an important side effect: they increase the instability of employment of the 
target population. A large ratio – approximately one-fifth – of working age Roma 
population is employed by such programmes. 
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The same paper provides recommendations for labour market policy. The 
author sees the strong decentralization of the public work system, which delegates 
responsibility to the municipalities, as a major problem. He argues that the present 
system of public work increases regional inequalities to a large extent, as well as 
greatly fragments local labour markets. He also argues that long-term unemployed, 
marginalized poor are extremely vulnerable in the present system, as they are 
exposed to the municipality’s good-will not only in terms of welfare subsidies, but 
also in terms of employment possibilities that would entitle them to receive welfare 
allowances. He also points out that public work does not change the employability 
of long-term unemployed, but instead of being an element of labour market 
policies it is rather an extension of the social welfare system. He proposes drawing 
up complex rehabilitation and integration programmes in regions with multiple 
disadvantages and a large Roma population. The present miserable situation is the 
product of various, interrelated and intermingling causes, consequently policies 
should focus on various spheres of social marginalization: employment, education, 
housing, local economy, social care and health care. Another paper dealing with 
the social welfare system argues in a similar vein: delegating responsibility of social 
care and social employment of marginalized groups to municipalities (that are as 
poor as their inhabitants) makes clients – especially Roma clients – even more 
defenceless to authorities (Szalai 2005).
The most recent policy action tackling tensions between work and welfare titled 
”Path to Employment” has been adopted and came into effect in January 2009. The 
policy measure linked welfare allowances to compulsory participation in public and 
communal work programs. The reasoning behind the new regulation was that the 
present social welfare system does not motivate the long-term unemployed enough 
to return to the labour market. Household income might be higher in a family with 
3 or more children without an employed adult (social benefits, child allowances), 
than in a household with 2 children and an employed parent. This programme 
may be seen as a modification of the act regulating welfare allowances and social 
benefits. The essence of the regulation is that it divides the population entitled to 
a regular social benefit (230,000 individuals) into two categories: those who are 
potentially able to work and those who are not. The second group continues to 
receive current regular social allowances, but the first group is obliged to partake in 
public work or, if the applicant is younger than 35 and has not completed primary 
school, s/he has to take part in public education till s/he finishes primary school. 
The new act was understood as a great victory of local politicians, but has been 
criticized by experts. The main criticism says that public work programme is a type 
of active labour market programme which is least suitable to support employability 
of the long-term unemployed according to international and national experience. 
In the Hungarian scene some of the research mentioned earlier in this chapter 
(Kertesi 2005; Fleck & Messing 2005, Váradi 2010) demonstrated that, in fact, public 
work programmes have a negative effect on the chances of getting employment on 
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the primary labour market due to its low prestige, zero effect on employability, 
short term and irregular nature. The new act is also criticized for lacking means for 
implementation. 
The next set of policies of relevance here focus on further active labour market 
measures. The Autonómia Foundation, with the support of ILO and UNDP, 
prepared a study on Roma Labour Market Programmes in 2003 (Csongor & al. 
2003). The study provided an overview of subsidized labour market programmes 
aimed at Roma citizens of working age. It distinguished among three types of 
programmes: 
• Governmental programmes including Roma employment programmes of 
the National Public Foundation for Employment (Országos Foglalkoztatási 
Alapítvány – OFA), Phare programmes, and social land programmes. 
• Non-Governmental Initiatives including programmes of the Autonómia 
Foundation – Foundation for Self Reliance and programmes of the Public 
Foundation for Romany in Hungary.
• Public work and “socially useful work” programmes. 
Estimates provided by the Employment Centre and by the Ministry of Economy 
concerning Roma participants in Hungarian active labour market programmes 
(ALMP) differ widely: according to Employment Centres 17,000 Roma people 
have participated, while the Ministry of Economy estimates that the number is 
almost twice as high (31,500). The numbers of Table 1 demonstrate that public 
work programmes represent a key sphere of ALMP for the unemployed Roma, on 
the one hand, and Roma represent a large proportion of the participants in these 
programmes, on the other hand. 
Another study commissioned by the Ministry of Employment Policy and 
Labour examined Labour Market Programmes directed at unemployed Roma and 
it came to similar conclusions (Fleck & al. 2006). The study provided a thorough 
examination of all government and NGO active labour market programmes aiming 
at increasing Roma employment. The research included employment programmes, 
training, active labour market programmes, public work programmes and corporate 
development programmes for companies which employ Roma workers. Results 
were disappointing: despite the relatively large number of programmes targeting 
unemployed Roma, very few demonstrate convincing outcomes. It is uncommon 
that Roma people participating in employment programmes remain on the labour 
market once the programme is finished.
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TABLE 1. Roma participants in active labour market programmes: estimates provided by the 
Employment Centre and the Ministry of Economy (N, %)
Total
Roma 
Participants 
(Employment 
Centre)
%
Roma 
Participants
(Ministry of 
Economy)
%
Active programmes in 
total 
135,792 17,025 12.5 31,500 23.2
Retraining 40,621 3,206 7.9 4,400 10.8
Socially useful public 
work 
34,414 7,531 21.9 17,300 50.3
Local public work 9,521 2,697 28.3 - -
Large-scale public 
work projects 
4,797 2,115 44.1 3,800 79.2
PUBLIC WORK TOTAL 12,343 21,100
Wage subsidies 20,364 1,479 7.3 1,800 8.8
Travel to work 
subsidies 
4,306 354 8.2 160 3.7
Payment of social 
charges on wages 
5,096 864 17.0 800 15.7
Other programmes 11,971 852 7.1 400 3.3
Special Roma 
programmes 
- 2,782 - 2,450 -
(Csongor & al. 2001, 13.)
A more recent study, published both in Hungarian and English (Fleck & 
Messing 2010) overviews public policy approaches and actual measures aiming 
at the inclusion of Roma and other socially marginalized groups into the labour 
market. The study outlines three major approaches that characterized public 
policy approaches in the past decade. Until the early 2000s color conscious policies 
characterized government measures: various Roma employment programs were 
constructed and conducted, which aimed to enhance the employment of Roma 
and compensate for the effects of labor market discrimination they face, primarily 
by implementing Roma (i.e. ethnically targeted) employment programs. Colour 
conscious policy measures failed to reach the Roma and to improve the labor 
market position of those involved in the programs. This approach was replaced by 
color blinde policies in the after 2002. Although populations truly in need could be 
accurately defined by territorial, social and educational traits taken together, this 
practice nevertheless failed to produce the expected results. Apparently, the agents 
implementing the programs (various ministries) considered such definitions too 
narrow, as their proposals contain simplified categories like ‘the unemployed’, those 
‘having a large family’, or with ‘low educational degree’, despite the fact that exactly 
the intersection of all these categories would have represented the group of those 
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truly in need. As a consequence, these programs, as well failed to reach their target 
populations (Fleck & Messing 2010). 
The study by Fleck and Messing (2010) formulated a number of policy 
recommendations. The most important of these point out some key needs:
• need to design complex micro-regional development programmes that focus 
simultaneously on various elements of social disadvantage (education, health, 
social welfare, labour market, economic competitiveness); 
• need to replace public work programmes that do not increase the employability 
of the clients with active labour market programmes combined with 
meaningful training; 
• need of professional support and monitoring, since without professional 
support and regular monitoring even projects implementing very good ideas 
go bankrupt as they lack management, financial and human resources and 
professional skills and experience necessary for running a business;
• need for greater transparency.
Immigration policies
The Hungarian Government’s migration policy was published in a policy document 
entitled Migration Stategy, issued in 2007. It defines migration strategy in the 
context of a general national security strategy. 
There are three salient elements of immigration policy in Hungary: (1) control 
of migration, (2) policies concerning refugees and asylum seekers (3) policies with 
regard to ethnic Hungarians residing in neighbouring countries. There is hardly 
any reference to the regulation of general labour migration, and very little thinking 
about possible consequences of immigration with regard to the Hungarian labour 
market. As mentioned above, immigrants in Hungary possess higher than average 
education and are much younger than the native population, therefore, immigration 
could be favourable to Hungary.
73THL – Report 41/2010Immigrants and Ethnic Minorities
6	 Roma	between	labour	market	and			
	 welfare	in	Slovakia
Zsuzsanna Vidra, Vera Messing
Demographic, labour market and socio-economic 
data on Roma in Slovakia
Roma during communism 
Due to the integration efforts and the labour market policy of the communist 
regime, by the 1980s the majority of Roma men were employed (according to the 
1980 Census, 85% of Roma men and 85% of men of the total population were 
economically active). The employment rate of Roma women was lower than that of 
the total population (45%, as opposed to 77% of the total female population). The 
Roma were mostly employed as unqualified manual labourers in industry, public 
services or agriculture (Kusá & al. 2008a).
Following the political and economic changes as well as the dissolution of 
Czechoslovakia, the Slovak economy suffered severe depression. The GDP declined 
by 23% in the early 1990s, the agricultural sector went through serious crises 
whereby production decreased by 43%. The public sector dismissed 1.3 million 
people at that time, when employment in industry had fallen by 24% (Kusá & al. 
2008a). The Roma population was gravely hit by the crises given the low educational 
level that made them a most vulnerable group to be excluded from the primary 
labour market. 
Another important factor that influenced the situation of Roma after the 
changes was the involuntary return of jobless people from the Czech lands. Out of 
the 314,000 people originally from Slovakia 291,825 received Czech citizenship1. 
The remaining 22,000 had to leave the country and return to Slovakia where they 
did not have a job or a house. There are no data as to how many of them were Roma, 
but it is assumed that probably a high proportion were of Roma origin (Kusá & al. 
2008a).
1 One of the most important policy measures of the communist government towards Roma the was 
“resettlement”, i.e. forced migration programme in former Czechoslovakia. In the late 1950s the government 
aimed at settling the wandering Roma in the Czech lands even if most of them were living in Eastern Slovakia. 
However, for the lack of jobs in the Slovak part of the country, thousands of people were forcefully recruited 
to work in the Western regions of Czechoslovakia. 
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Data collection on the Roma population
As in most Central and East European countries, partly due to the strict personal 
data protection laws, disaggregated data by ethnicity is very rare and only 
available when specialized data collection is carried out. These are usually done 
either by international organizations (such as the UNDP or the World Bank) or 
research institutes that undertake focused surveys on Roma. The Slovak Statistical 
Office (SO) collects ethnic data based on self-identification in the course of the 
census. Roma are very much underrepresented in the sample compared to their 
estimated number due to the same factors as in Hungary, described in detail in 
the previous chapter. During the 1990s there were no other data available on the 
Roma population but the census data. There was only one another attempt, under 
EU pressure, to produce statistics on the Roma population: the SO engaged in 
collecting data on Roma settlements and their inhabitants based on questionnaires 
filled in by mayors. Then the World Bank (2002) undertook a study on the poverty 
of Roma and the welfare system, however, this was not a representative survey but 
a case study carried out in three settlements. The same year, the UNDP and the ILO 
(2002) published a comparative survey on the situation of Roma minority in five 
CEE countries (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania and Slovak Republic) 
based on comparable socio-economic data from a cross-country survey among 
5034 respondents representing the region’s Roma population. In 2004, the World 
Bank funded a project entitled the “Sociographic mapping of Roma settlements 
in Slovakia” and it gives to date one of the most reliable and precise data of Roma 
housing and living conditions. In 2005, with the support of the World Bank, the 
UNDP (2006) undertook another representative survey to give an assessment of 
the situation of Roma in Slovakia.
Roma population; basic demographic data 
Although it is well known that the census data from the socialist period are distorted 
and the Roma population is underestimated, this is the only database that can serve 
as a basis for comparison. In the 1970 census 3.5% of the total population of the 
Slovak part of the country, 159 275 people, declared themselves to be Roma. In the 
1980 census the number had grown to 199 853, representing 4% of the population. 
After the political regime change, the first census took place in 1991 when only 
1.4% of the population in Slovakia identified themselves as Roma (75 804 persons). 
Ten years later, during the 2001 census, slightly more individuals – 1.7% of the 
population (89 920 people) – stated they belonged to the Roma minority.
Given that all census data are very unreliable, there are several estimations by 
various organizations and interest groups that try to assess the real number of Roma. 
The estimates by local governments and Roma leaders are quite close to that of the 
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London-based Minority Rights Group NGO. The first figure is between 420,000 
and 500,000 and the second one is between 480,000 and 520,000, representing 
9–10% of the total population (World Bank 2002, UNDP 2002). The Demographic 
Research Centre speaks of 380 000 Roma, i.e. 7.2% of the total population. (Vaňo 
2001, in UNDP 2006.)
The birth rate of the total population has been declining, dropping from 
15.2 live births per 1,000 in 1990 to 10.7 in 1998. In contrast, that of the Roma 
population has been increasing (World Bank 2002). The average age of the Roma 
population was around 24 years in 2004, in contrast to 36 for the total population. 
(UNDP 2006) The huge difference may be attributed to two intersecting factors 
simultaneously: higher number of children and lower life expectancy among Roma 
when compared to the ethnic majority population. There is also a strong correlation 
between the settlement type and the above mentioned demographic factors: the 
highest number of children per family and the youngest population of Slovakia live 
in segregated settlements. ECOHOST’s estimates concerning the life expectancy of 
the Roma says that Roma men live 12 years and women 15 years shorter on average 
than their Slovakian counterparts (55 years in contrast to 67 years for men and 59 
years in contrast to 74 years for women) (World Bank 2002). The gap is huge in 
demographic sense and ay be explained by unreasonable living conditions, extreme 
poverty and limited access to health care and healthy lifestyle. 
Regional distribution, spatial segregation and some characteristics 
of the socio-economic situation 
The geographical distribution of Roma is very unequal across the country: two 
thirds of the Roma are concentrated in Eastern and Southern Slovakia in 9 districts 
all of which are situated in three regions: Košice, Banská Bystrica and Prešov 
(World Bank 2002). In Košice 27% and in Prešov 33% of the population is Roma 
(Kusá & al., 2008a). 
Regarding Roma settlements, data on the location and condition of Roma 
housing were collected by sociographic mapping. Altogether 1,575 settlements 
were identified as inhabited by Roma. Half of them (776) were considered mixed 
settlements where the Roma live integrated among the non-Roma. There were three 
more categories of settlements: communities where the Roma live concentrated 
in a street or a district (177 communities); communities located at the edge of 
villages or towns (338 communities); and communities spatially separated by 
natural or artificial barriers (284 communities). In addition to this categorization, 
distinction was made between separated and segregated settlements, the latter 
indicating location without access to water mains and where the proportion of 
undocumented housing reaches 20%. There were 149 communities with about 
120,000 to 150,000 residents of this kind. Moreover, out of these 149 there are 46 
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settlements lacking any infrastructure (National Strategy Report 2008; Kusá & al. 
2008a). These data refer to the fact that a significant propotion of Roma in Slovakia 
live both spatially and socially excluded, in circumstances that would qualify for 
‘third word’ circumstances. 
Concerning the poverty rates in the Slovak Republic during the 1990s, two 
major phenomena have to be highlighted. The 1996 microsensus revealed that the 
absolute poverty rate compared to other countries in the region was low, with 4.30 
dollars per person per day. At the same time, the number of people living under 
the poverty line of 2.15 dollars per person per day was twice as high as in e.g. 
Hungary and Poland. Thus, it was concluded that there was a significant part of the 
population living in deep poverty, or as it was often termed, there were important 
“pockets” of poverty, and these were concentrated in regions with high proportions 
of Roma (World Bank 2002).  
The data collected by the UNDP (2006) on subjective assessment of poverty 
are in compliance with the above conclusions. On a ten-point scale (one referring 
to the poorest, ten to the richest) 57% of the Roma population placed themselves 
in the lowest two categories whereas only 19% of the non-Roma population said 
they belonged to these categories. Moreover, the majority of the general population 
(54%) assigned itself to the fourth and fifth category, meaning that they felt close to 
the average. According to settlement types, a huge difference was discovered. 43% of 
Roma living in segregated settlements considered themselves and their households 
to be very poor (worst off), whereas in separated and mixed settlements it was only 
27%.
The main conclusions are that poverty in Slovakia is significantly concentrated 
in certain regions heavily populated by Roma and within these regions the poverty 
situation is further worsened by spatial factors. 
Educational level
According to a survey carried out in the early 1990s (Vašecka 2000), 56% of Roma 
men and 59% of Roma women had not completed primary education (World Bank 
2002). Apparently, the situation has somewhat improved since the 1990s. In 2006 
the UNDP survey found that 35% of the total Roma population had not finished 
primary school and about 37% had primary education as their highest level of 
education. In comparison: this proportion was only 7% for the total population 
in 2007 (National Strategy Report 2008). Altogether 24% of the Roma went on 
to secondary education but about 9% dropped out and only 15% succeeded in 
finishing it. The proportion of Roma students in higher education was as low as 
0.2%. The majority of Roma who benefit from secondary education go to vocational 
schools and only a few continue towards academic or comprehensive tracks after 
primary school (UNDP 2006).
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Racial segregation in schools is a prevalent phenomenon in Slovakia. Besides 
spatial segregation several factors contribute to the fact that a significant proportion 
of Roma children attend schools or classes separated from their non-Roma peers. 
While Roma are estimated to comprise less than 10 per cent of Slovakia’s total 
population, they make up 60 per cent of the pupils in special schools. One factor 
is institutional: special schools for mentally handicapped children have become an 
institution contributing to segregation as well as to the low school attainment level 
of Roma pupils in Slovakia. Once enrolled in a special school, pupils will have the 
least chance to go on to secondary education and, thus, to better opportunities on 
the labour market. Many of the Roma children are placed in special schools for 
reasons of the lack of command of the Slovak language as well as because of the 
cultural unfairness of the diagnostic tests on which psychological and pedagogical 
decisions are based and also by the push towards separation by the schools and 
‘white’ parents. This involves that disadvantages deriving from the different cultural 
and social environment in which children have been socialised are treated as mental 
handicaps. Besides the biases of the tests, some serious procedural problems exist 
violating the current legislation, and they have not been overcome despite the fact 
that the State School Inspection has exposed these problems at several occasions. 
There has been one governmental pilot programme addressing the problem of 
special schools. “Transition classes” were introduced to help Roma pupils back to 
the mainstream education from special schools. In 2007, 20 schools participated in 
the programme involving 162 children, but at the end only a couple of the pupils 
were transferred to standard classes (Kusá & al. 2008b).
Segregation in education is most probably increasing: according to the UNDP 
findings (2008, 22-23) 4% of Roma in Slovakia attend or attended special schools, 
while for those currently in school age this proportion reaches 15% in ethnically 
segregated and 9% in mixed settlements. Another research found that in the Prešov 
region – with the highest density of Roma population – the share of Roma in these 
types of schools was 28%, in contrast to 11% in the whole country and 62% of 
Roma children were enrolled in special schools in the region as opposed to 3% for 
the total school age population. The researchers point out that since the results are 
based on information from Roma, it is possible that in certain schools the share of 
Roma pupils reaches 80% (Kusá & al. 2008b). 
Besides the widespread practice of placing Roma pupils in special schools, 
there are other forms of separating Roma and non-Roma children. In the case of 
segregated settlements, it is very rare that parents take their children outside the 
district school, thus all school-aged Roma children coming from the settlement go to 
the same school that is evidently ethnically homogeneous. Very often, in ethnically 
mixed schools there are segregated classes, justified by their different performance 
levels, or segregated clubs and canteens for the Roma. Some of the programmes 
with the aim of addressing differences in school performance may have a counter 
effect of enhancing ethnic segregation. Catch-up classes often become segregated 
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classes with only Roma pupils attending them. Another problem is white flight: 
once the proportion of Roma pupils reaches a certain level in a school, non-Roma 
parents decide to take their children to other schools (Kusá & al. 2008b). 
Amnesty International has urged the Slovakian government to take measures 
to end segregation of Roma children in schools, a practice that leaves thousands of 
Roma pupils in substandards education in schools and classes.
The labour market situation of the Roma 
The National Labour Office collected data on ethnicity in Slovakia until 1997 and 
later the Office had unofficial figures on the Roma. According to these estimates, 
17–18% of all unemployed were Roma in 1996. Geographical differences are huge: 
40–42% of all unemployed in Eastern Slovakia were Roma. In certain areas and 
settlements, however, the total Roma population was totally ousted from the labour 
market (Kusá & al. 2008a). 
A couple of years later, in 2004, the official unemployment rate presented by 
the Office of Governmental Plenipotentiary for Roma communities (OGPRC) 
was 80% (Kusá & al. 2008a). Similarly, the 2006 UNDP survey found that 72% of 
working age Roma men and 52% of women were officially outside employment 
(unemployed, economically inactive etc.). The unemployment rate differed, again, 
according to settlement type and spatial segregation: the more segregated Roma 
lived the higher was the proportion of those excluded from the labour market 
(Kusá & al. 2008a; National Strategy Report 2008).
The employment rate was as low as 11% for Roma men and 5% for women 
according to the UNDP survey, which asked whether the respondent was regularly 
working. There were significant differences between settlement types: it was found 
that people from segregated areas had the worst employment rates (both men and 
women) and those from ethnically mixed areas had above-average employment 
rates. In the study among the control group, i.e. the general population in nearby 
areas, the rate of employment was higher but still very low: less than half of non-
Roma were in some kind of employment in these areas of the country (National 
Strategy Report 2008). 
The UNDP research (2006) stated that the long-term registered unemployment 
rate is not significantly different for the Roma and the non-Roma control 
population, except for one important thing. The main difference between the long-
term unemployment patterns of the two populations is that non-Roma are usually 
unemployed for a shorter period of time.   
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TABLE 1. Length of unemployment spells among the Roma by settlement type (%)
Unemployment spell Segregated Separated Mixed Total
Less than 6 months 9.8 10.4 9.0 9.7
6 months – 1 year 16.7 16.5 10.7 14.4
1–2 years 17.8 20.0 16.6 18.0
2–3 years 9.5 10.4 7.6 9.1
3 years and more 46.2 42.6 56.1 48.8
Registered unemployed total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Roma labour migration
There is few data available on Roma emigration during the past two decades. The 
first important wave of data collection took place in 1997–1999 when between 
1,000 and 1,200 Roma from Slovakia applied – rather unsuccessfully – for asylum 
in the UK and Finland. The International Organization for Migration carried 
out research in 2000 to describe the emigrant population and it discovered that 
contrary to the expectations the majority of the migrants were of working age 
(24–40) from urban areas in Eastern Slovakia (World Bank 2002). Apart from 
the generally poor living conditions and labour market opportunities, the 1998 
labour market Act that halved social assistance for the long-term unemployed
, seriously effecting the Roma population, might have had an impact on the 
increasing level of migration from that part of the country where many Roma lived 
without perspectives of succeeding (Kusá & al. 2008a). 
According to the Labour Force Survey data, 7% of the total Slovak economically 
active population works abroad which amounts to the share of 15% in Prešov 
region in Eastern Slovakia. Although there is no data on the ethnic composition 
of the emigrating population, it is assumed from local observations and irregular 
school attendance of children that in fact many of these people are Roma (Kusá & 
al. 2008a).
Slovakian welfare and labour market policies; impacts 
on Roma
Social policy was reorganized based on universal principles emphasizing the 
human rights after 1990 in Slovakia. The new approach has had both negative 
and positive impacts on the Roma population. On the one hand, social benefits 
became unconditional, e.g. family allowance was not linked anymore to school 
attendance of children and the maternity leave was not linked to medical visits 
during pregnancy. These measures emphasized the individuals’ right to freely 
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make decisions concerning their life. On the other hand, the district networks of 
social workers dealing mainly with Roma were abolished claiming that no targeted 
programmes should exist for they stigmatise the given population. These measures 
were regarded and applauded by most scholars and intellectuals as empowerment 
contrary to previous state paternalism in the first half of the 1990s. 
The tendency was further strengthened by the practice of abolishing data 
collection based on ethnicity; it was later on codified in the 2002 Act on personal 
data protection. Thus, it became impossible to monitor how policies affected Roma 
in general or their subgroups. This practice of “ethnic invisibility” in statistics did 
not prevent the central government in the majority of the cases to use the “blaming 
of the poor” – and especially the Roma – argument to justify policy changes.
It is only a recent change in practice and discourse that ethnic data collection is 
seen as a necessary tool to assess the effects of welfare and labour market policies 
on one of the most vulnerable groups, the Roma. In 2008, a resolution was 
passed under civil pressure, to change the legislation on personal data protection
 (Kusá & al. 2008a). 
As regards to the concrete policy measures, in the 1990s the main 
assumption on which the social policy of the country was based was that high 
rate of unemployment would be a transitory social phenomenon. Therefore, the 
minimum subsistence level for the eligibility of social assistance was introduced 
in 1991, providing benefits on a universal basis supposing that “people will live 
on minimum subsistence income only for a short period and they have a real 
opportunity to improve their situation by their own effort” (Kusá & al. 2008a, 30). 
In 1998 a new Act on social assistance came into force making a difference 
between subjective and objective reasons for material need. Those who fell in 
the category of subjective reasons were entitled only to 50% of the minimum 
subsistence. A very important part of the Act was that long-term unemployed 
(more than two years) were categorized as having only subjective reasons for social 
assistance (Kusá & al. 2008a).    
Several social and labour market policy reforms were introduced which affected 
the socially marginalized Roma severly in the period of 2002–2004 in Slovakia. First, 
social benefits were cut for both the subjective and the objective categories and the 
amount was maximized (309 Euros) for households irrespective of family size. The 
next important reform came with the intention to combine active labour market 
instruments and social assistance in order to reduce welfare dependence and increase 
work incentives (or, as the political slogan went, “make work pay”) (Kusá & al. 
2008a). The previous benefit system was changed in the 2003 Act on social assistance 
by removing the distinction between subjective and objective reasons for material 
need and by introducing a differentiated system of benefit allocation calculated by 
household composition and supplemented by four types of allowances (health care 
allowance, activation allowance, housing allowance and protection allowance).
Another important element of the reform was that the system became much more 
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decentralized. Three types of allowances (excluding the housing allowance) were 
allocated to the local authorities in the hope of being better targeted (UNDP 2006). 
The Act on Employment Services introduced labour market activation 
programmes in 2004. The social welfare reforms already aimed at making benefits 
conditional upon participation in work, and activation programmes were to make 
the unemployed actively seek work, participate in educational programmes, in 
community, public and voluntary work. In the framework of the reform a new 
counselling system was established to help people in job search. In the past, 
participants of the public work programmes were entitled to social security and 
the time spent in this employment was taken into account in the accruement of 
pensions. With the newly introduced measures, this was changed. 
Looking at the situation of income structure and welfare dependency before 
the reforms among the Roma population, it was found that the proportion of 
government transfers of the total household income was around 70%, i.e. highest 
among the five studied CEE countries in Slovakia in 2001 (Figure 1 by UNDP 
2002).
FIGURE 1. Main income source of Roma households in Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Slovakia and Romania in 2001
(Source: UNDP 2002.) 
Regarding the ratio of Roma families’ depending on government transfers, 
Slovakia was again at the top: 44% of families could only maintain themselves 
because of the benefits they received from the government (UNDP 2002). A rather 
high proportion of Roma participated in public works in Slovakia as compared 
to the other four countries in the UNDP survey. For Slovakia the share was 25%, 
whereas for example in Bulgaria, it was 6%. – This was, on the one hand, due to the 
dominance of public work programmes as labour policy instruments in the country, 
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and on the other hand, to the fact that after six months of public work, people could 
be re-registered as unemployed and eligible for otherwise unobtainable benefits 
(UNDP 2002). Still this system traps the Roma and other socially marginalized 
groups in the vicious circle of public employment and social benefit, and it does not 
contribute to the actual intergration into the labour market and society in general. 
The impacts of the 2002 and 2004 reforms were measured by the “disincentive” 
rates. This indicator shows to what extent it is worth taking up a job rather than 
receiving state benefit (closing the benefit trap). It was found that the share of 
persons in the benefit trap dropped by 88% in 2004. The cut of benefits decreased 
the number of recipients by 35% resulting in a budgetary saving of 2.5 billion 
Slovak crowns. It was also found that 69% of former social benefit recipients found 
employment. All in all, the major impact of the reforms was a significant reduction 
of the unemployment rate and welfare dependence. Nonetheless, the poverty rate 
of those who still depend on social welfare has increased, especially for families 
with children (Mészáros 2008).
The 2006 UNDP survey was to assess the impacts of the 2003-2004 social 
assistance and labour market reforms on the Roma population. Altogether 73% of 
the Roma households in the sample were receiving some kind of benefits, against 
only 23% of the non-Roma in the neighbouring areas. Concerning the proportion 
of the take-up of the various allowances, 35% of Roma social assistance recipients 
and 26% of all Roma households received a health care allowance. As to activation 
allowance the rates were 66% and 48% correspondingly. The housing allowance was 
received only by 16% of the benefit recipients and by the scholarship recipients in 
6% of the cases. The difference between Roma and non-Roma regarding the take-
up rate of allowances was not significantly different. The figures indicate that the 
dependence of the Roma population on social welfare benefits had not changed, 
and it remains on the same level as before the reforms, whereas the supplementary 
allowances reach the Roma to the same degree as the non-Roma population.    
The same survey also evaluated the extent to which the Roma participated 
in the active labour market programmes and assessed whether they were able to 
achieve their original goal which is to enable the unemployed to find work on 
the primary labour market. It was discovered that 63% of the Roma had not been 
involved in the activation programmes at all. Interestingly, the rate among the 
non-Roma population was even smaller, they participated about three times less 
frequently than the Roma in the activation programmes. Table 2 shows the share of 
Roma participation in activation programmes by the settlemet type. 
The participants of the activation programmes were asked if they felt more 
motivated to seek employment after having participated in the programme. The 
answers were rather positive, since 50% said yes. Another question was whether 
the programmes improved their chances to find a job and the majority, 59%, said 
no. With respect to the possible impact of the activation programme on social 
integration, it was found that almost all participants worked near their residence. 
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Thus, the chances for establishing social contacts outside of one’s community were 
extremely limited and as a consequence the chance to get a job – irrespective of the 
willingness - did not increase significantly. One has to add that although there are 
no data collected about employers’ discrimination practices it is pretty obvious that 
Roma face significant racial discrimination when applying for an open position. 
TABLE 2. Share of the Roma in activation programmes by length and settlement type (%)
Period Segregated Separated Mixed Total
Total (if ever) 41.4 31.7 38.5 37.2
In previous months 32.9 21.7 30.1 28.3
Difference 8.5 10.0 8.4 8.9
Note: The question was asked for all household members over the age of 18. 
(Source: UNDP 2006.)
Besides its low effectiveness, there are some important controversial elements 
of the activation programmes that should be pointed out. Employers (local 
governments, villages or companies) simply used activation work to reduce their 
expenses. Moreover, from the respondents’ answers it could be assumed that in 
many cases there was actually not enough work to involve everybody who was 
willing to participate. In other words, it is decided by local officials and mayors 
what jobs will be offered to whom. Taking into consideration the unemployment 
and dependency rates of the Roma population in Slovakia, it can be concluded that 
the activation programmes (and the corresponding reforms in general) have not 
had a positive effect on this part of the population. Moreover, the poverty rate of 
those dependent on social benefits is still considerable, which mainly affects the 
Roma.
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7	 Roma	between	labour	market	and			
	 welfare	in	Romania
Zsuzsanna Vidra
Research on the Roma population and basic 
demographic data 
The census data (from 1992 and 2002) containing ethnic affiliation figures based on 
self-declaration are used for the analysis very of Roma situation with a reservation. 
Given the unreliability of the ethnic figures of the census, the Research Institute for 
Quality of Life (Zamfir & Zamfir) carried out representative surveys in 1992 and 
1998 to have more precise data on the Romanian Roma population. As one of the 
basic methodological concerns, the sampling was not exclusively based on self-
identification but also on identification by external sources such as interviewers. 
The UNDP has undertaken several research projects with the aim of exploring 
and comparing the socio-economic situation of the Roma populations in the CEE 
(Central and Eastern Europe) and the Balkan countries, especially as nationally 
produced data are often missing. Romania was included in several of the UNDP 
projects, e.g.“The Roma in Central and Eastern Europe: Avoiding the Dependency 
Trap” (2002); “Faces of Poverty, Faces of Hope” (2005); “At Risk: Roma and the 
Displaced in Southeast Europe” (2006). The projects used both survey methods 
based on a representative sample as well as incorporated existing national statistics. 
The World Bank also carried out important research projects on the issue. “Roma 
and the Transition in Central and Eastern Europe”, published in 2000, was the 
first cross-country report on the poverty and human development challenges 
that Roma face in Central and Eastern Europe. The report entitled “Roma in an 
Expanding Europe: Breaking the Poverty Cycle” (2005) was based on survey data 
and case studies. 
The most recent project, “Inclusion and Exclusion of Roma in Present-Day 
Romanian Society” (2008), was developed as the research component of the Phare 
programme titled “Strengthening Capacity and Partnership Building to Improve 
Roma Condition and Perception”. The research contained both quantitative and 
qualitative data collection and analysis with the aim of producing comparable 
socio-economic data on the Roma and the non-Roma populations living in 
their proximity. The study, which was carried out for policy-making purposes, 
described mechanisms of social exclusion. The project combined three different 
methodologies: a representative survey with a Roma and a non-Roma sub-sample, 
36 community studies and a survey on local authorities.  
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As indicated above, census data on ethnicity, especially of the most marginalized 
groups, are very unreliable as to the actual size of the given ethnic population. A 
detailed description of the causes of the unreliability of data – i.e. unreliability of 
external identification, self identification (Roma usually a second ethnic identity) 
and situational nature of ethnic identification – is provided by Ladányi-Szelényi 
(2002) in their cross-country comparative Roma survey and by Fleck & al. (2008). 
As to the census data, which considerable underestimate the number of Roma in 
all CEE countries 401,000 people declared themselves Roma, representing 1.7% of 
the total population in the first census after the collapse of the state-socialist area 
was held in 1992. During the next census in 2002, the number of self-declared 
Roma had grown to 535,000 (2.4% of the total population). In 1992, the Research 
Institute for Quality of Life set out to provide an expert estimation of the size 
of the Roma population. According to the results of their survey the number of 
Roma was around 1 million, i.e. 5% of the total population in the early 1990s in 
Romania (Magyari & al. 2008a). Besides surveys, there were estimates as well, such 
as that of Bárány (2002) who calculated that around 1.5 million Roma lived in 
the country (7%). The Roma Education Fund in 2005 assessed that between 1.5–2 
million of Romanians were of Roma origin. All studies and documents point out 
that Romania has the largest Roma minority group in Europe. 
Basic demographic characteristics: birth rate, age structure, family 
structure 
However we define the ‘Roma’ all essential demographic data are very different 
for the Roma when compared to the non-Roma population. The fertility rate among 
Roma (2.6) was significantly higher than in the total population (1.8) according to 
the 1992 census. According to the findings of the Reproduction Health Survey 
conducted nine years later, in 2001, the Roma reproduction rate had not changed 
compared to the previous periods, while the rate has dropped among Romanians 
(1.2) and the ethnic Hungarians (1.3) (UNDP 2002). Thus, the age structure of 
the Roma population is tilted towards the youngest age cohorts (UNDP 2002). 
Life expectancy, and consequently the ratio of elderly are also significantly lower 
among Roma than the entire population. For every member of a Roma household 
between 30 and 59 years old, there are only 0.2 elderly people, compared to 0.5 
in the non-Roma households (Strategic National Report 2008). Family size is also 
larger among Roma compared to the total population: 3.1 for the total population 
(census 1992) and 6.7 among Roma (data by the Research Institute for Quality of 
Life 1992).
Marriage patterns are significantly different as well between Roma and non-
Roma in Romania. First of all, around 40% of the Roma are not married legally 
and this phenomenon is more frequent among the younger generations: only half 
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of the families under the age of 24 are legally married. When married, the age 
of wedlock is much lower than in the general population: 35% of Roma women 
married at the age of 16, 17% at the age of 17–19 and 26% between 19 and 22, 
while in the total population the marrying age 22.25 years according to the 1992 
census. Concerning family planning, by the findings of the Research Institute for 
Quality of Life, the share of those using contraception was four times lower among 
the Roma than in the general population (UNDP 2002). 
Educational level
The level of education of the Roma population in Romania is significantly lower 
than that of the majority population. A very important factor in adequate school 
attainment is early socialization that starts with kindergarten attendance. The Phare 
survey indicated that 52% of Roma children attended kindergarten as opposed to 
76% of the total number of children. It was found by that 27% of Roma boys and 
35% of girls do not complete primary school (UNDP 2002), and in contrast to 33% 
of non-Roma 66% of Roma had only primary level education or less (World Bank 
2005). Regarding further educational attainment data, the 2008 Phare survey found 
that only 9% of Roma aged between 18 and 30 years of age had completed secondary 
school as opposed to 41% in the total population, and only 2% of Roma had a 
university degree against 27% of the general population (Strategic National Report 
2008). To a lower extent than in other CEE countries, but still quite frequently 
Roma children are channelled to special schools in Romania (UNDP 2002; cf. the 
article on Slovakia). Their socialization disadvantages due to socially unprivileged 
or linguistically different environments are regarded as mental handicaps and they 
are placed in schools for those with intellectual disabilities. It was found that 2.5% 
of the Roma and 1.7% of the children of the total population attended such schools 
in Romania (Phare 2008). The difference is rather small in towns and villages but 
fairly large in large cities where 2% of the total and 10% of the Roma pupils are 
enrolled in special schools. The difference may be explained also by structural 
reasons, namely, that special schools are typically available in large cities. The 
generally low educational attainment level, and the high proportion of those, who 
have not completed elementary education makes the Roma extremely vulnerable 
on the labour market, where according to legal requirements, a completed primary 
school education is the minimum prerequisite to applying for jobs as well as to 
participating in labour market training programs (OSI 2006). 
Another general problem related to quality of the education of Roma, also 
prevalent in other of CEE countries, is significant ethnic and social segregation in 
the school system. According to results of the Phare survey 25% of Roma children 
attend segregated classrooms and less than half (47%) of the school-aged Roma 
children go to fully non-segregated classrooms in Romania. There is, however 
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a special problem characteristic only for Romania that further complicates the 
situation, namely the lack of birth certificates and identity cards for important 
segments of the Roma population. Without these documents, children drop out 
of the official registration systems, and in practice may be completely excluded 
from education. Despite government efforts to provide all citizens with proper 
documents there is still a good number of undocumented people, most of whom are 
Roma living in socially and geographically marginalized and segregated locations 
such as favela-like settlements in the proximity of waste dumps. Many of those 
living among such circumstances are children, who never go to school, or if the 
go, drop out after a few years of unsuccessful education (Magyari 2010). The 2003 
National Democratic Institute estimated that one fifth of the Roma population did 
not have identity cards (UNDP 2005) whereas in the more recent research (Phare 
2008) it was found that only 2% did not have this document (mainly in large cities 
where it amounted to 4%). 
In Romania a great number of Roma are illiterate (Phare 2008): 22% of Roma 
as opposed to 2% in the total population. Naturally the proportion is strongly 
correlated to the number of years spent in education: 7% of Roma people over 14 
who graduated from primary school were actually illiterate and 28% of those who 
attended school but dropped out halfway could neither read nor write, while 88% 
of those who never went to school were illiterate. 
Geographical distribution/spatial segregation/housing conditions  
According to the figures of the Roma Inclusion Barometer (2007), the majority of 
Roma live in rural areas (60%), and the remaining 40% lives in urban environments, 
mainly in old, dilapidated houses in city centres, or suburban deprived settlements 
(Magyari & al. 2008a). 
A typology of Roma settlements was elaborated on the basis of a country-
level survey conducted by the National Agency for Roma (Sandu 2005). In the 
framework of the research 848 Roma communities comprising of about 250,000 
inhabitants were studied: 59% of them, were classified as poor. A further important 
piece of information was that 75% of the poor Roma communities were located 
adjacent to cities or small towns (Zaman & Stặnculescu 2007). 
The 2005 UNDP study indicated that as opposed to 4% of the total population 
29% of the Roma did not have access to secure housing. Concerning the housing 
space, the Phare survey found that it was over twice better among non-Roma 
households than Roma ones. Poor housing infrastructure was disproportionately 
frequent among Roma household: in contrast to 2% nationally, 15% of Roma 
households had no electricity. As opposed to the national average of 9%, 36% of 
Roma households did not have access to running water.
7   Roma between labour market and welfare in Romania
88 Immigrants and Ethnic MinoritiesTHL – Report 41/2010
In the Phare research some dimensions of spatial segregation were measured 
by using four different indicators referring to ethnic and economic segregation. 
The study assessed the influence of segregation on various aspects of life. The 
study demonstrated how much living conditions differed and what affect they had 
on everyday life: 29% of the households in unkempt neighborhoods (”unkempt” 
meaning ethnic and aconomic segregation at neighbourhood level) did not have 
access to electricity whereas for households in other district- and neighborhood 
types this share was only 7%. The study revealed that residential segregation 
influenced educational segregation as well. Children living in such communities 
were more likely to study in ethnically homogeneous, segregated Roma only 
classrooms. 
Social situation i.e. poverty of the Roma 
Several studies deal with the living conditions and poverty of the Roma population 
in Romania. The 1992 “Socio-economic life conditions of the Roma population” 
survey undertaken by the Institute of Quality of Life found that about 41% of the 
Roma respondents could not provide for their basic needs. The study was repeated 
six years later and it proved that the situation had deteriorated. In 1998, 68% of 
the Roma said that they did not have the necessary means to maintain themselves 
(Magyari & al. 2008a). 
Another survey – the Ethnic Relations Barometer 2002 (Magyari & al. 2008a) 
– showed the difference of the poverty rate of the Roma population compared 
to other ethnic groups in the country. Altogether 52% of Roma lived under the 
severe poverty rate (approximately 30 euros per month) as opposed to 9% of the 
Romanians and 6% of the Hungarians (Magyari & al. 2008a). 
The 2007 World Bank report indicated an important decrease of absolute 
poverty in Romania between 2000 and 2006: it dropped from 36% to 14%. The 
decline was a result of the rapid annual economic growth (5–6%) the country went 
through in this period, which benefited all population groups. Very importantly, 
the inequality level, wich was comparable to EU-25 and EU-15 levels, and lower 
than e.g. in Poland, Estonia, Lithuania and the UK did not grow significantly 
during this process. Nonetheless, deep “pockets of poverty” had not disappeared, 
multiple deprivation in rural areas and certain geographical regions especially in 
the North-East of the country was found. Some social groups as well as the Roma 
population remained the most vulnerable in terms of living conditions, access to 
services and chances of mobility. Although the poverty rate of the Roma decreased 
from 76% in 2003 to 58% in 2006, their relative risk of poverty increased. It was 3 
times higher than the national average in 2003 but 4 times higher than that in 2006. 
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Labour market situation of Roma 
The unemployment rate after the economic and political changes in Romania 
grew to 11% in 1994 and increased further to 12% in 1999. It was the result of 
the restructuring measures introduced when large state-owned non-profitable, so 
called ‘socialist’ industries and companies were closed and employees dismissed. 
Unemployment rate dropped in 2000 and has remained since then around 7–8% 
(Zaman & Stặnculescu 2007). Due to the generally low level of education and 
unfavourable geographical distribution of Roma in those regions, where economic 
depression is more salient, unemployment among Roma is significantly higher, 
than among non-Roma. It was first assessed in 1992 in the framework of the 
“Socio-economic life conditions of the Roma population” survey. This study 
revealed that 51% of the Roma did not have a job at that time (Magyari & al. 
2008a). According to the ILO broad definition of unemployment4, 44% of the 
Roma were unemployed in 2005. As to the gender division, 38% of Roma men and 
52% of Roma women were unemployed. When respondents were asked whether 
they considered themselves unemployed, the rate was 78% for the Roma and 25% 
for the non-Roma population. Hence, there is a significant difference between the 
employment rate of the minority and the majority population. 
In addition to data on the labour market situation of Roma another indicative 
piece of information is the type of economic activity typical for this segment of the 
society. The Phare study distinguished “regular work”, “casual work”, “housework” 
(e.g. helping in families), “student” and “do not work” categories for the age group 
of 18–59. The survey showed traits of exclusion of Roma from the official and 
regular labour market and their squeezing out towards irregular and unofficial 
labour: about half of the non-Roma (51%) had regular work as opposed to 22% in 
the Roma sample. Few i.e. only 5% of the non-Roma had casual work, in contrast to 
18% of the Roma. Despite the significantly lower age structure typical for the Roma 
(see the section on demography) the rate of students among Roma was significantly 
lower than for non-Roma: 7% of the non-Roma and only 2.6% of the Roma were 
students. Interestingly, the unemployed (“do not work”) category was closer in the 
two groups than in the macro-data: altogether 24% of the non-Roma respondents 
said they did not work, and only somewhat more, 37% of the Roma, responded in 
the same way. This could be a result of the fact that the survey measured economic 
activity that is much broader a term than employment, and Roma considered 
themselves as working, even if such work was unreported or irregular. The results 
show that if the two income-generating activities are considered (“regular work” 
and “casual work”), the difference of the rates of economic activity between the 
Roma and non-Roma population is significantly lower (40% and 56%).
Related to the type of activity dimension, another important piece of 
information concerns is the involvement in the informal economy. The 2002 
UNDP survey indicated that 70% of Roma involved in income generation activities 
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worked in the informal sector of the economy. It was also found that activity in the 
informal economy was about four times higher among the Roma than among the 
non-Roma population (UNDP 2006). 
It is an important indicator of labour market status in which sectors the Roma 
are employed. As the Table 1 shows the majority work in agriculture and 31% are 
unqualified workers (Zaman & Stặnculescu 2007). By the Phare survey results, 
the findings reflect the results of earlier studies. One third of the economically 
active Roma work in agriculture i.e. Roma work in agriculture about three times 
more often than the non-Roma, and Roma are also somewhat overrepresented in 
construction but seriously underrepresented in all other sectors (Table 1). 
TABLE 1. Distribution of economic sectors by ethnicity (Roma vs. non-Roma, respondents 
aged 18–59, %) 
Roma Non-Roma
Education, science, health, culture 1.8 9.9
Transport 3.7 8.8
Other 6.3 7.5
Industry, mining 7.3 10.5
Trade 11.5 13.9
Construction 18.8 11.4
Services 18.1 24.7
Agriculture, forestry 32.4 13.4
Total 100.0 100.0
(Source: Phare 2008.)
Migration and Roma 
In the early 1990s, large numbers of Germans left the country. The subsequent 
years saw an exodus of illegal migrants looking for work opportunities in developed 
countries, and according to the estimates, twice as many Romanians worked in 
Western Europe in 1999 than in 1992. The 2002 introduction of the Schengen 
visa has further reinforced migration trends. Data concerning migration are very 
difficult to retrieve and they are not very trustworthy given the high proportion of 
illegal emigrants from Romania. It was, however, deduced from census data that 
about 600,000 people had left the country between 1992 and 2002. There are other 
estimates, too; one is that by International Organization for Migration in 2003, 
which approximated the number of Romanian working abroad to be around 1.7 
million, while this number went up to 2 million by 2006 (Zaman & Stặnculescu 
2007).
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As mentioned above the data on migration are to a large extent based on 
estimations and, thus, unreliable to certain extent. It is even more difficult to obtain 
similar data for the Roma population. Nonetheless, the Phare survey included 
questions5 on migration and thus it provides some figures as to what extent the 
Roma partake in this process. According to this research, combined emigration 
potential (covering all kinds of intentions to work abroad) of Roma was higher 
than that of the non-Roma: 31% for the Roma, and 18% for the non-Roma. The net 
migration potential, which included only those respondents who would indicate 
a date of their forthcoming emigration was lower for both Roma (21%) and non-
Roma (11%) but the relative difference by ethnic group was about the same. 
The propensity to emigrate was higher among the Roma than non-Roma by the 
indicators used, but the actual chance to work abroad in near future was lower 
among Roma. 
Phare Project also studied to what extent migration improved the financial 
situation of Roma and non-Roma households (see Table 2.).
TABLE 2. Development of household’s financial situation, by migration experience of 
household members and by ethnicity (%)
Ethnicity
Financial situation
Better Same Worse
Roma
   Total 
   With migration experience
   Correlation index 
13.8
33.1
2.4
38.4
21.3
0.6
47.8
15.6
0.3
Non-roma
   Total 
   With migration experience 
   Correlation index
17.8
29.2
1.6
52.9
18.1
0.3
29.3
18.6
0.6
(Source: Phare 2008.)
The data show that working abroad improved the financial situation of Roma 
households more than that of non-Roma households. In Roma households it was 
2.4 times more likely that the situation got better than in non-Roma households, 
where it was only 1.6. 
Policies relevant for Roma
As an introduction to this section, one has to shortly present the key changes that 
the social protection system and the labour market have undergone in the last two 
decades, and then describe, how these changes and policies affected the Roma 
population. 
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Social protection schemes, which cover pensions, healthcare services, 
unemployment insurance, as well as family and child allowances, were very 
fragmented, ineffective and insufficient during the early 1990s. This was partly due 
to the fact that the population’s contribution to the central budget was extremely 
low, given the fact that about one third of the total income in the country was in 
kind at that time and only about half of the population paid for social insurance. 
Meanwhile, the income level was among the lowest in Europe indicating major 
problems caused by poverty (World Bank Labour, Employment and Social Policies 
2002). About 30% of all employed people in Romania were paid at the minimum 
wage level (Zaman & Stặnculescu 2007). 
The first significant reform of the social protection system was introduced in 
1995 with two major elements. One was decentralizing social protection system 
and allocating important responsibilities to local authorities. The other one was 
establishing a system of minimum guaranteed income (MGI). Decentralization 
in the short run caused serious problems in social protection, due to shrinking 
financial resources and the inefficient cooperation between the central and local 
authorities and as a result of this both social and regional inequalities increased 
significantly. 
The minimum wage, which had been 65% of the average wage in 1989 
gradually declined until 1999, when it represented no more than 27% of the 
average wage. The system collapsed in 2000, and was followed by a reform in 2002. 
which clarified responsibilities and benchmarked MGI is at 36% of the minimum 
gross wage (Zaman & Stặnculescu 2007). Several other allowances and services – 
i.e. medical insurance, emergency allowance and household heating allowance – 
became conditioned: MGI applicants have to perform an ‘activity of public interest’ 
if they wish to get entitled (Strategic National Report 2008). 
As to labour market policies, it was in 1991 when the first labour market 
reform took place with the establishment of an unemployment fund to which 
employers and employees had to contribute on an obligatory basis and the self-
employed on a voluntary basis (Zaman & Stặnculescu 2007). There are some 
major problems related to labour market policies in Romania. One of them is the 
high rate of payroll tax: in 2005, they represented 47.5% of the gross salary, which 
pushes large numbers of people – over 20% according to latest estimates – into 
the informal economy, a process affecting population with a low education and 
Roma disproportionately. The National Institute for Labour Research and Social 
Protection calculated that about 1.2 million people (approximately 11% of the 
total labour force) were employed in the informal sector. The government has 
tried to address the situation with little success by creating the institution of labour 
inspection as well as by providing sets of incentives for employers to create new 
jobs in the formal sector (Zaman & Stặnculescu 2007). In 1997, with the largest 
wave of dismissal of workers from non-profitable state enterprises, the government 
introduced the National Programme for Active Labour Market Policies (ALMP) 
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aiming to reintegrate unemployed workers by subsidies for geographical mobility, 
starting small businesses or enrolling in training programmes (Zaman & 
Stặnculescu 2007). 
Impacts of social assistance and labour market policies on Roma 
Since there are no studies that directly deal with the issue of the impact of these 
policies on the Roma population in Romania, the impact must be estimated by other 
source. After the introduction of the minimum guaranteed income (MGI) and new 
social protection measures, their impact on the reduction of poverty in general was 
analysed. As regards to the MGI, it was found in 2004 that it had a positive effect 
on severe poverty but it was still not well targeted, meaning that the poorest were 
not well reached. Concerning the social protection and social assistance transfers, 
it was discovered that the most positively affected group was the elderly aged above 
65. Among all social transfers, child allowances proved to have the highest positive 
impact on reducing poverty by reaching the widest range of the poorest families 
(Zaman & Stặnculescu 2007).  Here we had to add again, that most probably, those 
Roma families, who lived in total social exclusion; i.e. without official documents, 
were completely ousted from the social protection system, as well. 
Labour market measures, even if not targeted at Roma, might bear a major 
impact on their labour market situation. Still the lack of specific data, or information, 
on how this group has been affected by labour market measures, restrains us to 
provide any conclusion here. Some ethnically targeted labour market programmes 
have been introduced as well, with the aim of helping the Roma to enter the primary 
labour market. No overview or research on the effectiveness of these programs are 
available, thus we may only provide some examples here. A special programme 
offered 9,845 jobs to Roma people in 2004 (Zaman & Stặnculescu 2007). More 
recently, the Strategic National Report Regarding Social Protection and Social 
Inclusion (2008) mentioned that in the framework of a special programme 15,987 
Roma persons have been employed. Given the low number of jobs offered within 
such frameworks and the lack of impact assessment the effect of these programmes 
on the employment situation of the Roma in general is probably very small. 
Another important phenomenon related to the impact of policies on the 
living conditions of Roma should still be highlighted. In the 2002 UNDP survey, it 
was found that a somewhat more than 10% of the Roma had an income from the 
formal sector, around 40% had an income from the informal sector, and about 25% 
lived mainly on government transfers. The 2008 Phare survey showed a gradual 
change in the composition of the income sources: 43% of income came now from 
government transfers (social benefits, MGI), and 23% from informal activities. It is 
not obvious how this very interesting result should be interpreted.
As pointed out before, the poverty rate of the Romanian population as a whole 
has declined as well as that of the Roma population. However, social policies have 
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not prevented the inequalities from increasing and now Romanian Roma are poorer 
in relative terms than before. This means that social disparities are growing, most 
probably also inside the Roma population. The labour market situation of Roma 
has not changed significantly; neither unemployment nor employment rates have 
improved. The general picture reinforces the impression that government policies 
are inadequate to compensate for the low status and poor living conditions of the 
Roma. This most probably influences Roma interest in emigration, which is higher 
than the non-Roma one.
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8	 Suggestions	for	further	research	on		
	 immigration	and	immigrant	policy
Hans-Peter van den Broek, Vera Messing, Simo Mannila
The degree of participation of immigrants and ethnic minorities in the European 
labour markets and welfare regimes varies widely among different EU member 
States. While some, in particular Southern European countries are experiencing 
major inflows of migrants, putting great pressure on their labour markets and welfare 
systems, other, for instance Nordic countries are facing opposite demographic 
challenges like population stagnation and aging, which higher immigration rates 
might help to solve. And whereas some countries may be characterized by a high 
degree of turnover in population – large numbers of workers are emigrating, 
while at the same time immigrants, occupy the jobs they leave behind – other if 
any, countries are less affected by immigration, instead they have high shares of 
ethnic minorities, whose problematic integration challenges social cohesion. These 
divergent phenomena generate a wide range of academic and popular debates and 
research in the EU Member States and give rise to a spectrum of different labour 
market and welfare policies aimed at immigrant and ethnic minorities.
With the free mobility of the European workforce it is possible that the all-
European labour market will become uniformly segmented, as has already been 
described by theorists of primary and secondary labour markets, while national 
borders and policies lose importance. It is possible that knowledge immigrants 
will constitute a new European segment of high-quality professionals, while the 
problems of those at risk of labour market marginality will principally remain at 
the level of national social policies. 
Research shows that immigrants and ethnic minorities face a higher degree of 
labour market flexibility than native workforce. Thus, we may pose the following 
questions: what is the position of immigrants and ethnic minorities in terms 
of flexicurity? Does immigrant or ethnic minority status mean flexibility in the 
labour market without the corresponding security? We have addressed this issue to 
various degrees in the above articles, without finding a conclusive answer. It is not 
in the interests of the EU Member States to let labour market and social exclusion 
of immigrant and ethnic miorities grow.
In relation to this, we hypothesize that increasing flexibility in the labour market 
has a greater impact on family structures and gender relationships of immigrants 
and ethnic minorities than on those of native populations. What are the key 
problems of interaction between work and family among immigrants and ethnic 
minorities? Are theu different or more pronounced than in the basic population? 
Why do so many immigrant women stay out of labour market? Do welfare state 
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solutions work equally on behalf of all immigrant and ethnic groups and what has 
been done for the most vulnerable groups? Family life and participation in paid 
work are strongly influenced by cultural factors.
Unemployment rates among immigrants and ethnic minorities tend to be 
higher than among native workers. However, for Spain this has not been true 
until the present financial crisis – why? Is there a different selection process into 
immigration to Spain than other countries or will the unemployment rate for 
immigrants in Spain rise in the coming years to the above-average level that is 
typical of other EU countries? Or does the Spanish labour market have specific 
characteristics that favour the incorporation of immigrant workers? Additional 
research would be here needed.
As a result of growing shares of immigrants in many EU countries, who 
predominantly occupy low-skilled industry and service jobs, with corresponding 
implications to their subsistence, do labour market policies in Europe tend to focus 
more on quantitative than on qualitative aspects of employment, for instance in the 
active labour market policies and other job creation? Is there a relation between 
the characteristics of labour market participation of immigrants (high flexibility, 
high rate of low-skilled jobs) and the incidence of working poor in society, and if 
yes, for which immigrant groups this is true? Can the situation of ethnic minorities 
be analyzed in similar terms, or should we already initially make a distinction 
between types of immigrants? Do the cohorts of immigrants and ethnic minorities 
increase among Europe’s working poor? Hence, can we detect an ‘ethnification’ of 
the working poor phenomenon in the EU member States? 
We see that special attention must be paid to jobs created by public funding, 
the quality of these jobs and their capacity to channel employees further into the 
open competitive labour market. Together with education and training, these jobs 
constitute an important means of integration for immigrants. The integration 
schemes of different member States of the EU should be comparatively studied 
in order to identify transferable good practices in these schemes. A special focus 
should be on the role of teaching the language and cultural skills of the host 
country: it has been stated that language skills are the key into the new society. 
The project work financed by the European Social Fund has already contributed to 
a certain extent to the consolidation and transfer of good practice across various 
European countries. 
We would also wish to plead for more cultural studies of immigration and 
immigrant life in the context of European research programmes. Such issues as 
informal employment or working poor are not only relevant in relation to tax 
base or targeting social assistance: they may be based voluntary or involuntary 
choices, defining life chances not only to the persons and families in question but 
to generations. Immigrants’ problems deserve multidisciplinary attention. For 
policy-making, it is useful to address labour market and social issues also in a 
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wider context: this is pointed out, for instance, in some of our articles describing 
the importance of regional policies for successful integration. 
Labour mobility in the European Union and the immigration from non-EU 
countries will undoubtedly create a new tension: while labour markets become 
unified, cultural segmentation may prevail and even increase. Integration as the 
optimal goal of the acculturation process, in which both the host society and 
immigrant communities take part, is not an ideal everybody in society agrees 
with – people may also champion full assimilation of immigrants or the cultural 
segregation of native and migrant communities. These theoretical classifications 
bear wide practical implications.
98 Immigrants and Ethnic MinoritiesTHL – Report 41/2010
References
Accenture (2007): Kotouttamisen vaikuttavuus 
ja mittaaminen -projekti. Loppuraportti 
työministeriölle 16.3.2007. 
Akhlaq, A (2005): Getting a Job in Finland. 
The Social Networks of Immigrants 
from the Indian Subcontinent in the 
Helsinki Metropolitan Labour Market. 
University of Helsinki, Department of 
Sociology, Research Reports No. 247. 
Helsinki: Helsinki University Press.
Ala-Kauhaluoma, M., Keskitalo E, Lindqvist 
T & Parpo A (2004): Työttömien 
aktivointi. Kuntouttava työtoiminta 
-lain sisältö ja vaikuttavuus. Research 
Reports 141. Helsinki: STAKES. 
Anhöriginvandrare och deras familjer (2008): 
Demografiska rapporter 2008: 3. Stock-
holm: Statistiska centralbyrån.
Arango, J. & R. Sandell (2004): Inmigración: 
Prioridades para una nueva política 
española. Madrid: Fundación Real Instituto 
Elcano de Estudios Internacionales y 
Estratégicos.
Babusik, F (2004): A szegénység csapdájában 
[In the poverty trap], Research Report, 
available on: www.delphoi.hu.
Babusik, F. (2006): Foglalkoztatási 
egyenlőtlenségek a munkaerő-piacon: a 
romák foglalkoztatási diszkriminációja 
[Employment inequalities on the Labour 
Market. Labour market discrimination 
of Roma], Delphoi Consulting, 
Budapest, available on:  www.delphoi.
hu.
Bădescu, G. and Grigoraş, V. and Rughiniş, 
C. and Voicu, M. and Voicu, O. (2007): 
Barometrul Incluziunii Romilor [Roma 
Inclusion Barometer], Open Society 
Foundation –   Romania, http://www.
osf.ro/en/publicatii.php
Baldwin-Edwards, M & Kraler A (2009): 
REGINE. Regularisations in Europe. 
Study on practices in the area of 
regulatisation of illegally staying third-
country nationals in the Member States 
of the EU. Vienna: International Centre 
for Migration Policy Development. 
Bárány, Z. (2002): The East European Gypsies: 
Regime Change, Marginality and 
Ethnopolitics. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.
Bask, M (2005): “Welfare problems and 
social exclusion among immigrants in 
Sweden.” European Sociological Review 
21, 73-89.
Békési Á. (2003): Muzsikusok [Musicians], 
Pont Kiadó, Budapest.
Bernát, A. (2006): “A magyarországi 
cigányság helyzete közép-kelet-európai 
összehasonlításban” [The situation of 
Hungarian Roma in comparison with 
other countries in CEE], in Kolosi, Tóth, 
Vukovich (eds.), Társadalmi Report 
2006. Budapest: TÁRKI.
Berry, J. (1997): “Immigration, acculturation 
and adaptation”, Applied Psychology: An 
International Review 46 (1), 5-68.
Bitu, N. (1999): Situation of Roma/Gypsy 
Women in Europe, OSI &Romani 
CRISS, Bucharest, available on: http://
cps.ceu.hu/romapolicyfellowship_
resources.php?cmssessid=Tf1b5871684
44c140a50c9a.
Blom, S. (2008a): “Background from country 
of origin”. In Blom S. & Henriksen K., 
eds. (2008) Living Conditions Among 
Immigrants in Norway 2005/2006, 27-
33. Oslo: Statistics Norway.
Blom, S. (2008b): “Family in Norway”. In 
Blom S. & Henriksen K, eds. (2008) 
Living Conditions Among Immigrants 
in Norway 2005/2006, 48-60. Oslo: 
Statistics Norway.
Blom, S. (1998): Levekår blant ikke-vestlike 
innvandrere I Norge. Rapporter 16. 
Statistisk sentralbyrå: Oslo. 
Blom, S. (2008): “Non-response, generation 
and length or residence”. In Blom S. 
& Henriksen K., eds. (2008): Living 
Conditions Among Immigrants in 
Norway 2005/2006, 21-26. Oslo: 
Statistics Norway.
Bodrogi B., Iványi, K (2004): Esélytelenül. 
Faji alapú megkülönböztetés a 
munkaerőpiacon [Without chances. 
Racial discrimination on the labour 
market], NEKI – Másság Alapítvány, 
Budapest (Legal Defence Bureau for 
National and Ethnic Minorities and 
Otherness Foundation), available 
on:  http://www.neki.hu/kiadvanyok/
without_chance.htm.
Cachón Rodríguez, L. (1997): “Segregación 
sectorial de los inmigrantes en el 
Mercado de trabajo en España”, 
Cuadernos de Relaciones Laborales, nº 
10. Madrid: Serv. Publ. UCM.
Calderón Milán, Mª J. & A. Hidalgo Vega 
(2007): “La segregación sectorial y 
ocupacional de los inmigrantes en 
España: identificación de los espacios 
laborales prioritarios por países de 
References
99THL – Report 41/2010Immigrants and Ethnic Minorities
origen”, paper presented at VII Jornadas 
de la Asociación Española de Economía 
Laboral, Gran Canaria, 12-13 July, 
2007. http://www.congresos.ulpgc.es/
aeet_aede/Descargas/Sesion3Sala2/
Calderon-Hidalgo.pdf
Carrasco Carpio, C. (2008): “Mercado de 
trabajo e inmigración”, paper for the VI 
Informe sobre exclusión y desarrollo 
social en España.  Fundación FOESSA.
Castelló Roselló, V. (2005): “Inmigración y 
mercado laboral”, Cinco Días, 14 June, 
2005.
CES (2004): La inmigración y el mercado 
de trabajo en España, Informe 2/2004. 
Madrid: Consejo Económico y Social.
Colectivo Ioé (2000): “Discriminación de los 
inmigrantes en el trabajo”, Sociedad y 
Utopía, Nº 16, pp. 91-102. 
Colectivo Ioé (2002): Inmigración, escuela 
y mercado de trabajo. Una radiografía 
actualizada. Fundación “la Caixa”, 
Colección Estudios Sociales, núm. 11. 
COM (2003) 336 final: “Communication 
from the Commission to the Council, 
the European Parliament, the European 
Economic and Social Committee 
and the Committee of the Regions 
– on immigration, integration and 
employment”; Brussels, Commission of 
the European Communities. URL: http://
ec.europa.eu/justice_home/funding/ 
2004_2007/doc/com_2003_336_final.
pdf. 
Csongor A., Lukács G., O’Higgins, N. 
(2003): Labour Market Programmes 
for the Roma in Hungary, Hungarian 
Foundation for Self–Reliance, ILO, 
UNDP, available on: http://www.ilo.org/
public/english/region/eurpro/budapest/
download/roma_labour_market.pdf.
Daugstad, G., ed. (..): Fakta om invandrere og 
deres etterkommere 2007. Hva tallene 
kan fortelle. Oslo: Statistisk sentralbyrå.
Dayton-Johnson, J., Katseli L T, Maniatis 
G, Münz & Papademetriou (2007) 
Gaining from Migration: Towards a 
New Mobility System. Paris: OECD 
Development Centre.
Dercon, S., ed. (2008): Insurance Against 
Poverty. UNU-WIDER Studies in 
Development Economics. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press.
Dietz, B. (2000): “German and Jewish 
migration from the former Soviet Union 
to Germany: Background trends and 
implications”. Journal of Ethnic and 
Migration Studies 26 (4), 635-652.
Dölvik, J.E. & Eldring, L. (2008): 
Arbeidsmobilitiet fra de nye EU-
landene til Norden - utviklingstrekk 
og konsekvenser. TemaNord 2008: 502. 
Köbenhavn: Nordisk Ministerråd.
Domingo, A. & R. Houle (2005): “The 
Economic Activity of Immigrants in 
Spain: Between Complementarity and 
Exclusion”, Paper presented at the IUSSP 
Conference, Tours, France. (Draft, not to 
be cited)
Durst, J (2003): Innen az ember jobb, ha meg 
is szabadul – Megélhetési stratégiák 
egy kisfalusi cigány közösségben [It is 
better to escape from here – subsistence 
strategies in a rural gypsy community].
Enyedi, Z., Fábián, Z., Sik E. (2004): “Nőttek-e 
az előítéletek Magyarországon?” [Has 
prejudice increased in Hungary?], in 
Társadalmi Riport. Budapest: TÁRKI.
ERRC (2007): The glass box. Exclusion 
of Roma from employment, ERRC, 
Budapest.
Esping-Andersen, G. (1998): The Three Worlds 
of Welfare Capitalism. Sunderland: Polity 
Press.
Ethnobarometer (2004): Ethnic mobility in 
Romania, Ethnobarometer, Rome (retrieved 
from http://www.ethnobarometer.org).
European Commission (2008): Green Paper 
on the European Workforce for Health. 
Brussels 10.12.2008 COM(2008) 725 
final. 
European Roma Right Center (1997): Time 
of the Skinheads. Denial and Exclusion 
of Roma in Slovakia. ERRC Country 
Report Series, No. 3.
Fiáth, T. (2000): A magyarországi roma 
népesség általános iskolai oktatása, 
Delphoi Consulting, Budapest, available 
on:  http://www.delphoi.hu/download-
pdf/roma-oktat-monogr.pdf.
(Finnish) Government Programme for 
Immigration (2006). Publications of the 
(Finnish) Employment Administration 
371. Available from www.intermin.fi/. In 
Finnish, Swedish and English. 
(Finnish) Government Report to the 
Parliament on the Implementation of 
the Integration Legislation (2008). Vns 
4/ 2008. Available on www.eduskunta.
fi/. In Finnish.
(Finnish) Ministry of the Interior (2008): 
Työvoiman maahanmuuton edistämisen 
yhteistyömuodot lähtömaiden kanssa. 
References
100 Immigrants and Ethnic MinoritiesTHL – Report 41/2010
Helsinki: Publications of the Ministry of 
Interior 31/ 2008. 
Fleck, G., Messing, V., Mike K. (2005): Roma 
foglalkoztatási programok értékelése. 
[Evaluation of Rom Employment 
Programmes], Budapest: TÁRKI, 
Working Paper. 
Fleck, G. and Messing, V. (2010). 
Transformations of Roma Employment 
Policies. In (Fazekas, Lovász, Telegdy 
(ed.): The Hungarian Labour Market – 
Review and Analysis 2010. Budapest, 
MTA KTI
http://econ.core.hu/file/download/mt2010_
eng/discrimination.pdf
Fleck, G. and Rughinis, C. (Eds.) (2008): 
Come Closer. Inclusion and Exclusion 
of Roma in Present-Day Romanian 
Society. Human Dynamics, Bucharest.
Forsander, A (2002): Luottamuksen 
ehdot. Maahanmuuttajat 1990-luvun 
suomalaisilla työmarkkinoilla. Helsinki: 
Finnish Association of Population and 
(Finnish) Population Research Institute 
D 39. 
Gadd, M (2005): Cardiovascular diseases 
in immigrants in Sweden. Karolinska 
University Press: Stockholm. 
Gallup Hungary (2003): Formation of anti-
Semite and anti-Roma attitudes in the 
Hungarian society in the last 10 years, 
available on: http://www.gallup.hu/
Gallup/release/eloitelet030919.htm
García-Espejo, I. & M. Ibáñez (2006): 
“Educational-skill matches and labour 
achievements among graduates in 
Spain”, European Sociological Review, 
vol. 22, nº. 2, pp. 141-156.
Gissler, M., Malin M., Matveinen P. (2006): 
”Terveydenhuollon palvelut ja 
sosiaalihuollon laitospalvelut”. In Gissler 
M., Malin M., Matveinen P., Sarvimäki 
M. & Kangasharju A. Maahanmuuttajat 
ja julkiset palvelut, 1-98. Studies in 
Employment Policy 296. Helsinki: 
Ministry of Labour. 
Gödri, I., Tóth, P. P. (2005): Bevándorás 
és beilleszkedés [Immigration and 
integration]. Budapest: KSH NKI.
Guy, W. (2001): “The Czech Lands and 
Slovakia: Another False Dawn”, in Guy, 
W., ed., Between Past and Future: The 
Roma of Central and Eastern Europe, 
2001, University of Hereford Press, pp. 
295-323. 
Haberfeld Y., Semyonov, M., Cohen Y. 
(2000): “Ethnicity and labour market 
performance among recent immigrants 
from the former Soviet Union to Israel”. 
European Sociological Review 16 (3), 
287-299.
Hablicsek, L. (2000): “Kísérlet a roma népesség 
előreszámítására 2050-ig.” [An attempt 
of estimating the number of Roma 
population by 2050], in: Cigánynak 
születni. Budapest: ATA. 
Hablicsek, L. and Tóth, P.P. (2000): “A 
nemzetközi vándorlás szerepe a 
magyarorszá-gi népesség számának 
megőrzésében 1999–2050 között”, 
Demográfia, 43: 11–46.
Hajduk, Annamária (2008): Esély vagy 
veszély? Bevándorlás Magyarországra. 
[Opportunity or danger. Immigration to 
Hungary.] DEMOSZ, Budapest
Halkos G. & Salamouris D. (2003): “Socio-
economic integration of ethnic Greeks 
from the former USSR: Obstacles to 
entry into the Greek labour market”. 
Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 
29 (3), 519-534.
Hárs Á. (1995): “Migration and the Labour 
Market”, in Fullerton M., Sik E., Tóth J., 
eds., Refugees and Migrants: Hungary 
at a Crossroads. Budapest: Institute 
for Political Science of the Hungarian 
Academy of Sciences.
Hárs, Ágnes – Sik Endre, eds. (1999): 
Átmenetek.
Hárs, Á., Simonovits, B., Sik, E. (2004): 
“Munkaerőpiac és migráció: fenyegetés 
vagy lehetőség?” [Labour market and 
migration: an opportunity or a threat?], 
in Társadalmi Riport. Budapest: TÁRKI.
Havas, G., Kemény, I., Liskó,I. (2002): Cigány 
gyerekek az általános iskolában. [Gypsy 
children in the primary school], OKI-Új 
Mandátum, Budapest.
Heikkilä E. & Pikkarainen M. (2008): Väestön 
ja työvoiman kansainvälistyminen 
nyt ja tulevaisuudessa. Siirtolaisuus-
tutkimuksia A 30. Turku: Institute of 
Migration. 
Henriksen K. (2008):  “Education”. In Blom S. 
& Henriksen K., eds., Living Conditions 
Among Immigrants in Norway 2005/ 
2006, 74-78. Oslo: Statistics Norway.
Herm, A. (2008): “Recent migration trends: 
citizens of EU-27 Member States become 
ever more mobile while EU remains 
attractive to non-EU citizens”, Eurostat, 
Population and social conditions, 
98/2008. 
References
101THL – Report 41/2010Immigrants and Ethnic Minorities
Hjern A.,Haglund B., Persson G. & Rosen 
M. (2001): “Is there equity in access to 
health services for ethnic minorities in 
Sweden?” European Journal of Public 
Health 11, 2, 147-152.
Innvandrere i Norge. http://no.wikipedia.org/
wiki/Innvandrere_i_Norge. 22.3.2009. 
Integration - en beskrivning av läget i Sverige. 
Integration: Rapport 1. Statistiska 
centralbyrån: Stockholm
Integration och etnisk diskriminiering 
i arbetslivet. En utmaning för 
fackföreningsrörelsen in Norden 
(2006). Council of Nordic Trade Unions 
26.8.2006. 
Integrationsbarometer 2007. Integrationsverkets 
rapportserie 2007: 4. Integrationsverket: 
Norrköping. 
Invandrare i Sverige. http://se.wikipedia.org/
wiki(Invandrare_i_Sverige. 22.3.2009.
Invandrares flyttmönster (2008): Demografiska 
rapporter 2008: 4. Stockholm: Statistiska 
centralbyrån. 
Izquierdo Escribano, A. (2008): “El modelo de 
inmigración y los riesgos de exclusión”, 
en VI Informe sobre exclusión y 
desarrollo social en España, 2008. 
Fundación FOESSA.
Izquierdo Escribano, A. & S. León (2008): “La 
inmigración hacia dentro: argumentos 
sobre la necesidad de la coordinación 
de las políticas de inmigración en un 
Estado multinivel”, Política y Sociedad, 
Vol. 45, Núm. 1: 11-39. 
Jaakkola, M (2009): Maahanmuuttajat 
suomalaisesta näkökulmasta. Asenne-
muutokset 1987-2007. Helsinki: City of 
Helsinki, Urban Facts Research Series 1/ 
2009.
Járóka, L. (2006): Report on the situation of 
Roma women in the European Union. 
European Parliament, Committee 
on Women’s Right and Gender 
Equality, available on: http://www.
soros.org/initiatives/women/news/
landmark_20060602/EP_resolution.pdf.
Jasinskaja-Lahti, I., Liebkind K. & Vesala T. 
(2003): Rasismi ja syrjintä Suomessa. 
Gaudeamus: Helsinki. 
Johansson, E. (2008): Does Finland suffer 
from brain drain? Discussion Papers No. 
1153. Helsinki: The Research Institute of 
the Finnish Economy.
Jääskeläinen, A. (2003): “Intermarriage and 
segmented integration into Finnish 
society: Immigrant women from the 
former Soviet Union”. Yearbook of 
Population Research in Finland 39, 
Helsinki: The Population Research 
Institute, 33-54. 
Kállai, E. (2000): “Roma vállalkozók 1998-
ban” [Roma enterprenuers in 1998], 
in Kemény (ed) A romák/cigányok és 
a láthatatlan gazdaság [The Roma / 
Gypsies and the unvisible economy].
Katseli, L.T., Lucas R.E.B. & Xenogiani T. 
(2006): Effects of Migration on Sending 
Countries: What Do We Know? Paris: 
OECD Development Centre.
Kemény, I., Janky, B., Lengyel, G. (2004): 
A magyarországi cigányság 1971-
2003 [The Hungarian Gypsies 1971 - 
2003], Gondolat – MTAKI, Budapest, 
available on: http://www.mtaki.hu/
kiadvanyok/kemeny_janky_lengyel_
moi_ciganysag_main.html
Kemény István (ed.) (2000): A romák/cigányok 
és a láthatatlan gazdaság [The Roma/
Gypsy and the invisible economy], 
Osiris - MTA Kisebbségkutató Muhely.
Kende, A. (2005): “Értelmiségiként leszek roma 
és romaként leszek értelmiségi” Vizsgálat 
roma egyetemisták életútjáról [“I will be 
an intellectual as a Roma and a Roma 
as an intellectual” A study on the life-
history of Romani university students], 
in Neményi–Szalai, eds., Kisebbségek 
kisebbsége [Minority of minorities], 
Új Mandátum Publ., Budapest, 
available on: http://romaweb.hu/doc/
konyvtar/egyeb/kendeanna_vizsgalat_
romaegyetemistak_eletutjarol.pdf
Kertesi Gábor – Kézdi Gábor (2000): A cigány 
népesség Magyarországon. [Gypsy 
population in Hungary] Socio-typo, 
Budapest. 
Kertesi G., Kézdi G. (2006): Expected long-
term budgetary benefits to Roma 
education in Hungary,  Department of 
Human Resources, Budapest University 
of Economics; Institute of Economics 
Hungarian Academy of Sciences, 
available on: http://www.econ.core.hu/
doc/bwp/bwp/bwp0605.pdf
Kertesi, G. (2004): Budapest Working Papers 
on the Labour Market; The Employment 
of the Roma.  Evidence from Hungary, 
Institute of Economics of the Hungarian 
Academy of Sciences, Budapest, pp. 13-
45. 
Kertesi, G. (2000): “Cigány foglalkoztatás 
és munkanélküliség a rendszerváltás 
elott és után” [Roma employment and 
unemployment before and after the 
References
102 Immigrants and Ethnic MinoritiesTHL – Report 41/2010
transition], in Cigánynak születni, Bp., 
ATA. 
Kertesi, G. (2005): “Roma foglalkoztatás 
az ezredfordulón. A rendszerváltás 
maradandó sokkja” [The employment of 
the Roma in the end of the 20th century. 
The remaining shock of the transition], 
in  Szociológiai Szemle (Review of 
Sociology), 2005/2. 
Kertesi, G. (2005): A társadalom peremén. 
Romák a munkaerőpiacon és az 
iskolában [On the brinks of the society. 
Roma on the labour market and at 
school], Osiris, Budapest.
Klinthäl, M. (2007): Ethnic background, 
labour market attachment and severe 
morbidity. Working Papers in Social 
Insurance 2007:1. Swedish Social 
Insurance Agency: Stockholm. 
Kóczé, A. (2003): Double Discrimination 
Faced by Romani Women in Europe, 
available on: http://www.penelopes.org/
Anglais/xarticle.php3?id_article=713. 
Korkiasaari, J. & Söderling, I. (2007): 
“Muuttoliike”. Koskinen S, Martelin 
T, Notkola I-L, Notkola V, Pitkänen K, 
Jalovaara M, Mäenpää E, Ruokolainen 
A, Ryynänen M & Söderling I., eds. 
Suomen väestö, 239-270. Helsinki: 
Gaudeamus & Helsinki University Press. 
Kusá, Z. and Dráľ, P. and Kostlán, P. (2008a): 
“Ethnic Relations in Slovakia.” Institute 
for Sociology Slovak Academy of 
Sciences (manuscript) .
Kusá, Z. and Dráľ, P. and Kostlán, P. (2008b): 
“Education in Slovakia” (manuscript). 
(2008): Education in Slovakia. Institute for 
Sociology Slovak Academy of Sciences 
(manuscript). 
Lakatos E. (2000): “Akik lemennek az üzletért 
a világ végére” [Those who travel for 
business till the end of the world] in 
Kemény, ed., A romák/cigányok és 
a láthatatlan gazdaság. [The Roma / 
Gypsies and the unvisible economy]
Lange A. (1999): Invandrare och diskriminering 
IV. En enkät- och intervjuundersökning 
om etnisk diskriminering på uppdrag 
av Diskrimineringsombudsmannen. 
CEIFOs skriftserie 79. Edsbruk: 
Akademitryck.
Laparra Navarro, M. & A. Martínez de 
Lizarrondo Artola (2008): “Las políticas 
de integración social de inmigrantes en 
España”, paper for the VI Informe sobre 
exclusión y desarrollo social en España. 
Fundación FOESSA.
Lepola O. & Villa S. eds. (2007): Syrjintä 
Suomessa 2006. Helsinki: Finnish 
League of Human Rights. 
Liebkind K. (2001): “Acculturation”. In Brown 
R & Gaertner S., eds., Intergroup 
Processes. Blackwell Handbook of Social 
Psychology. Oxford: Blackwell, 386-406. 
Liebkind K., Mannila S., Jasinskaja-Lahti I., 
Jaakkola M., Kyntäjä E., Reuter A. (2004): 
Venäläinen, virolainen, suomalainen 
- kolmen maahanmuuttajaryhmän 
kotoutuminen Suomeen. Helsinki: 
Gaudeamus. 
Lukács, G. (2005): “Roma munkaerőpiaci 
programok és környezetük” [Roma 
labour market programmes and their 
environment],  in Neményi, Szalai (eds.), 
Kisebbségek kisebbsége. Budapest: Új 
Mandátum Publ.. 
Maahanmuuttajat Suomessa. http://
fi.wikipedia.org/wiki/Maahanmuutta-
jat_Suomessa. 23.3.2009.
Magyari, N. and Mark, L. and Harbula, 
H. and Magyari-Vincze, E. (2008a): 
“Country Report on Ethnic Relations” 
(Manuscript)  
(2008b): Report on Ethnic Minority Education 
and the Related Education Policies. 
Malmberg-Heimonen I. (2008): Ethnic 
minority and Roma women in Norway. 
Country Report for the Expert Group 
on Gender and Social Inclusion. Oslo 
University College. 
Mannila, S. (2008): “Maahanmuuttajat - 
terveitä vai sairaita?” Suomen lääkäri-
lehti 32, 2509-2513.
Manpower (2008): ”El mercado de empleo en 
España aumenta su cualificación en los 
últimos doce años”. URL: 
 http://129.35.74.13/Img/83AC7F3999A
B4E8E9A186137A0D48EF7.pdf 
Manpower (2009): “Índice laboral. Crisis 
económica y desempleo: algunos rasgos 
del aumento del paro en la etapa actual”. 
Volumen 33, Enero 2009. URL: 
 http://129.35.74.13/Img/3EADAE755A
BA4E6F9786D25E5792CC65.pdf 
Martikainen T. & Tiilikainen M., eds. (2007): 
Maahanmuuttajanaiset: kotoutuminen, 
perhe ja työ. Publications of the 
(Finnish) Population Research Institute 
D 46. Helsinki: Finnish Association 
of Population & (Finnish) Population 
Research Institute.  
Martínez Veiga, U. (1997): La integración 
social de los inmigrantes extranjeros 
References
103THL – Report 41/2010Immigrants and Ethnic Minorities
en España. Madrid: Trotta. ISBN: 
8481641243. ISBN-13: 9788481641240
Martínez Veiga, U. (2003): “Pobreza absoluta e 
inmigración irregular: la experiencia de 
los inmigrantes sin papeles en España”, 
Papeles de economía española, ISSN 
0210-9107, Nº 98, (Ejemplar dedicado a: 
Inmigración en España), pags. 214-224.
Martínez Veiga, U. (2004): Trabajadores 
invisibles: precariedad, rotación y 
pobreza de la inmigración en España. 
Madrid. ISBN: 9788483191958.
Mathisen B. (2008): “Work”. In Blom S. 
& Henriksen K., eds. (2008): Living 
Conditions Among Immigrants in 
Norway 2005/2006, 79-85. Oslo: 
Statistics Norway.
Matlack, C. (2007): “How Spain Thrives on 
Immigration”, BusinessWeek, 9 May, 
2007.
Messing, V. (2006): “Lyukakból szőtt 
háló: háztartások közötti támogató 
kapcsolatok roma és nem roma 
szegények körében” [A net made out of 
holes: supporting household networks of 
Roma and non-Roma poor], Szociológia 
Szemle 2006/2 National Census, KSH 
(Central Statistical Office), available on: 
http://www.nepszamlalas.hu/hun/kotetek/04/
tabhun/tabl05/load05.html
Mészáros, M. (2008): “Az állami 
paternalizmustól az egyéni felelősség felé – 
Szegénység, jövedelmi egyenlőtlenségek, 
munkapiaci kirekesztés, jóléti transzferek 
Szlovákiában”, in Törzsök, E. and Paskó, 
I. and Zolnay, J. (2008), Cigánynak 
lenni Magyraországon, Jel Jentés 2007. 
A gyűlölet célkeresztjében. Budapest: 
EÖKIK.  
Mikkelsen F. (2001): Integrationens paradox. 
Invandrere og flyktinge I Danmark 
mellem inclusion og marginalisering. 
Catinet: Köbenhavn.
Münz R. (2008): “Ageing and migratory 
flows: East-West and East-East. Paper”, 
presented in “Reinventing Retirement: 
Reshaping Health & Financial Security 
for the EU 27 and Eastern Europe”, 
Dürnstein 23 October 2008. 
National Strategy Report on Social Protection 
and Social Inclusion 2008-2010. The 
Republic of Slovakia.
Neményi, M., Szalai, J. (ed.) (2005): Kisebbségek 
kisebbsége. A magyarországi cigányok 
emberi és politikai jogai. [Minority of 
minorities. Political and human rights 
of the Gypsies in Hungary] Budapest, Új 
Mandátum Kiadó.
Neményi, M., (2007): Serdülő roma gyerekek 
identitás-stratégiái [Identity strategies 
of Roma adolescents], in: Education 
2007/1.
Observatorio de Demografía y Mercado 
Laboral (2007): “La Inmigración en el 
Mercado Laboral Español”. Boletín nº 
3, Madrid, marzo de 2007. URL. www.
peoplematters.es. 
OECD (2008a): International Migration 
Outlook. Annual Report 2008 Edition. 
Paris: SOPEMI. 
OECD (2008b): The Looming Crisis in the 
Health Workforce. How Can OECD 
Countries Respond? Paris.
O’Higgins, N. – Ivanov, A. (2006): “Education 
and Employment Opportunities for the 
Roma”, Comparative Economic Studies 
2006, 48 (6-19). 
Olika villkor - olika hälsa. En studie bland 
invandrare från Chile, Iran, Polen 
och Turkiet (2000). Invandrares 
levnadsvillkor 4. SoS-rapport 3. 
Socialstyrelsen: Stockholm. 
OSI (2006): Brief assessment of Romania’s 
compliance with some critical EU 
Requirements. Budapest.
Östby L. (2002): Lowest mortality among first 
generation immigrants. Demography of 
the immigrant population in Norway. 
Oslo: Statistisk sentralbyrå. 
Österberg T. & Gustafsson B. (2006): 
“Disability pension among immigrants 
in Sweden”. Social Science and Medicine 
63, 805-816.
Paananen, S., ed. (2005): Maahanmuuttajien 
elämää Suomessa. Helsinki: Statistics 
Finland. 
Pérez Infante, J.I. (2007): ”Inmigración y 
mercado de trabajo”, Cinco Días, 20 
April, 2007.
Pimentel, M. (2006): «Impacto de la 
inmigración en el mercado local», Cinco 
Días, 12 January, 2006.
Pohjanpää K, Paananen S & Nieminen M 
(2002) Maahanmuuttajien elinolot. 
Venäläisten, virolaisten, somalialaisten 
ja vietnamilaisten elämää Suomessa 
2002. Elinolot 2003: 1. Helsinki: 
Statistics Finland.
Prieto, J. (2009): “Ya somos 46 millones”, El 
País – Domingo, 4 January, 2009.
Rechel B., Dubois C-A. & McKee, eds. 
(2006): The Health Care Workforce in 
Europe. Learning from Experience. 
References
104 Immigrants and Ethnic MinoritiesTHL – Report 41/2010
Copenhagen: European Observatory on 
Health Systems and Policies & WHO.
Rédei, M (2006): Magyarországot érintő 
nemzetközi migráció. Budapest: KBH 
Kiadó; 178.
Ringold, D., Mitchell A. Orenstein and Erika 
Wilkens (2003): A World Bank Study: 
Roma in an Expanding Europe Breaking 
the Poverty Cycle, The International 
Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development/The World Bank. 2003, 
Ringold, D. (2000): Roma and the Transition 
in Central and Eastern: Europe: Trends 
and Challenges, The International Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development/
The World Bank, Washington.
Sacristán Romero, F. (2005): “Evolución de 
las políticas activas de empleo para 
inmigrantes en España”, Revista de 
Historia Regional 10(2): 109-128. 
Sandell, R. (2005): “La inmigración en 
España: ¿problema u oportunidad?”, 
ARI Nº 13/2005. Madrid: Fundación 
Real Instituto Elcano de Estudios 
Internacionales y Estratégicos.  
Sandu, D. (2005): Dezvoltare Comunitară: 
Cercetare, practică, ideologie, Bucharest, 
Polirom.
Scheffer, P. (2000): “Het multiculturele drama”, 
NRC, 20 January 2000.
Scheffer, P. (2008): Het land van aankomst. 
Amsterdam: De Bezige Bij.
Serra, A. (2005): “Spain”, in Jan Niessen, 
Yongmi Schibel & Cressida Thompson, 
eds., Current Immigration Debates 
in Europe. (with the assistance of Pau 
Mas and Alicia Xalabarder and the 
collaboration of Gemma Pinyol)
Simón, H., E. Sanromá & R. Ramos (2007): 
“Segregación laboral y estructuras 
salariales de nativos e inmigrantes 
en España. Un análisis con datos 
emparejados empresa-trabajador”. 
Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones 
Económicas, S.A. (Ivie) in the series 
Working Papers. Series EC, nº 2007-03. 
URL. http://www.ivie.es/downloads/
docs/wpasec/wpasec-2007-03.pdf. 
Social och ekonomisk förankring bland 
invandrare från Chile, Polen och Turkiet 
(1999). Invandrares levnadsvillkor 
2. SoS-rapport 9. Socialstyrelsen: 
Stockholm. 
Sociographic mapping of Roma Communities 
in Slovakia (2004). Office of the 
Plenipotentiary of Roma Communities 
in Slovakia
Statistics Finland (2006): Foreigners and 
Immigration 2006. Finnish Official 
Statistics SVT 2006: 8. Helsinki. 
Statistikrapport 2007 (2008). Uppdatering 
av aktuella siffror, relevanta nyckeltal 
och indikatorer om integration. 
Integrationsverket: Norrköping. 
Stewart, M. (1997): The Time of the Gypsies. 
Studies in the Ethnographic Imagination, 
Westview Press.
Strategic National Report Regarding Social 
Protection and Social Inclusion (2008 – 
2010)
Syed H., Dalgard O., Hussain A., Dalen I. 
& Claussen B. (2006): “Inequalities in 
health: A comparative study between 
ethnic Norwegians and Pakistanis in 
Oslo, Norway”, International Journal for 
Equity in Health 29:5 (1), 7. 
Szalai, J. (2005): A Jóléti fogda [The welfare 
catch], Új Mandátum Kiadó.
Szelényi, I., Ladányi, J. (2006): Patterns of 
Exclusion: Constructing Gypsy Ethnicity 
and the Making of an Underclass in 
Transitional Societies of Europe. New 
York: Columbia University Press.
Szuhay, P. (2004): “Foglalkozási és 
megélhetési stratégiák a magyarországi 
cigányok körében” [Employment 
and subsistence strategies among 
Hungarian gypsies], in Ferenc Glatz, 
ed., A cigányok Magyarországon, MTA 
Társadalomkutató Központ, Budapest. 
Tardos Katalin (2005): “Az önkormányzati 
munkaerőpiac és a roma 
munkanélküliek” [Labour-market of 
the local authorities and the Roma 
unemployed.], in Neményi, Szalai (eds.): 
Kisebbségek kisebbsége, Új Mandátum 
Publ., Budapest. 
Tema invandrare (1991). Levnadsförhållanden. 
Rapport 69. Statistiska centralbyrån: 
Stockholm.
Thompson K. (2006): “Dårlig integrering av 
innvandrere koster Danmark 30-50 
milliarder årlig”. Horisont 2, 32-35.
Tóth, H. (2005): Roma Women’s 
Unemployment in Hungary, Centre 
for Policy Studies, CEU, available on: 
http://pdc.ceu.hu/archive/00002701/01/
HungaryRomaniWomenEP.pdf
Tronstad, K.R. (2008). In Blom S & Henriksen 
K., eds., Living Conditions Among 
Immigrants in Norway 2005/2006, 134-
143. Oslo: Statistics Norway.
Vaattovaara M. & Kortteinen M. (20003): 
“Beyond polarisation versus 
References
105THL – Report 41/2010Immigrants and Ethnic Minorities
professionalisation? A case study of the 
development of the Helsinki Region”. 
Urban Studies 40: 11, 2127-2145.
UNDP and ILO (2002): Avoiding the 
Dependency Trap. The Roma in Central 
and Eastern Europe. Geneva. Available 
on: http://roma.undp.sk/
UNDP and ILO (2005): Faces of Poverty, 
Faces of Hope. Geneva.
UNDP and ILO (2006): At Risk: Roma and the 
Displaced in Southeast Europe. Geneva.
UNDP and ILO (2006) Report on the Living 
Conditions of Roma Households in 
Slovakia. Geneva.http://www.statistics.
sk/webdata/english/census2001/tab/
tab3a.htm
Vaňo, B. (2001): “Demographic characteristic 
of Roma population in Slovak Republic” 
[Demografická charakteristika rómskej 
populácie v SR] Infostat. Inštitút 
informatiky  a  štatistiky. Výskumné 
demografické centrum. Bratislava. 
http://www.infostat.sk/vdc/pdf/rom.pdf
Vašecka, M. (2000): “Roma – The Greatest 
Challenge for Slovakia on its Way 
into the European Union.” Bratislava, 
Institute for Public Affairs.
WHO (2006): Working Together for Health. 
The World Health Report 2006. Geneva. 
World Bank (2000): “Roma and the Transition 
in Central and Eastern Europe.” 
World Bank(2002), “Poverty and Welfare 
of Roma in the Slovak Republic.” 
Washington
World Bank (2002): “Labor, Employment, and 
Social Policies in the EU. Enlargement 
Process Changing Perspectives and 
Policy Options.” Washington.
World Bank (2005): “Roma in an Expanding 
Europe: Breaking the Poverty Cycle.” 
Washington.
World Bank (2007): Romania. Poverty 
Monitoring Analytical and Advisory 
Assistance Program. First Phase Report, 
Fiscal Year 2007. Washington.
Zaman, C. and Stặnculescu, M. S (2007): The 
Social Dimension in Selected Candidate 
Countries in the Balkans: Country 
Report on Romania. European Network 
of Economic Policy Research Reports 
(retrieved from http://www.enepri.org).
